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THE LAW OF REPUTATION AND THE 
INTEREST OF THE AUDIENCE 
Laura A. Heymann* 
Abstract: Although an individual has control over many of the state-
ments, acts, and other biographical data points that are used to construct 
her reputation, she does not ultimately have control over the result of 
that reputational assessment, the pronouncement of which is a task re-
served to others. Reputation is fundamentally a social concept; it does not 
exist until a community collectively forms a judgment about an individual 
or firm that has the potential to guide the community’s future interac-
tions. Despite reputation’s relational nature, discussions of the law’s in-
terest in reputation tend to focus on one of two parties: the individual or 
firm holding the reputation and the defendant accused of having unlaw-
fully harmed that reputation. This framework leads to particular concep-
tions of the reputational interests, such as from a property or dignity per-
spective, and of the countervailing, often First Amendment–related, 
interests of the defendant. But the community that constructs one’s repu-
tation also has an interest in the soundness of a reputation’s foundation 
so that future uses of others’ reputations will be effective. A more com-
plete conception of reputation, therefore, should take such community 
interests into account. 
Introduction 
 When Shakespeare wrote in Othello, “Who steals my purse steals 
trash; ’tis something, nothing;/’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave 
to thousands;/But he that filches from me my good name/Robs me of 
that which not enriches him,/And makes me poor indeed,” he was ex-
 
* © 2011, Laura A. Heymann, Class of 2014 Professor of Law, College of William & 
Mary—Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Many thanks to Mark Badger, Margo Bagley, John 
Duffy, Brett Frischmann, H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Trotter Hardy, Allison Orr Larsen, 
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Joseph Liu, Paul Marcus, William McGeveran, Mark McKenna, Lisa 
Ramsey, Jessica Silbey, Talha Syed, William Van Alstyne, and Felix Wu, as well as the par-
ticipants at workshops at William & Mary, the Cardozo School of Law, and the University of 
Virginia, the 2010 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, and the 2011 Works in Pro-
gress Intellectual Property Conference for comments and suggestions. Thanks as well to 
Tyler Akagi, Brad Bartels, Kristen Brown, Mitchel Feffer, and William Versfelt for research 
assistance and to the staff of the Boston College Law Review for their hard work. 
1342 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1341 
pressing a universal sentiment: the importance of reputation.1 Shake-
speare’s equation of reputation to monetary wealth suggests a simple, 
property-based interest in reputation: it is something that is owned, can 
be stolen, and has a calculable value. Many legal and cultural discus-
sions of reputation reinforce this view, suggesting that one’s reputation 
is a matter predominantly of individual or corporate interest and there-
fore is something over which one can and should have control.2 
 But reputation is not property in a Lockean sense; rather, reputa-
tion is a social creation dependent on intergroup communication. Al-
though an individual or firm may have control over many of the state-
ments, acts, and other data points that form the basis of reputation, 
neither one ultimately has control over the result of that assessment, 
the pronouncement of which is a task reserved to others. At its core, 
then, reputation is the result of the collective act of judging another 
and the potential use of that result to direct future engagements.3 Al-
though an individual may suffer emotional harm and a corporation 
may lose profits as a result of reputational injury, these harms are de-
rivative. Injury to an individual’s or firm’s reputation causes harm pri-
marily because of the effect of that injury on such collective judgments, 
which may then result in other harms. 
 Various areas of the law are either designed to vindicate reputa-
tional harm or have been used by plaintiffs to do so. Defamation and 
product disparagement claims often involve the publication of false 
facts that are alleged to have injured the plaintiff’s reputation. Privacy 
law (such as the false light and misappropriation torts) and the right of 
publicity can involve misimpressions created as to another’s associa-
tions or affiliations, which can have reputational effects. False en-
dorsement claims seek remedies for the unauthorized implication that 
                                                                                                                      
1 William Shakespeare, Othello, act 3, sc. 3; see also Robert C. Post, The Social Foun-
dations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 691, 692 (1986) 
(noting the “obligatory reference to Shakespeare[]” that typically accompanies discussions 
of reputation). 
2 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 782, 801 (1986) (characterizing reputation as “one of the bundle of property rights 
and liberty that all individuals enjoy”). 
3 See, e.g., 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 2 (2011) (“Defamation is an impairment of 
a relational interest; it denigrates the opinion which others in the community have of the 
plaintiff and invades the plaintiff’s interest in his or her reputation and good name.”); 
David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of Defamation 
Law, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 261, 267–68 (2010) (encouraging greater attention to 
community and context in online defamation cases); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Pri-
vacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 551 (2006) (“[O]ne’s reputation is the product of the judg-
ment of other people in society.”). 
2011] The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience 1343 
one supports a product or service when one does not desire such asso-
ciation. Various aspects of trademark law target uses of a trademark that 
are said to have negative effects on a firm’s or brand’s reputation. Cop-
yright lawsuits can seek to redress not only economic harms but also 
the use of one’s creative material in a way that casts a shadow on the 
artist’s intent or affiliations. The common thread among all these vari-
ous causes of action, from the plaintiff’s view, is that the defendant has 
made an express or implied false statement that causes disruption to 
the plaintiff’s sense of identity or autonomy. But this interest is not 
equally reflected in each of these causes of action. As a result, we have 
areas of the law that have reputational harms as a core concern and 
largely focus on that interest (defamation and trademark infringe-
ment); areas of the law that are not designed to vindicate reputational 
harms but often are used in service of that goal (copyright law, right of 
publicity, and privacy law); and areas of the law that are supposed to be 
about reputation but upon closer inspection do not truly address repu-
tational interests (trademark dilution). 
 This state of affairs has resulted, in part, from a focus on the plain-
tiff’s interests. Scholars have offered various justifications for the law’s 
protection of reputation, including that it should be protected as a 
property interest; that it should be protected in order to preserve hu-
man dignity; and that it should be protected to vindicate society’s inter-
est in a hierarchal system of honor and prestige.4 While these explana-
tions are illuminating, each of them focuses on the law’s interest in 
reputation from the perspective of the holder of reputation, consistent 
with a civil litigation structure that assumes that plaintiffs are acting in 
their own interests. It might therefore not be surprising that plaintiffs 
who feel that they have suffered a reputational injury would seek to 
vindicate that harm through any available cause of action, whether or 
not that tort is meant to redress reputational harms. But reputation is 
of interest not only to the holder of reputation, for whatever economic 
or psychic benefits it can provide, but also, in a more limited way, to 
those who interact with the reputation holder, either for use as a form 
of warranty, to reduce search costs, or as a signaling device. Both repu-
tation holders and audiences have an interest in ensuring that one’s 
reputation—whether that of an individual or that of a firm or prod-
uct—is based on accurate information. To the extent, then, that we be-
lieve that the law provides too many avenues to redress reputational 
concerns, a more consistent incorporation of the social nature of repu-
                                                                                                                      
4 See infra notes 83–119 and accompanying text. 
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tation would help to cabin the expansiveness of plaintiffs’ efforts to 
vindicate reputational interests, limiting such claims to those in which 
the ability of the relevant social group to make accurate judgments 
about the plaintiff is likely to be hampered.5 
 Consideration of some of the various causes of action used to vin-
dicate reputation allows us to see where the interests of plaintiff and 
audience might conflict. For example, where the defendant’s activity 
consists of conveying a falsehood by impersonating or speaking on be-
half of the plaintiff, the audience’s interest in accurate information is 
largely aligned with the plaintiff’s interest in stopping such activity.6 A 
truthful communication that affects the plaintiff’s reputation, by con-
trast, may well cause an audience to think differently of the plaintiff, 
but it does not implicate audience interests to the same extent; indeed, 
it may well be consistent with audience autonomy, even if it frustrates 
the plaintiff’s autonomy by depriving the plaintiff of control over the 
timing or form of disclosure. Courts might therefore be more skeptical 
of claims by plaintiffs that seek to limit the dissemination of truthful 
information on the grounds that such information will cause reputa-
tional injury. Additionally, a focus on audience interests may influence 
the appropriate form of remedy, even if it does not limit the kinds of 
claims a plaintiff might bring. For example, a reputational injury might 
be ameliorated sufficiently through a disclaimer or retraction that cor-
rects the informational imbalance as opposed to an injunction or a sig-
nificant monetary award to the plaintiff.7 
                                                                                                                      
 
5 Similar questions about the proper focus as between the rightholder’s interest and 
the audience’s interest can be seen in the trademark literature, which has considered 
whether trademark law should be primarily concerned with producers’ interests in marks 
as property or consumers’ interests in marks as signals. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative 
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1840–41 (2007). 
6 For a discussion of impersonation issues in social networks, see generally Lisa P. 
Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark Infringement by Impersonation of Markhold-
ers, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 851 (2010). 
7 Other considerations of overlaps in these areas of law include Ralph S. Brown, Copy-
right and Its Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity, Unfair Competition, 33 J. Copyright Soc’y 301 
(1986); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of 
Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 836, 848–49 (1983) (contending that publicity 
rights should be treated like other intellectual property rights); Nat Stern, Creating a New 
Tort for Wrongful Misrepresentation of Character, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 81, 93–95 (2004) (propos-
ing that plaintiffs be prohibited from bringing both defamation and false light claims 
based on the same communication and proposing an alternative claim of wrongful mis-
representation of character); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intel-
lectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DePaul-LCA J. 
Art & Ent. L. & Pol’y 283, 292–93 (2000) (arguing that “any form of property right in 
informational material that is not provided for under the copyright clause should be re-
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 The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the 
nature of reputation from a sociological perspective, describing its fun-
damentally social nature and its continuing importance in an Internet 
age.8 Part II moves to a consideration of the justifications that have 
been proposed to support the law’s interest in reputation and suggests 
that a more complete justification would take account of audience in-
terests.9 Part III discusses the various causes of action that might be 
used to vindicate individuals’ or firms’ reputational interests and notes 
the ways in which each such cause of action addresses, or fails to ad-
dress, the reputational interest at stake from the perspective of audi-
ences.10 Part IV then offers some proposals for how the law of reputa-
tion might take such audience interests into account, ranging from the 
less modest to the more so.11 
I. The Creation and Use of Reputation 
A. The Creation of Reputation 
 Reputation has long been cited in the common law and in various 
state constitutions as an interest justifying legal protection.12 Yet despite 
its central importance to the lives of individuals and the formation and 
maintenance of social and economic interactions, the concept of repu-
tation has also long been characterized as relatively under-theorized, 
both in terms of its scope and in terms of the law’s appropriate re-
sponse to the interest at stake.13 One might easily characterize an indi-
                                                                                                                      
 
quired to meet the same tests for validity that are applied to other forms of government 
regulation of speech”). 
8 See infra notes 12–82 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 83–119 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 120–298 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 299–369 and accompanying text. 
12 See, e.g., Ind. Const. art. I, § 12 (“All courts shall be open; and every person, for in-
jury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 Geo. L.J. 555, 592–93 & 
n.241 (1997) (providing citations). 
13 See, e.g., D.B. Bromley, Reputation, Image and Impression Management 8 (1993) 
(“Reputation is a phenomenon of considerable social and scientific importance, but the 
interest shown in it by writers and by ordinary people has not been paralleled by an equiv-
alent degree of interest shown by social and behavioural scientists.”); Lawrence McNa-
mara, Reputation and Defamation 19 (2007) (asserting that although much literature 
touches on reputation-related matters, “only a few works are concerned with the nature of 
reputation”); Post, supra note 1, at 692 (“It is all too easy to assume that everyone knows 
the value of reputation, and to let the matter drop with the obligatory reference to [Sha-
kespeare] . . . .”); David Rolph, Dirty Pictures: Defamation, Reputation, and Nudity, 10 L. Text 
Culture 101, 102 (2006); Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defama-
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vidual or a firm as having a good reputation or an unfavorable reputa-
tion, but it is more difficult to pinpoint the basis for such reputations, 
the existence of any accord about the subject, and the reason why repu-
tation should matter. 
 It is, perhaps, easier to identify the benefits of reputation to others 
than the genesis or scope of reputation itself. First, a good reputation 
facilitates economic interactions by reducing search costs. One typically 
chooses a doctor, for example, not by interviewing several professionals 
until one finds a good fit, or scheduling initial appointments with sev-
eral before committing to one, but by reputational signals: word of 
mouth, based on others’ experiences; the universities the doctor at-
tended; or a rating offered on a website or in a magazine. Some rank-
ings of law schools and other educational institutions that have come to 
capture the attention of applicants, such as those provided by U.S. News 
and World Report,14 specifically build reputational assessments into their 
overall scores; these rankings (supplied by, in the case of law schools, 
faculty at other institutions as well as judges and lawyers) may, in some 
instances, be based on still other reputational signals, such as the titles 
of the journals in which faculty have published articles.15 One might 
choose to buy a car based not only on a test drive but also on the reputa-
tion of its manufacturer for quality, a metric that, as with other experi-
ence goods, is difficult to evaluate prior to purchase. In each instance, 
the consumer uses reputation to make a decision about an economic 
transaction. If the interaction turns out not to match the reputational 
signal, the individual may well not only decline future interactions but 
may communicate that disappointment to others, thus contributing to 
modifications of the reputation at issue. 
 Reputation is also of value in making choices that, while still eco-
nomic, relate more closely to identity creation or self-fulfillment. In 
1968, Robert Merton noted that the amount of research published in 
the sciences was so extensive that scientists hoping to keep up with de-
velopments in their field tended to rely on the professional reputation 
of the articles’ authors as a way of identifying which articles to read, 
                                                                                                                      
tion, 4 Colum. L. Rev. 33, 34 (1904) (characterizing the state of the law regarding reputa-
tion as “a confused one”). 
14 Rankings, U.S. News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/rankings (last vi-
sited June 19, 2011). 
15 Malcolm Gladwell, The Order of Things, New Yorker, Feb. 14 & 21, 2011, at 68, 73 
(“[R]eputational ratings are simply inferences from broad, readily observable features of 
an institution’s identity, such as its history, its prominence in the media, or the elegance of 
its architecture. They are prejudices.”). 
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thereby reinforcing those authors’ reputations.16 Some scholars claim, 
in this vein, that the Gospels were disseminated under the names of 
Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John rather than by their true authors for 
precisely this reason: the four were better known names and thus more 
likely to be viewed as authoritative.17 Celebrity endorsements, to take 
another example, are a way of making purchasing decisions based on a 
transfer of reputation from the celebrity to the product, the goal being 
to inspire consumers who admire the celebrity to assign those same as-
sociations to the product.18 When such endorsements involve a testi-
monial—the celebrity directly extolling the virtues of the product—one 
can assume that they are based on the celebrity’s presumed profes-
sional expertise, such as when a famous chef endorses a line of cook-
ware or a professional model endorses a line of cosmetics, or on the 
reputation of the celebrity as a generally trustworthy individual whose 
opinion is to be given credence. Celebrity endorsements that merely 
feature the celebrity using the product or appearing in the commercial 
or advertisement, however, may depend on the transmission of an im-
plicit testimonial—that the celebrity would not have appeared in the 
advertisement if she did not recommend the product—or on a more 
general reputation transfer—from the celebrity to the advertised prod-
uct or service.19 Thus, after news broke in late 2009 that the profes-
                                                                                                                      
 
16 The phenomenon, which Merton termed the “Matthew Effect,” is no doubt more 
prevalent today. For the original article, see Robert K. Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science, 
159 Science 56, 58 (1968). For the follow-up article, see generally Robert K. Merton, The 
Matthew Effect in Science, II: Cumulative Advantage and the Symbolism of Intellectual Property, 79 
ISIS 606 (1988) [hereinafter Merton, The Matthew Effect, II], in particular, id. at 621 (dis-
cussing how attribution is “central to the incentive system and an underlying sense of dis-
tributive justice that [does] much to energize the advancement of knowledge”). The vari-
ous scholarly works that have taken on Merton’s thesis are too numerous to cite. 
The effect occurs with other reputational ranking systems. See Gladwell, supra note 15, 
at 73 (noting that the U.S. News rankings of educational institutions are a “self-fulfilling 
prophecy” because respondents use past rankings to assess schools about which they know 
little). 
17 See, e.g., David G. Meade, Pseudonymity and Canon: An Investigation into the 
Relationship of Authorship and Authority in Jewish and Earliest Christian Tra-
dition 13, 207 (1986). 
18 Research by one industry group indicates, however, that advertisements featuring 
celebrities “do not perform any better than non-celebrity ads, and in some cases they per-
form much worse.” See Ace Metrix, Celebrity Advertisements: Exposing a Myth of 
Advertising Effectiveness 1 (2010), available at http://mktg.acemetrix.com/acton/ct/ 
563/p-001d/Bct/-/-/ct14_1/1. 
19 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, 1009 (1995) 
(“[Michael Jordan] endorses Nike shoes. Some of his social capital is transferred to the product 
endorsed, and the meaning of wearing Nike shoes changes.”); Grant McCracken, Who Is the 
Celebrity Endorser?: Cultural Foundations of the Endorsement Process, in Culture and Consumption 
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sional golfer Tiger Woods had been involved in several extramarital 
affairs, Woods was dropped from a number of lucrative endorsement 
deals.20 This was not, presumably, because his reputation as a golfer 
had diminished—it was unlikely that anyone thought that Woods was a 
worse player as a result of the revelations—but rather because his repu-
tation as a moral, upstanding individual was now in question. Firms us-
ing a reputation transfer model, one assumes, did not want Woods’s 
revised reputation dominating the message of their advertisements. 
 Reputations also reduce search costs in interpersonal transactions. 
One might decide whether to form new friendships or romantic at-
tachments based on the other individual’s reputation in the community 
or based on the recommendation of a trusted third party. One might 
decide whether to share personal information with a colleague one 
does not know well based on her reputation for discretion among her 
peers or decide whether to let one’s child associate with an unfamiliar 
classmate based on the classmate’s reputation among other parents for 
maturity and friendliness. In all of these ways, reputations facilitate so-
cial and economic interaction. Moreover, to the extent that social or 
other networks reward positive reputations and punish negative reputa-
tions, such mechanisms “incentivize individuals to behave more coop-
                                                                                                                      
II: Markets, Meaning, and Brand Management 97, 97 (2005) (setting forth a “meaning-
transfer” theory of the celebrity endorser); cf. Therese A. Louie, Robert L. Kulik & Robert Ja-
cobson, When Bad Things Happen to the Endorsers of Good Products, 12 Marketing Letters 13 
(2001) (testing the effect on firm value of celebrity endorser blameworthiness). Social networks 
have attempted to use the reputations of its members in particular social circles to similar effect. 
See William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 1105, 1107 (describing marketing through online social networks as “a form of reputa-
tional piggybacking”). 
20 One study estimates that shareholders of companies endorsed by Woods lost be-
tween $5 billion and $12 billion in wealth as a result of the revelations. Christopher R. 
Knittel & Victor Stango, Shareholder Value Destruction Following the Tiger Woods Scan-
dal 1 ( Jan. 5, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.gsm.ucdavis. 
edu/~vstango/tiger004.pdf. Corporations that are seen as bad actors in connection with 
a defining event can suffer the same economic harm. See Rob Cox, Richard Beales & Chris-
topher Hughes, Reputation’s Price, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2010, at B2 (positing that at least 
part of the decrease in BP’s and Goldman Sachs’s market capitalization in 2010 was due to 
reputational harms after an oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico and an SEC investigation, re-
spectively). At least one manufacturer appears to be using this effect strategically. See Si-
mon Doonan, How Snooki Got Her Gucci: The Dirt on Purses, N.Y. Observer (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://www.observer.com/2010/culture/pricey-landscaping (reporting that manufactur-
ers of luxury handbags were sending competitors’ bags to a reality television star in the 
hope that she would be seen publicly with the bags, causing their cachet to diminish). 
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eratively” and, concomitantly, encourage the transmission of informa-
tion that helps to form reputation.21 
 This does not mean, however, that reputation is a matter of mere 
personal or corporate effort. Social theorists who write about reputa-
tion and impression management consistently discuss reputation as a 
social phenomenon, as something that is created and altered by the 
judgments of others rather than something that exists inherently or 
develops organically as a result of efforts by the reputation holder.22 
Commentators as early as Aristotle have acknowledged reputation’s so-
cial nature, noting that a good reputation “consists in being considered a 
man of worth” or is “what other people prefer and value.”23 More re-
cently, scholars have discussed reputation in terms of information 
processing and assessment, describing it as “a social judgment of the 
person based upon facts which are considered relevant by a commu-
nity.”24 The nature and scope of reputation thus depend on the nature 
and scope of the community; as a result, an individual or firm may have 
as many different reputations as there are relevant communities, and 
such reputations may change over time as the relevant communities 
expand, change, and contract.25 
                                                                                                                      
21 Cameron Anderson & Aiwa Shirako, Are Individuals’ Reputations Related to Their His-
tory of Behavior?, 94 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 320, 320 (2008); see also id. at 329 
(concluding that the effectiveness of reputation in serving social functions may depend on 
how socially connected the individual in question is); F.G. Bailey, Gifts and Poison, in Gifts 
and Poison: The Politics of Reputation 1, 4 (F.G. Bailey ed., 1971) (noting that the 
importance of one’s reputation depends on one’s degree of interaction with others). 
22 See Bromley, supra note 13, at 8; Kenneth H. Craik, Reputation: A Network In-
terpretation at xvii (2009). 
23 John Rodden, The Politics of Literary Reputation: The Making and Claim-
ing of “St. George” Orwell 55 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing Aristotle, The Rhe-
toric 12 ( John Henry Freese trans., 1982)); 3 Henry John Stephen, Commentaries on 
the Laws of England (Partly Founded on Blackstone) 395 (1908) (“A person’s repu-
tation is what other people think of him; and not what he thinks of himself.”); Theodore 
Tilton, The Problem of Life, in 3 Scrap-Book Recitation Series 36, 37 (H.M. Soper ed., 
1882) (“A man’s character is what he is; a man’s reputation is what other people may imag-
ine him to be.”). 
24 McNamara, supra note 13, at 21. Although McNamara’s definition is, on its face, re-
stricted to individuals, there seems to be no reason why this definition would not be equal-
ly applicable to corporations. See also Craik, supra note 22, at xvii (“Reputation is a dis-
persed phenomenon that is to be found in the beliefs and assertions of an extensive 
number of other individuals.”); Rodden, supra note 23, at 55 (noting that “[o]thers confer 
repute” and that “the attribution of reputation is an act of perception about a property 
which may or may not inhere in the object”). 
25 See Rodden, supra note 23, at 66 (characterizing reputation as “the cumulative, ulti-
mate consequence of innumerable acts of receiving and approving (or disapproving)”). 
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 In this way, although the facts upon which a reputation is based 
may be true or false, reputation itself, as simply a collective judgment or 
opinion, is not so categorical. It is entirely possible for a restaurant that 
serves simple food at inexpensive prices to be thought of by some as a 
venue representing good value for money and by others as an unsavory 
dive. Thus, one can attempt to influence reputation, whether one’s 
own or another’s, by adding to the mix of judgments to shift the collec-
tive wisdom in a particular direction or by controlling dissemination of 
the underlying facts that others use to make such judgments. One can-
not, however, directly control the outcome itself. A speaker can, for ex-
ample, attempt to defame another by communicating false facts about 
the individual, but a speaker cannot ensure that others will receive or 
perceive such statements in a particular way. One has been defamed as 
a legal matter only when a judicial body interprets a statement as likely 
to have a deleterious effect on the relevant community’s collective 
judgment about the individual.26 
 This is not to say, of course, that the social nature of reputation 
yields no benefits for the reputation holder. Indeed, the way in which 
we are perceived by others is a significant part of how many of us per-
ceive ourselves, and both individuals and firms often modify their fu-
ture activities (or choose not to do so) in response to the judgments of 
others.27 More particularly, the fact that reputation is often used as a 
heuristic can yield significant social and economic benefits,28 particu-
larly for those individuals or businesses that are fortunate enough to 
acquire a good reputation early in the game. Because of what Robert 
Merton has termed the “Matthew Effect” (or, as one scholar has put it, 
                                                                                                                      
26 Cf. J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 30 (2d ed. 1975) (noting that 
while saying “you were cowardly” may insult someone, the statement “I insult you” cannot 
do so). 
27 Craik, supra note 22, at 98.  
It is reasonable for [a] person to treat reputation as a central epistemological 
resource. In everyday social life, the person is surrounded by others who par-
ticipate in and manifest their common knowledge of the person. In that way, 
reputation content claims come to influence a person’s own understanding of 
the kind of individual he or she is. 
Id. 
28 Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and 
Contemporary Approaches 152 (1981) (“Most analyses of impression management as-
sume that a primary goal in presenting oneself to others is the attainment of social ap-
proval.”); id. at 155 (noting how “in impression management theory, people want to con-
vey, given social constraints, as positive and consistent a public image as possible in order 
to obtain social rewards”). 
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the fact that reputation “typically makes for more reputation”),29 the 
well-regarded writer, for example, is likely to have a leg up when his 
next submission goes to the publisher, and a new product released by 
an established company is likely to attract more initial attention in the 
marketplace than a product from an unknown entity. 
 But reputations are neither formed in a vacuum nor the result of a 
single interaction with an individual or firm. One may develop an as-
sessment of an individual, firm, or product based on one’s own experi-
ence and interactions, but such assessment is not typically referred to as 
“reputation.” We wouldn’t tend to think to ourselves, for example, “I’ve 
been to that restaurant three times and had a bad experience each 
time. It now has a terrible reputation.” One who asks a friend about the 
reputation of a carpenter she is thinking of hiring is not seeking merely 
the friend’s experience with the carpenter’s work; indeed, the friend 
need not have hired the carpenter previously in order to respond. 
Rather, an inquiry about the reputation of another is seeking a collec-
tive judgment formed via communications among a relevant commu-
nity.30 Communicating one’s opinion about another is thus necessary 
to the formation of reputation and to the acquisition of its benefits 
both by the holder of reputation and by the relevant community. Be-
cause our individual experiences with others, and thus our ability to 
contribute underlying facts to the formation of reputation directly, is 
necessarily limited, however, facilitation of this communication often 
depends on an intermediary. The more an intermediary is trusted, the 
greater the influence he or she can have on one’s reputation.31 One 
might place a great amount of trust in a single reputation influencer, 
such as the restaurant critic for a major newspaper, or place a greater 
                                                                                                                      
29 Rodden, supra note 23, at 57; see also Merton, The Matthew Effect II, supra note 16, at 
621. 
30 See McNamara, supra note 13, at 33 (noting that reputation involves a moral judg-
ment based on particular facts evaluated in light of prevailing mores of the community); 
Thomas Gibbons, Defamation Reconsidered, 16 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 587, 592 (1996) (not-
ing that a reputation is “socially contingent”); Anderson & Shirako, supra note 21, at 321 
(noting that not all perceptions are deemed interesting enough to pass on to others). 
31 One commentator has set forth four relevant “layers of source credibility” that may 
influence reputations: (1) the credibility of the publication containing the statement at 
issue, (2) the credibility of the conveyer of the statement, (3) the credibility of the speaker 
of the statement (in other words, the person to whom the statement is attributed), and (4) 
the credibility of any group or organization with whom the speaker is associated. Clay Cal-
vert, Harm to Reputation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Impact of Denial of Defamatory 
Allegations, 26 Pac. L.J. 933, 946 (1995). Of course, this exercise can become endlessly re-
cursive, as “credibility” is just another way of describing reputation (here, a reputation for 
truth). 
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value on the collective opinions of many consumers, such as the restau-
rant ratings that appear on a website like Yelp. 
                                                                                                                     
 The latter form of reputation development has, it goes without say-
ing, been enhanced by the Internet. In earlier eras, reputations were 
developed and disseminated in defined communities. The personal 
reputation of many individuals would develop and have meaning within 
family, acquaintance, and professional circles but would likely not be of 
much interest beyond those communities. Gossip functioned as a fairly 
effective private enforcement mechanism in that information could be 
shared directly and easily in the relevant community.32 The reputations 
of producers of goods were similarly cabined, with consumers purchas-
ing directly from producers and returning to the physical market if they 
were in need of additional goods.33 Although the interest in either indi-
vidual or corporate reputation is probably not substantively different 
from previous eras, the modern age has rendered reputation vulnerable 
in particular ways. The ability to engage in communications with others 
around the world via the Internet, with no requirement in many fora 
that such communications be conducted using one’s true name, both 
enables the construction of multiple identities to which a reputation can 
be attached and allows others to more easily disseminate information or 
opinions, sometimes pseudonymously,34 that shape the reputations both 
of individuals and of companies and their products. What was formerly 
communicated via in-person word of mouth or through letters to com-
 
32 Cf. Craik, supra note 22, at 147 (noting that communication about individuals (i.e., 
gossip) “generates an efficient pooling and summarizing of the community’s observations 
and opinions concerning the person”); Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in 
Electronic Commerce, 62 La. L Rev. 1165, 1166 (2002) (noting that “private enforcement 
mechanisms such as gossip are unlikely to be suitable for geographically distant transac-
tions if the parties are not members of the same enforcement regime, such as a local trade 
association”). 
33 See Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks—Their Early History, 59 Trademark Rep. 551, 
551–52 (1969); see also, e.g., Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 
Trademark Rep. 265, 289–90 (1975); cf. Richard A. Posner, The Little Book of Pla-
giarism 69 (2007) (“The resemblance of plagiarism to trademark infringement . . . is not 
an accident. . . . Trademarks and author ‘branding’ (by naming) coevolved as ways of pro-
tecting sellers and consumers as markets expanded and became impersonal.”). See generally 
Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 
Trademark Rep. 305 (1979) (exploring the historical legal development of unfair compe-
tition and trademarks). 
34 Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of On-
line Feedback Mechanisms, 49 Mgmt. Sci. 1407, 1410–11 (2003) (describing challenges of 
pseudonymity to online feedback communities); Mary Madden & Aaron Smith, Pew In-
ternet & American Life Project, Reputation Management and Social Media 11–12 
(May 26, 2010), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Reputation-Management. 
aspx (describing widespread use of pseudonyms to post material online). 
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pany executives can now be broadcast to a worldwide audience, re-
transmitted, and discussed.35 Additionally, given the relative perma-
nence and accessibility of information preserved electronically, one’s 
reputation is likely to be based on a more comprehensive set of data 
(both true and false) and, for this reason, may be more difficult for the 
individual or firm in question to alter. Whether this is progress or not 
may depend on whether one is in the position of the investigator or the 
investigated.36 
 The sometimes fluid relationship between reference and referent 
means that reputation is typically attached to a name rather than to an 
identity. In other words, unless the community is aware of an individ-
ual’s or company’s use of different names for different endeavors, each 
name will develop a separate reputation. For example, an actor who has 
a reputation for theatrical skill under a stage name will not benefit 
from that reputation if he pens a newspaper opinion piece under his 
birth name, unless information in the opinion piece makes that con-
nection clear. Indeed, in some instances, writers will make deliberate 
choices to pursue endeavors in various creative fields under different 
names to avoid reputation spillovers.37 Likewise, it is not an uncommon 
practice for corporations to change their names (sometimes after an 
unfavorable public relations experience) or to rebrand products in or-
der to start fresh with a new reputation or, conversely, to keep the same 
corporate name even though the individuals to whom the firm’s repu-
tation is owed are no longer with the firm.38 Individuals can do the 
                                                                                                                      
35 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in 
Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research 404, 404–05 
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); Dellarocas, supra note 34, at 1407. 
36 See, e.g., Madden & Smith, supra note 34; Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Repu-
tation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet 4 (2007) (noting how the Inter-
net makes “[i]nformation that was once scattered, forgettable, and localized . . . perma-
nent and searchable”); Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. Times, July 
25, 2010 (Magazine), at 30; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiq-
uitous Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1667, 1693–94 (2008) (proposing greater 
disclosure of some types of information about individuals in order to reduce reliance on 
other types); Eric Goldman, Reputational Information: A Research Agenda 2–3 (May 1, 
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (considering the way in which repu-
tational systems aid decision making) . 
37 See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and 
Trademark Law, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1377, 1404–05 (2005). 
38 Charles J. Fombrun, Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image 
51 (1996) (describing how Disney released its R-rated films under the Touchstone Pictures 
brand “[t]o avoid diluting the Disney name”); Steven Tadelis, Firm Reputation with Hidden 
Information, 21 Econ. Theory 635, 635 (2003). See generally Laura A. Heymann, Naming, 
Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 Ind. L.J. 381 (2011). 
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same in their nonprofessional lives, although presumably the social and 
transaction costs of doing so are higher. In the online world, however, 
name changing is much easier: The availability of pseudonymity in var-
ious online fora “turns the transfer of reputation information into a 
strategic variable, controlled by each player” in an interaction.39 
 Indeed, reputation is often not merely a strategic tool but the sub-
ject of transactions, both by firms and by individuals. In some instances, 
a reputation may be borrowed, such as in the case of a celebrity en-
dorsement or in a letter of recommendation or introduction. Trade-
mark licensing is a well-known example of this borrowing. A restaurant 
that enters into a franchise agreement with a trademark holder to open 
a restaurant under the trademark is seeking to use the trademark hold-
er’s reputation to avoid the costs associated with developing a reputa-
tion associated with a new trademark; in the same way, a trademark 
holder can reap the benefits of extending a well-known mark to addi-
tional product lines.40 Researchers have also discussed the ability of a 
firm to signal product quality by “renting” the reputation of another 
entity, such as a retailer, such that consumers will transfer the reputa-
tion of the retailer to the as-yet unfamiliar product.41 Indeed, as some 
economists have suggested, it is preferable to allow a well-functioning 
market in names (as repositories for reputations) so as to incentivize 
employees throughout their working careers.42 If a manager expects to 
be able to sell the company name and its associated reputation upon 
exit from the industry, he or she has an incentive to maintain the level 
of that reputation until the sale occurs.43 Such benefits may come, 
however, at a transparency cost to the public, who may not be aware of 
the transfer and who are at risk of relying on what will turn out to be an 
                                                                                                                      
39 Eric J. Friedman & Paul Resnick, The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms, 10 J. Econ. & 
Mgmt. Strategy 173, 174 (2001). 
40 See Julie Manning Magid, Anthony D. Cox & Dena S. Cox, Quantifying Brand Image: 
Empirical Evidence of Trademark Dilution, 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 30–32 (2006) (describing the 
marketing benefits of strong brands). 
41 Wujin Chu & Woosik Chu, Signaling Quality by Selling Through a Reputable Retailer: An 
Example of Renting the Reputation of Another Agent, 13 Marketing Sci. 177, 177–78 (1994); see 
also Jonathan Macey, The Value of Reputation in Corporate Finance and Investment Banking (and 
the Related Roles of Regulation and Market Efficiency), 22 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 18, 19 (2010) 
(defining a “reputational intermediary” as a firm “whose business is to ‘rent’ its own repu-
tation to client companies that are not large or established enough to have their own, or 
that obtain added value from burnishing their reputations by associating with a reputable 
intermediary”). 
42 Steven Tadelis, The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism, 110 J. Pol. Econ. 
854, 875 (2002) (discussing the benefits of a well-functioning market for names and noting 
that making information about name transfers public can cause this market to collapse). 
43 Id. 
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untrustworthy reputational signal. A bad actor (an incompetent fran-
chisee, for example) who borrows the good reputation of another and 
runs the business poorly is likely to affect the reputation of the parent 
firm with which the name is associated, rather than his own.44 
 While both individuals and firms can allow others to borrow their 
reputations, the outright assignment of reputation is the province of 
firms.45 In the corporate setting, reputation is often equated to the 
concept of “goodwill,” although commentators are not agreed on 
whether this is a precise overlap. Some commentators equate goodwill 
to a firm’s reputation, characterizing the former term as deriving from 
law and accountancy and the latter term deriving from economics or 
other fields,46 while others define goodwill as a term that comprises an 
entire class of intangible assets, including reputation and intellectual 
property.47 Accountants will typically describe goodwill by what it is not 
rather than by what it is: as the excess of a company’s worth over the 
value of its tangible assets or, put differently, what is left on the balance 
sheet once the value of those assets has been subtracted.48 (This de-
scription may help to value goodwill, but it does not prove very helpful 
in defining it.) Legal commentators, by contrast, often tie goodwill to 
consumer activity, characterizing it as the probability of repeat busi-
ness.49 Although the possibility of repeat business may have a relation-
                                                                                                                      
 
44 George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, Who Wants a Good Reputation?, 68 Rev. Econ. 
Stud. 415, 429 (2001) (concluding that names of firms with good reputations are particu-
larly attractive to inept entrants); Steven Tadelis, What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable 
Asset, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 548, 559 (1999) (“Good types value good names because of their 
future prospects to maintain it, whereas bad types value good names because they lack the 
ability to build one themselves.”). 
[I]f we believed that good names were always bought by good types, then a 
short period of bad performance would not cause a loss in reputation. The 
fact that this cannot be an equilibrium causes clients to update their beliefs 
downwards after bad performance, anticipating that downward shifts in per-
formance are a signal of some permanent change . . . . 
Tadelis, supra, at 559. 
45 See Tadelis, supra note 42, at 855. 
46 Odek Shenkar & Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, Reputation, Image, Prestige, and Goodwill: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach to Organizational Standing, 50 Hum. Rel. 1361, 1361 (1997) (using 
“standing” as a substitute, equally, for “prestige” (from sociology), “reputation” (from eco-
nomics), “image” (from marketing), and “goodwill” (from law and accountancy)). 
47 Tadelis, supra note 44, at 548 n.2 (suggesting that goodwill includes reputation). 
48 Fombrun, supra note 38, at 86; Tadelis, supra note 44, at 548 n.2. 
49 See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555–556 (1993) 
(“Although the definition of goodwill has taken different forms over the years, the short-
hand description of goodwill as ‘the expectancy of continued patronage,’ provides a useful 
label with which to identify the total of all the imponderable qualities that attract custom-
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ship to reputation, it is not coextensive. The continued flow of con-
sumers to a firm or a product may depend on their own experiences or 
inertia, rather than their awareness of reputation, or it may be based on 
more prosaic considerations, such as the convenience of a company’s 
retail outlets. Relatedly, reputation need not be tied to particular con-
sumer experiences with the company’s goods or services. The exten-
sion of a brand name into a widely divergent area of business might not 
cause consumer defection from the original line of business,50 but it 
may cause consumers to have a different perception of the company as 
a whole. Likewise, a company’s labor practices, philanthropic efforts, 
statements on public issues, and the like may cause others to change 
their opinion of the company, even if many members of the public have 
no plans for any type of consumer interaction with the firm.51 Goodwill 
is thus better described as evidence of reputation, rather than its equiv-
alent. 
 The relationship of goodwill to reputation, and the difficulty of 
defining the former term, arises particularly when a trademark is trans-
ferred to another entity. Trademark doctrine provides that when a 
trademark is sold, the goodwill associated with the mark must be trans-
ferred, which is typically interpreted as encompassing a transfer of as-
sets or technical know-how of the business.52 But because a company 
                                                                                                                      
ers to the business.”) (citation omitted); Cruttwell v. Lye, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 
(opinion of Lord Eldon) (goodwill is “nothing more than the probability, that the old 
customers will resort to the old place”); 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trade-
marks and Unfair Competition § 2:18 (4th ed. 2003) (providing one set of definitions of 
“good will” as “the lure to return,” “buyer momentum,” and the “expectancy of continued 
patronage”); 2 Judicial and Statutory Definitions of Words and Phrases 762–65 
(West Publishing 1914) (collecting similar definitions from cases). See generally Robert G. 
Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 
547 (2006) (providing a thorough discussion of the various conceptions of goodwill). 
50 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 
430–33 (2010). 
51 See, e.g., Josh Marshall, Not as Simple as It Seems, TPM (Aug. 5, 2010, 3:11 PM) http:// 
www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/2010/08/not_as_simple_as_it_seems.php (discuss-
ing public response to a political donation by Target and subsequent apology issued by 
Target’s CEO). 
52 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (2000) (assignments of registered marks); 3 McCarthy, supra note 
49, § 18:2 (“Good will can no more be separated from a business than reputation from a 
person.”); id. § 18:23 (stating that courts typically equate transfer of tangible assets with 
transfer of goodwill, although noting that “transfer of technical information and know-
how together with customer lists” may suffice). The question of what constitutes the good-
will that must be transferred has been a matter of frequent analysis. See, e.g., Irene Calboli, 
Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 Fla. L Rev. 771 
(2005); Walter J. Halliday, Assignments Under the Lanham Act, 38 Trademark Rep. 970, 971–
73 (1948). 
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could fire all of its key employees and start again the next day with a 
new staff—indeed, the company that purchases another’s trademark 
along with its associated goodwill could presumably do the same the 
day after the sale—it is unclear precisely what is being transferred as 
“goodwill.”53 Consumers are unlikely to discover (or to have the incen-
tive to discover) whether the same individuals are responsible for the 
product or service from day to day,54 and thus presumably expect only 
that the goods they are buying from the company today are more or 
less of the same quality as the goods they bought yesterday. But as 
commentators have noted, the assumption that trademarks incentivize 
companies to maintain consistent quality55 is true only on a macro lev-
el.56 In this sense, then, reputation is an inherently consumer-based 
concept, in that goodwill is deemed to have been transferred along 
with a trademark only if consumers have the same general perceptions 
about the offerings and level of quality associated with the mark after 
the assignment as before.57 
                                                                                                                      
53 3 McCarthy, supra note 49, § 18:10 (suggesting that the rule against assignment of 
a trademark in gross “does not guarantee continuity, but only facilitates it”); Calboli, supra 
note 52, at 830 (noting that “trademark owners have always been free to modify the quality 
or kind of their products as long as they used the mark in ways that were not misleading or 
deceptive to the public”) (citation omitted); id. at 836–37 (highlighting the importance of 
labels and disclaimers in notifying consumers of changes). As one example of a change in 
personnel, see Marshak v. Green, 505 F. Supp. 1054, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that 
the transfer of “The Drifters” for the singing group was accompanied by goodwill, even 
though one of the original members left the group, because “the singing in The Drifters 
style . . . remained unchanged in the public eye”). 
54 See Tadelis, supra note 44, at 551–52 (assuming that it is “not true that shifts of own-
ership are readily observable by all clients” and that to most clients, “the firm is repre-
sented only by its name, and the actual agent or group of agents who produce the good 
and own the firm are unknown”). 
55 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 
Trademark Rep. 267, 271–72 (1988). 
56 3 McCarthy, supra note 49, § 17:24 (noting that while “a substantial change in the na-
ture or quality of the goods sold under a mark may so change the nature of the thing symbol-
ized that the mark becomes fraudulent and/or that the original rights are abandoned,” con-
sumers expect minor changes). What constitutes a significant or minor change, however, may 
be in the eye of the beholder. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. G.C. Murphy Co., 
199 U.S.P.Q. 807, 813 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (finding no abandonment of trademark when product 
was changed from premium wall paint to budget paint, given “substantially similar chemical 
ingredients”). 
57 See, e.g., Topps Co., Inc. v. Cadbury Stani S.A.I.C., 526 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(stating that the goodwill requirement requires only that the assignee’s products be “sub-
stantially similar [to those of the assignor] such that consumers would not be deceived or 
harmed” rather than requiring identical products) (internal quotation marks omitted); 3 
McCarthy, supra note 49, § 18:27 (noting that the test is “whether the assignee’s new 
product is so different from the assignor’s product that it would be a fraud on the public 
to allow the assignee’s continued use”). 
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 The possibility of licensing or assigning reputation thus raises is-
sues of control. In general, most of us want to control our reputations 
and thereby control the outcomes of decisions based on those reputa-
tions; the person who professes not to care what others think about him 
is seen as unusual. This desire for control “is an assertion of auton-
omy,”58 an attempt to engage in self-identity creation, whether by indi-
viduals or by firms, and a resistance to definition by others.59 For ex-
ample, an individual might well decide to lend her name to a particular 
commercial enterprise that others find questionable even though she 
would have objected to the use of her name by that same enterprise 
without authorization. Likewise, a corporation may object to the use of 
one of its trademarks in a completely unrelated field by another corpo-
rate entity on the grounds that such use would dilute the value of its 
mark even though corporations are free to, and often do, deploy a sin-
gle trademark in many unrelated fields.60 
 This desire for control rests in tension, however, with the socially 
constructed nature of reputation. While individuals and firms may want 
to control the information about them that is disseminated to others, 
they cannot ultimately control the judgments and assessments that are 
made in response to that information once released. At best, they can 
attempt to influence that assessment through a number of avenues. 
They can engage in self-help measures, such as disseminating counter 
messages or releasing information that attempts to discredit the source 
of the original information.61 They can also, in extreme cases, abandon 
ship by changing their name or brand and starting again under a new 
moniker, free from the reputational associations of the past. Or they can 
seek a legal remedy and the official imprimatur that legal proceedings 
                                                                                                                      
58 Gibbons, supra note 30, at 589. 
59 See James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(“Though economic harm per se is not required, this court has pointed out that the owner 
of a mark is damaged by a later use of a similar mark which places the owner’s reputation 
beyond its control, though no loss in business is shown.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, 
False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 364, 365 (1989) (de-
scribing the Warren and Brandeis view of privacy as one of “selective anonymity”). 
60 See generally Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 Iowa L. 
Rev. 731 (2003). 
61 See R.I.M. Dunbar, Gossip in Evolutionary Perspective, 8 Rev. Gen. Psych. 100, 106 
(2004) (describing the “free rider problem” of those who “take the benefits of sociality but 
decline to pay all of the costs” and suggesting that individuals are predisposed to exchange 
information about free riders through gossip because “free riders are extremely destruc-
tive for societies based on a social compact”); Strahilevitz, supra note 36, at 1721 (“In per-
haps the majority of instances, the most appropriate role that the state can play in facilitat-
ing the development of a robust reputational market is to get out of the way.”). 
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confer, both through a legal judgment that one’s reputation has been 
unjustly harmed and the restoration (at best, incomplete) of one’s for-
mer position through the payment of damages and through retractions 
or disclaimers, which allow the defendant to correct the record. All of 
these remedies, whether legal or extralegal, may have the salutary bene-
fit of inspiring feelings of vindication on the part of the individual or 
firm whose reputation has been altered and, in the case of firms, provid-
ing compensation for loss of business due to the reputational harm. But 
the ultimate goal—and, presumably, the primary goal in many cases— 
looks to the future rather than to the past: it is to influence, through 
official or unofficial signals, the collective judgment of the relevant 
community going forward by adjusting distortions in the flow of infor-
mation. 
B. The Use of Reputation 
 Recognizing the collective nature of reputation and the way in 
which others are instrumental in creating, defining, and changing an 
individual’s or firm’s reputation suggests that we might take a more ex-
pansive view of the benefits of vindicating reputational interests. It is 
not surprising that legal justifications for the protection of reputation 
focus on the reputation’s importance for the plaintiff; the individual or 
the firm is, after all, the party who is seeking vindication of legal 
rights.62 But, as in trademark law, we might consider that the plaintiff is 
in some way acting on behalf of an audience who is not before the 
court, an audience who relies on the accurate transmission of informa-
tion about the plaintiff to form judgments and opinions and to make 
choices about future economic, social, and identity-based interactions. 
Thus, to describe protection of reputation as a right owned by the indi-
vidual or entity with which the reputation is associated does not fully 
reflect the scope and nature of the interests at issue. Indeed, one might 
suggest, analogous to Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss’s assessment of trade-
mark value, that the very fact of the public’s input into the creation of 
reputation gives the public a claim to at least a portion of the value that 
is thereby created.63 
                                                                                                                      
 
62 See Zimmerman, supra note 59, at 424 (noting that the false light tort does not re-
quire detrimental reliance and that “[t]he subject of the falsehood, not the hearer to 
whom it is communicated, is deemed to be the party who has been injured”). 
63 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Gen-
eration, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 402–10 (1990); cf. Gladys Engel Lang & Kurt Lang, Rec-
ognition and Renown: The Survival of Artistic Reputation, 94 Am. J. Soc. 79, 80 (1988) (discussing 
collective memory as a form of “collective property, a form of folk knowledge, more or less”); 
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 The interests of communities or audiences in others’ reputations 
overlap, but are not always coextensive with, the interests of reputation 
owners. A reputation owner may want another to use his reputation as a 
way to reduce search costs or as a form of warranty or predictor of fu-
ture conduct, but presumably only if his reputation is a good one. The 
owner of a bad reputation, by contrast, is likely to encourage others to 
rely on other enticements, such as price, proximity, or appearance, ra-
ther than reputational signals, as a guide to future interactions. Like-
wise, a reputation owner may acquiesce, explicitly or implicitly, to the 
use of its reputation by others as a signaling device but only so long as 
the borrower does not do anything to reduce the strength or value of 
those reputational signals. But the reputation owner’s desires quite ob-
viously have little bearing on whether his reputation is used by others; in 
this sense, it seems inaccurate to talk of a reputation “owner” at all. Ra-
ther, as I now discuss, reputation is a form of social signal that conveys 
the probable course of future transactions based on past experience. 
1. Reputation as Warranty 
 Reputations have value to their owners because of their use by oth-
ers. It does an individual or firm no good to have a reputation for hon-
esty, talent, quality, or skill unless others are both aware of that reputa-
tion and use it to make further judgments or to take a particular action. 
Thus, reputations are often used by others as a form of warranty or 
guarantee in situations in which experience with performance is lim-
ited.64 One might, for example, buy a book by an author one hasn’t 
read before based on an awareness of the author’s reputation for 
thoughtful writing or vote for a politician based on his or her reputation 
for honesty; one might also visit a restaurant or buy a particular good 
that one hasn’t tried before based on its reputation for quality.65 Reli-
ance on reputation is rational because, we can assume, the reputation 
holder has an interest in acting consistently with a good reputation or 
                                                                                                                      
Rolph, supra note 13, at 123 (suggesting that celebrities’ reputations are “public ‘property’ 
beyond [their] control”). 
64 Fombrun, supra note 38, at 3 (noting that a contractor’s reputation “signals the like-
lihood that our dealings with them will be up to snuff—that they will meet our expecta-
tions”); Shenkar & Yuchtman-Yaar, supra note 46, at 1365 (discussing an economic view of 
reputation “as an imperfect substitute for direct knowledge, particularly in uncertain situa-
tions where it is difficult to ascertain quality”). 
65 Gillette, supra note 32, at 1170 (noting that “brand names constitute reputational 
signals that allow users of one of a firm’s products to predict the performance level of 
another product sold by the same firm”). 
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will have an incentive to improve a bad reputation.66 (Of course, what 
constitutes a “good” or “bad” reputation depends on the community in 
which the reputation holder operates.) Attribution is a significant com-
ponent of this exchange, as names are used by others as hooks for repu-
tational assessments. One who donates funds to charity anonymously 
will not see those activities having any effect on her reputation because 
they will go unrecognized by society. Likewise, a firm that sells an un-
branded product in the market, such as unpackaged produce, will have 
no way of enticing future purchases by consumers who hear about the 
quality of the product from others; such consumers will have to rely on 
the reputation associated with the retail outlet at which such products 
e p
vited to participate in the NCAA postseason tournament was signifi-
                                                                                                                     
ar urchased. 
 Indeed, in many instances, decision-making opportunities are 
structured precisely to avoid using reputation as a heuristic, both within 
and outside the law. Federal evidence law, for example, generally limits 
the use of character evidence to prove action in conformity with that 
character,67 thus disallowing the use of reputation as a predictor of 
some types of conduct. Many activities involving selection or judgment 
are conducted by imposing or encouraging anonymity in part to avoid 
the effect of reputation on the outcome. Law school examinations, for 
example, are often graded anonymously not only to discourage positive 
or negative bias on the part of the grader based on the instructor’s own 
experience, but also to avoid the possibility that the instructor will as-
sign the examination a higher grade than it warrants because the stu-
dent is “known” to be a good student at the school. Orchestra audi-
tions, to take another of many such examples, might be conducted 
behind a screen to eliminate the possibility that a position will be 
awarded based on the renown of the performer, and some publications 
maintain a “blind” submissions policy, in which the submission is evalu-
ated without knowledge of the identity of its author, in an attempt to 
avoid Robert Merton’s Matthew Effect.68 The failure to construct such 
an environment can have significant results. For example, a 2005 study 
concluded that the likelihood of a college basketball team’s being in-
 
66 But see Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Välimäki, Bad Reputation, 118 Q.J. Econ. 785, 785 
(2003) (constructing a model in which reputation holders take suboptimal actions in an 
attempt to distinguish themselves from bad actors). 
67 Fed. R. Evid. 404, 405, 607–609 (all noting exceptions to the general ban of charac-
ter evidence). 
68 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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cantly affected by organizers’ perception of the team’s status and not 
simply by the team’s performance that season.69 
 The interests of the reputation owner and the community diverge, 
however, at the point of dissemination of reputational information. The 
community or audience presumably has the same interest in the heuris-
tic value of reputational signals whether they point in a favorable or 
unfavorable direction, as long as they are based on accurate inputs. By 
contrast, the reputation owner may have an incentive to impede unfa-
vorable (but truthful) reputational signals by, for example, seeking to 
have communications about those signals removed from public view or 
to muddy the waters by adding untruthful inputs to the mix. The law, as 
I will discuss, tends to favor the reputation holder in this regard, allow-
ing a plaintiff to bring reputation-based claims either for the dissemina-
tion of false facts (as a defamation claim)70 or for the dissemination of 
true facts (as a privacy claim).71 The audience interest, however, is in 
having truthful information as the foundation of the reputational as-
sessment; hence, its interests are much less accommodated in the pri-
vacy tort than in the defamation tort. 
2. Reputation as User Signal 
 Reputations are often traded or borrowed based on economically 
motivated transactions in which the transfer of reputational value is, in 
large part, the point of the agreement, such as a franchise or licensing 
arrangement. Reputations are also borrowed for a price in instances 
where the borrowing is not the focus of the transaction.72 Luxury 
goods, for example, are typically purchased not simply because of the 
higher quality of those goods but also to indicate to others that the 
purchaser is a person of means who can afford high-quality or high-
status goods, and consumers pay extra for this effect.73 Likewise, a stu-
                                                                                                                      
 
69 Marvin Washington & Edward J. Zajac, Status Evolution and Competition: Theory and 
Evidence, 48 Acad. Mgmt. J. 282, 292 (2005). 
70 See infra notes 120–157 and accompanying text. 
71 See infra notes 268–290 and accompanying text. 
72 The use of the term “borrowed” obscures, of course, the fact that a reputation in 
such circumstances cannot be “returned.” 
73 The seminal work is Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class 43–63 
(Dover ed. 1994) (1899), which introduced the idea of “conspicuous consumption.” See 
also Landes & Posner, supra note 55, at 305; Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the 
Sumptuary Code, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 809, 886 (2010) (asserting that the challenge of intellec-
tual property law “will be to design rules that will facilitate attribution and thus the system 
of reputation-based distinction that is arguably one of the primary drivers of commons-
based production, but that will not at the same time facilitate the commodification and 
2011] The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience 1363 
dent at an elite university pays tuition not only for the quality of the 
educational and other offerings but also for the prestige of the school’s 
name, which the student then borrows to use as a signal of her own 
reputation when she lists the institution on her resume, or for access to 
well-known professors who can later be asked to lend their reputation 
to letters of recommendation. (Of course, another’s reputation may 
function as a signal only to particular or specialized communities, and 
part of the law’s task is to determine which communities count.74) In 
some instances, an employee is paid not simply to perform work for the 
employer but, in so doing, to burnish the employer’s reputation, from 
which the employee then benefits. The work lawyers perform for a law 
firm, for example, ultimately bears the name of the firm and so con-
tributes to the firm’s reputation, which each of its lawyers can then use 
to his or her benefit in various types of transactions in a way that a law-
yer maintaining a solo practice cannot.75 
 Of course, these are all two-way transactions, regardless of any ex-
press employment agreement. As with a franchise, the activity of the 
reputation’s bailee can redound either to the benefit or to the detri-
ment of the reputation’s owners. A graduate of a particular college who 
later wins a Nobel Prize may bring renown to the school; likewise, the 
graduate who is the subject of a federal indictment may cause his alma 
                                                                                                                      
consumption of attribution as a sign of social distinction”). A recent study discusses “con-
spicuous conservation”: the payment of a premium for a hybrid car, which requires forego-
ing performance and comfort, so as to signal both wealth and altruism. Vladas Griske-
vicius, Joshua M. Tybur & Bram Van den Bergh, Going Green to Be Seen: Status, Reputation 
and Conspicuous Conservation, 98 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 392 (2010); see also Jonah 
Berger & Morgan Ward, Subtle Signals of Inconspicuous Consumption, 37 J. Consumer Res. 
555, 555 (2010) (asserting that insiders prefer luxury goods with signals that are visible 
only to those “in the know”). 
74 See Post, supra note 1, at 714 (“The common law [of defamation] takes its function 
of maintaining community identity so seriously that it will refuse to protect individual dig-
nity if it determines that a particular community is not worthy of legal support.”). Post 
gives as an example the opinion of Connelly v. McKay, 28 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1941) in 
which the court held that a plaintiff’s claim that he had been defamed by a false statement 
that he was a government informant was not cognizable as defamation. Id. at 714; see Con-
nelly, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 329 (noting that to recognize the plaintiff’s claim “would impede law 
enforcement for the benefit of the anti-social”); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, 
Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1996) (noting that the Con-
nelly court “ignore[d] the actual community in favor of an idealized community created by 
its own decision”). 
75 Cf. Louis Menand, The Marketplace of Ideas: Reform and Resistance in the 
American University 106 (2010) (noting that a member of a university faculty has an 
advantage over an independent scholar because “the non-professional must build a repu-
tation by his or her own toil, while the professional’s credibility is given by the institu-
tion”). 
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mater’s reputation to fall in the public’s esteem. In this respect, an in-
stitution’s reputation presents a variation on the “tragedy of the com-
mons” problem, in that employees or associates of the institution can 
exploit its value without having to account to any other user, with the 
result that any such exploiters can deplete the value of the institution’s 
reputation if they take too individualistic a view of the scope of its 
uses.76 Here, however, the problem cannot be solved by according one 
party a property right: The institution presumably has no interest in 
preventing its alumni, for example, from using the institution’s name 
for its reputational benefits, and there is no way of predicting ex ante 
which users will be harmful and which will be beneficial, such that 
some users could be charged a higher “fee” for their use. Instead, the 
stability of the reputational signal depends on the cooperative efforts of 
those who benefit from it and the assumption that each such party has 
a mutually reinforced interest in obtaining a return on its investment. 
 Although such borrowings are often said to involve the “reputa-
tion” of the loaning entity, an insight from Marvin Washington & Ed-
ward J. Zajac provides some useful nuance. Washington and Zajac high-
light that such uses actually involve “status” rather than reputation, 
noting that status is “fundamentally a sociological concept that captures 
differences in social rank that generate privilege or discrimination,” 
while reputation is “fundamentally an economic concept that captures 
differences in perceived or actual quality or merit that generate earned, 
performance-based rewards.”77 For example, as they note, a luxury car 
can connote high social status, despite its poor track record in terms of 
reliability; likewise, a politician from a well-known family might win an 
election based on public affinity for his ancestry as opposed to his per-
formance in public office.78 At some point, then, we might say that 
one’s reputation ceases to be based on interactions or experience with 
others and becomes instead a matter of ossification of status—the point 
at which one becomes able to “rest on one’s laurels.” This insight may 
provide further justification for an alternative to a plaintiff-focused view 
of reputation, but it does not eliminate the audience interest in the flow 
of information. Indeed, to the extent that the community wishes to 
                                                                                                                      
76 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on Large Law Firms: A 
Comparative Perspective, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 593, 604–05 (2002) (discussing the “commons” of a 
law firm’s reputation and the risk of its devaluation by individual lawyers acting in accor-
dance with their own interests); I.P.L. Png & David Reitman, Why Are Some Products Branded 
and Others Not?, 38 J.L. & Econ. 207, 210 (1995) (discussing franchises). 
77 Washington & Zajac, supra note 69, at 283. 
78 Id. at 284. 
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“bask in the reflected glory” of the reputation of another,79 it becomes 
ever more important to consider the factual basis for that reputation. 
                                                                                                                     
 Although the Supreme Court has long noted society’s “pervasive 
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputa-
tion,”80 courts have been less clear about the nature of the interest. For 
example, at least some of the Court’s jurisprudence suggests that an in-
dividual’s interest in his reputation does not rise to the level of a liberty 
or property interest subject to due process under the U.S. Constitu-
tion,81 although state constitutions may provide broader protection.82 
This is not to say that the law should therefore take no interest in indi-
vidual or firm reputation, but it does give rise to a consideration of what 
it is about reputation that makes it a worthy subject of legal interest. 
II. Theories of Reputation 
 An influential attempt to outline a theory of reputation was pro-
vided by Robert Post in a 1986 article in the California Law Review.83 
Writing in the context of defamation law, Post offered three conceptions 
of defamation from the psychological and sociological literature: repu-
 
79 See Robert B. Cialdini et al., Basking in Reflected Glory: Three (Football) Field Studies, 34 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psych. 366, 366 (1976) (describing the human tendency to try to 
bolster one’s own status by association with another with high status). 
80 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). 
81 Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (“Where a person’s 
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is 
doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.”) (regarding identifica-
tion of the plaintiff as someone to whom sale of alcohol was forbidden), with Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 708–09 (1976) (interpreting Constantineau as holding that procedural due 
process applied because the government’s action deprived the plaintiff of a preexisting 
right under state law to purchase alcohol but that due process would not apply to reputa-
tional injury alone). This result has been the subject of some criticism. See, e.g., Krotoszyn-
ski, supra note 12, at 556–57 (suggesting that one’s interest in one’s reputation is as fun-
damental a right as his interest in free speech but that the Supreme Court does not accord 
reputation the same level of protection as speech); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and 
“Property,” 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 426 (1977) (criticizing the result in Paul by noting that 
“it is an unsettling conception of ‘liberty’ that protects an individual against state interfer-
ence with his access to liquor but not with his reputation in the community”); id. at 427 
(“[T]he Court’s conclusion that such an assault [upon an individual’s sense of identity] 
implicates no constitutionally protected interest stands wholly at odds with our ethical, 
political, and constitutional assumption about the worth of each individual.”). 
82 See, e.g., Matter of E. Park High Sch., 714 A.2d 339, 345 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998) (noting that while the cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution require “stigma plus,” the New Jersey state constitution gives individuals “a 
protectable interest in reputation warranting due process protections without requiring 
any other tangible loss”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83 Post, supra note 1, at 693. 
1366 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1341 
tation as property, reputation as dignity, and reputation as honor. While 
each of these explanations resonates in some fashion with the sociologi-
cal theories just described, they cannot, as Post acknowledges,84 fully 
account for the law’s interest in reputation. 
A. Reputation as Property 
 One way of conceiving reputation is as the property of the individ-
ual or firm, a view that has found favor with both courts and commen-
tators.85 This view accords with many of the metaphors we use to talk 
about reputation: reputation can be gained, possessed, and lost; it is 
valuable or priceless; it can be borrowed or lent.86 The concept of repu-
tation as property has, not surprisingly, particular resonance in trade-
mark cases, in which courts have often justified trademark law in prop-
erty-based terms.87 In this view, the conception of reputation is a 
Lockean one. Reputation is something that is created by an individual 
or firm from the fruits of one’s labor, and so it is the individual or firm 
that is entitled to whatever ownership rights and value result.88 One 
who causes harm to another’s reputation has thus deprived him of a 
valuable asset in the same way as if he had stolen the other’s car. 
 The conception of reputation as property is satisfying in part be-
cause reputation shares a variety of characteristics with other things 
                                                                                                                      
84 Id. (suggesting that “an evaluation of the state’s interest in reputation can have no 
single outcome, for the meaning and significance of reputation will depend upon the 
kinds of social relationships that defamation law is designed to uphold”). 
85 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Reputation as Property in Virtual Economies, 118 Yale L.J. Pocket 
Part 120, 120 (2009), http://thepocketpart.org/2009/01/19/blocher.html; Epstein, supra 
note 2, at 801; Krotoszynski, supra note 12, at 591; Veeder, supra note 13, at 33 (noting that 
“[o]ne’s good name is . . . as truly the product of one’s efforts as any physical possession”). 
86 See, e.g., W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement, 45 J. 
Econ. Literature 595, 616 (2007) (characterizing reputational capital as “rent that a 
party receives for being trustworthy”). 
87 See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916). 
Common-law trade-marks, and the right to their exclusive use, are of course 
to be classed among property rights, but only in the sense that a man’s right 
to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good-will that 
flows from it, free from unwarranted interference by others, is a property 
right, for the protection of which a trade-mark is an instrumentality. 
Id.(citation omitted); see also Bone, supra note 49, at 560 (discussing how “the idea that 
trademark law protects goodwill as property” became “a central organizing principle” of 
trademark law). 
88 Post, supra note 1, at 695 (describing a view of reputation under which “[u]njustified 
aspersions on character can thus deprive individuals of the results of their labors of self-
creation, and the ensuing injury can be monetarily assessed”). 
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that we consider to be property. For example, it is often capable of hav-
ing an economic value, derived from the market, rendering it both the 
subject of trade and the basis of compensation resulting from harm. 
The value of a celebrity’s reputation, for example, can be assessed by 
determining the amount that the celebrity has been paid (or would be 
paid in the future) to appear in an advertisement—subtracting, per-
haps, the fee that would be paid to a non-celebrity simply for reciting 
the ad copy. Economic value also manifests itself in the many ways in 
which an individual with an enhanced reputation is able to command a 
higher fee for her services than an individual with a lesser perceived 
reputation and in which a company is able to command more for its 
products or services than others in its field. For example, a scientist 
with a reputation as a careful and productive researcher will presuma-
bly, all else being equal, receive a higher salary from laboratories than a 
recent graduate, and a lawyer or doctor with a good reputation can typ-
ically, absent regulatory controls, charge a higher fee for her services 
than a professional with a poor reputation. Likewise, a pharmaceutical 
company can continue to command higher prices for its branded drugs 
vis-à-vis generic versions even once an applicable patent expires, and 
designer handbags and other luxury goods fetch a considerably higher 
price than products similar in appearance.89 
 The appeal, then, of treating reputation as property is that dam-
ages can be calculated by reference to standard methods of evaluating 
harm to property rights, such as a decline in market value or the excess 
of firm value over tangible assets.90 The risk is that the ease of adminis-
trability on the damages side will spill over into the determination of 
liability, such that courts or juries will be more likely to see harm to 
reputation when the plaintiff is involved in commercial activity.91 It is 
                                                                                                                      
89 See Charles Fombrun & Mark Shanley, What’s in a Name?: Reputation Building and 
Corporate Strategy, 33 Acad. Mgmt. J. 233, 233 (1990); Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Ap-
proach to Channeling?, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 873, 878–81 (2009). Commentators dispute 
whether the law should protect this value. See Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the 
Trademark Consumer, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1227, 1251–59 (2008) (describing the de-
bate); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 
57 Yale L.J. 1165, 1205–06 (1948) (criticizing protectionism); Landes & Posner, supra note 
55, at 277 (contending that a rational consumer might be willing to pay a premium for the 
signal of quality control represented by the trademark). 
90 Post, supra note 1, at 694–95. 
91 Cf. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Curbing the High Price of Loose Talk, 18 U.C. Davis 
L. Rev. 359, 388 (1985) (suggesting that because the connection between “disparagement 
of the plaintiff in her trade, business profession, or office” (a type of slander per se) and 
“harm to economic well-being seems so concrete, the law has been especially ready to offer 
a remedy for untruths of this kind”). 
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therefore not surprising that in cases involving firms, as opposed to in-
dividuals, the discussion of reputation has a decidedly property-like fo-
cus, even when economic harm has not been demonstrated.92 On the 
other hand, although the scope of any property interest can vary, repu-
tation seems particularly difficult to limn with cognizable boundaries. 
The nature of one’s reputation can change from day to day. A corpora-
tion can be disgraced in one week and then redeem itself years down 
the road;93 an individual can have one reputation in the workplace, 
another on the golf course, and a third in his house of worship. In con-
trast to concepts such as fixation in copyright law, which is said to have 
the benefit of delineating the “metes and bounds” of the property in-
terest,94 there is nothing particular about the way reputation is pre-
sented to the public that suggests its limits, apart from the fact that 
reputation is anchored to a name.95 
B. Reputation as Dignity 
 The second characterization of reputation that Post describes is 
the conception of reputation as dignity—the idea that “every man has a 
right to his good name, unimpaired”96 as a result of “the essential dig-
nity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any de-
cent system of ordered liberty.”97 Under this conception, a person’s 
                                                                                                                      
92 James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(“Though economic harm per se is not required, this court has pointed out that the owner 
of a mark is damaged by a later use of a similar mark which places the owner’s reputation 
beyond its control, though no loss in business is shown.”). 
93 David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 747, 
777–78 (1984) (“In today’s pluralistic society, much is tolerated and little is universally 
condemned. . . . Even if one’s reputation is harmed, the victim is not condemned auto-
matically to live out his life in disgrace. The mobility and anonymity of modern society 
make rehabilitation much easier.”); Post, supra note 1, at 701 (noting that the conception 
of reputation as property “presupposes that individual identity is distinct from reputation, 
in the sense that an individual can always construct a new reputation”). In this vein, some 
commentators have advocated for a short statute of limitations for defamation claims. See, 
e.g., David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 
847, 850 n.16 (1986) (“If plaintiffs are genuinely interested in vindicating injury to reputa-
tion, it makes no sense to allow the wound to fester for years after the offense.”). 
94 See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consis-
tency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1343, 1380–84 (1989) (describing 
how the fixation requirement in copyright law substitutes for physical boundaries). 
95 Cf. Bone, supra note 49, at 584–85 (describing the amorphous nature of goodwill, 
particularly in the view of early-twentieth-century formalists). 
96 Senna v. Florimont, 958 A.2d 427, 433 (N.J. 2008) (citations omitted) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
97 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Post, su-
pra note 1, at 707–19. 
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reputation is not the result of effort or ingenuity but inheres in the in-
dividual by virtue of her existence; as such, it is fundamentally con-
nected to her identity and to concepts of self-representation.98 This 
view of reputation was, courts have noted, what underlay the common 
law rule that a defendant could be liable for a defamatory statement 
regardless of fault,99 since every individual is presumed to have a good 
reputation ab initio. 
 A conception of reputation as dignity is appealing precisely for the 
reason that adherents of this view would reject a conception of reputa-
tion as property. To view reputation as property is to commercialize ev-
er-increasing aspects of our daily lives and to view individuals merely as 
subjects for others transactions.100 A damage award under a property 
theory of reputation is merely a licensing fee; it does not take full ac-
count of the frustration of autonomy caused by harm to reputation, but 
instead treats individuals as economic units to be bought and sold. By 
contrast, a conception of reputation as dignity accords each individual 
the same intrinsic worth by validating the individual’s “full membership 
in society” while at the same time enforcing “society’s interest in its 
rules of civility.”101 Such an interest, however, is unlikely to ever be fully 
addressed by legal means; indeed, the turn to legal process itself might, 
in some way, devalue the dignity interest by reducing it to a subject of 
adjudication and debate. 
C. Reputation as Honor 
 Finally, Post discusses the conception of reputation as honor—the 
theory that one’s reputation comes from one’s assigned or acquired so-
cial status.102 In this conception, reputation is neither earned nor intrin-
                                                                                                                      
98 Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 
43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 79, 110 (2009) (summarizing conceptions of reputation as property, 
honor, privacy, and dignity and concluding that “[a]n essential commonality across the 
varied conceptions is the idea that an individual’s identity is, at least partially, constituted 
by her reputation”). 
99 Senna, 958 A.2d at 433. 
100 Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1377 (2000) (“Our conceptions of property, choice, and information 
reinforce one another; under all of them, individuals are treated as the natural and appro-
priate objects of others’ trades, others’ choices, others’ taxonomies, and others’ speech.”). 
101 Post, supra note 1, at 711. 
102 Id. at 699–700 (describing a form of reputation “in which an individual personally 
identifies with the normative characteristics of a particular social role and in return per-
sonally receives from others the regard and estimation that society accords to that role”). 
See generally Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2011) (discussing the legal vindication of honor). 
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sic but rather is conferred as a result of one’s position relative to others. 
One might accord the president of the United States a certain amount 
of respect, for example, despite disagreeing with his policies, because 
one is “respecting the office” rather than the individual. Social titles and 
other forms of etiquette also reflect the sense of reputation as honor. 
For example, it is customary to address physicians as “Doctor” and uni-
versity educators as “Professor,” regardless of the abilities or personality 
of the individuals who occupy those positions; as a result, certain social 
benefits derive from that recognition that are not available to individuals 
elsewhere in the hierarchy. The hierarchy communicates to its partici-
pants the expectations of interaction, thus facilitating social and eco-
nomic transactions. Those who transgress the hierarchy’s boundaries by 
falsely calling another’s honor into question cause an overall societal 
harm by disrupting the expected flow of interaction. 
 Because individuals have an interest in preserving their position in 
the hierarchy, in that their position contributes to their sense of iden-
tity and self-worth,103 the ability to vindicate reputation through legal 
proceedings minimizes the risk that individuals will turn to self-help 
measures.104 Its reliance on a shared understanding of social structure, 
however, renders a theory of reputation as honor conceptually easier to 
navigate for those familiar with the structure and, concomitantly, more 
difficult for others. (Consider, for example, the likely ramifications for 
a courtroom participant who unwittingly calls the judge by her first 
name.) Thus, this description of reputation takes some account of the 
social aspect of reputation—the importance of an individual or entity’s 
reputation to the preservation of social order and engagement—but it 
instantiates it in an ossified hierarchy of privilege, requiring the law, as 
Post puts it, to “define and enforce the ascribed status of social 
roles.”105 
                                                                                                                     
D. The Limits of Existing Theories 
 Each of the proposed theories of reputation holds a certain ap-
peal. The property theory of reputation responds to the entrenched 
sense that one’s reputation has value and that transgressions that harm 
 
103 See Mitnick, supra note 98, at 111 (discussing how “legally constructed labels, 
stamped upon individuals, may serve as social markers constituting aspects of individuals’ 
social identities”). 
104 See Senna, 958 A.2d at 433 n.4; McNamara, supra note 13, at 79 (describing the view 
that defamation laws “maintained peace and order”); Solove, supra note 36, at 114–17 
(describing the theory that legal vindication of reputation was a substitute for dueling). 
105 Post, supra note 1, at 702. 
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reputation should be remedied through financial compensation that 
not only attempts to make the plaintiff whole but serves as a signal to 
the community of the magnitude of the defendant’s misdeeds. Indeed, 
assuming media coverage of the suit, the availability of monetary com-
pensation allows plaintiffs to create their own signals through the 
amount of the ad damnum request in the complaint. The dignity theory 
of reputation, conversely, reflects our sense that reputation is value-
less—that a damages award is but a substitute for the restoration of 
one’s self-worth and the rehabilitation of one’s identity. The dignity 
theory thus should favor attention to statements of rehabilitation and 
confession, such as retractions and disclaimers, in addition to judicial 
pronouncements that return the individual to his prior state of person-
hood.106 Finally, the honor theory of reputation provides a justification 
that reflects the function of reputation in society. Whereas the property 
and dignity theories do not require participation by any individuals 
other than the plaintiff and defendant for legal resolution, the honor 
theory incorporates the interests of other members of society by pre-
serving one individual’s social role so that the roles of others can be 
qua
ments are sought—indeed, some suggest that they are the entire point 
                                                                                                                     
e lly maintained in relation.107 
 No one of these theories can offer a complete picture of the ways in 
which the law responds to reputational interests. For example, while the 
dignity and honor theories comfortably incorporate attention to retrac-
tions or disclaimers in determining the scope of an appropriate remedy, 
a property theory of reputation would not have much need for such 
remedies. If harm to one’s reputation were purely economic, a rational 
actor would presumably be made whole with a damages payment when 
his reputation was harmed; there would be no need for a judicial resto-
ration of reputation or a public statement by the defendant that he had 
erred. (One does not, for example, seek first and foremost a public 
statement of fault from the miscreant who steals one’s car; financial 
compensation is the primary consideration.) The fact that such state-
 
106 See, e.g., Craik, supra note 22, at 164 (“In village life in sixteenth-century England, 
the remedy was straightforward. At Sunday morning church service, for example, the de-
fendant would stand before the congregation, announce that he or she had sinned against 
the plaintiff, perhaps acknowledge the falsity of the assertions, publicly apologize, and seek 
forgiveness.”). 
107 Zimmerman, supra note 91, at 376 (discussing the Supreme Court’s defamation 
opinions as evidencing “an assumption that defamation was a vehicle designed not to deal 
with the irritating untruth but with those injuries that segregated their victims from the 
normal benefits of social intercourse or threatened the stability of the public order”). 
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of bringing a defamation suit108—suggests that something other than a 
pure economic interest is at stake. More particularly, as Post and other 
commentators have noted, a property theory of reputation does not ex-
plain certain restrictions on recovery for reputational harm, such as the 
requirement in defamation law that the communication be defamatory, 
as opposed to merely false, or the historical presumption of damages for 
certain kinds of communications.109 
 The dignity and honor theories, likewise, do not fully account for 
the fact that corporations can vindicate reputational interests under sev-
eral causes of action, including defamation, trade libel, and trademark 
infringement. Although corporations may share the speech interests of 
natural persons110 and may suffer reputational harm as a result of activi-
ties other than the production of goods and services, such as philan-
thropic efforts or community-based activities,111 it is difficult to charac-
terize corporate entities as having interests in dignity or honor. As 
Jerome Skolnick has noted, “[a] corporation falsely accused of bank-
ruptcy might lose property, but it cannot lose dignity, a distinction that 
judges do not always appreciate.”112 The dignity theory in particular also 
does not seem to explain various requirements in the doctrine, such as 
the requirement in defamation law that the statement at issue be pub-
lished to a third party; under a dignity theory, making the false state-
ment solely to the plaintiff would seem to be enough.113 In addition, as 
suggested earlier, neither the dignity theory nor the honor theory of 
reputation provides as strong support as does the property theory for 
monetary damage awards. It is true that monetary damage awards are 
often used as a measure of physical or emotional harm in tort law, even 
though financial compensation cannot restore an injured individual to 
her state before the accident; and it is likely that no plaintiff in a wrong-
ful death suit, for example, would attest that he was ambivalent between 
financial compensation and the death of his loved one. But in such 
cases, we understand the damage award to be representational of the 
                                                                                                                      
108 See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and 
What Plaintiffs Get, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 789, 791–93 (1986) (contending that plaintiffs pursue 
libel actions not for monetary relief but rather for “restoring reputation, correcting what 
plaintiffs view as falsity, and vengeance” and that plaintiffs view libel lawsuits “as a form of 
public vindication”). 
109 See, e.g., McNamara, supra note 13, at 38; Post, supra note 1, at 697–99. 
110 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010). 
111 See Marshall, supra note 51. 
112 Jerome H. Skolnick, Foreword: The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 
677, 678 (1986). 
113 Cf. Craik, supra note 22, at 168. 
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nature and magnitude of the harm inflicted while acknowledging that 
true restoration is impossible. By contrast, financial compensation seems 
fundamentally inconsistent with reputational harm described by a dig-
nity or honor theory, such that to even conceive of compensating such 
harm by reference to economics risks further dignity-based harm.114 
Finally, to the extent the honor theory relies on the preservation of so-
cial structure for its justification, it might be better characterized as a 
theory of status, rather than of reputation. 
                                                                                                                     
 This is not to say, however, that a theory of reputation requires any 
of these proposed explanations to be jettisoned. One could propose 
that corporate reputational interests, for example, be justified solely by 
reference to property interests while defending individual reputational 
interests on all three theories, or justify monetary damage awards on a 
property theory while justifying disclaimer and retraction remedies on 
a dignity or honor theory. Indeed, the inability of any one theory to 
explain the breadth of reputational interests that exist suggests a need 
for any satisfying theory of reputation to be multidimensional. The ex-
isting theories, taken collectively, provide such a multidimensional ac-
count of reputation, but they do so primarily from the perspective of 
the reputation holder. The audience is recognized in the property and 
honor theories but primarily as a way of providing or assessing the value 
of the reputational interest to the reputation holder. But such a view 
does not fully incorporate the way in which reputation formation and 
usage is part of a cyclical exchange on the part of the audience: The 
audience both provides the inputs that are the basis of reputation and 
benefits from the outputs that are the result of the community’s collec-
tive judgment. It is the recognition of this interest that, this Article pro-
poses, provides a more complete justification for the law’s interest in 
reputation. 
 For example, the property theory of reputation suggests that repu-
tation should be protected because its value derives from the efforts of 
the reputation holder. But the threshold question is not the value of 
reputation; it is how it comes to be considered property at all. Unlike 
physical property or even some forms of intangible property, such as 
works protected by copyright law, reputation’s ontological status as 
property is not created until it reaches the economic or intellectual 
marketplace. Even a sculpture that no one wishes to acquire is still con-
 
114 Cf., e.g., David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 1047, 1049 
(2006) (“Reducing defamation to a remedy for economic loss would exalt commercial 
values over the more important social and cultural values that the law serves, not only in 
defamation but in tort law generally.”). 
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sidered the property of the sculptor; were that sculpture to be stolen 
from the artist’s studio, a court would hold that a conversion had oc-
curred and that the sculptor was entitled to a remedy under tort law, if 
only minimal monetary damages. But unlike the efforts of the sculptor 
that turn raw materials into art, one’s deeds do not automatically create 
reputation, contrary to what Lockean labor theory might suggest. Rep-
utation cannot exist without the judgments of others. The deeds that 
one does that lead to the formation of reputation are within an indi-
vidual’s control, but the reactions and judgments of others are not.115 
Granted, the property theory has a relational aspect to it, in that the 
propertization of reputation can contribute to a well-functioning mar-
ket. Without a conception of reputation as property, firms would have 
to make different choices about the structure of their businesses,116 and 
individuals would find that the search for products, employers, and 
other experience goods would become costly. But these scenarios re-
flect the treatment of reputation as property after its creation, not the 
commercialization of reputation because it is property. 
 Trademark law, in fact, illustrates the importance of audience in-
terest. By its very nature, a trademark exists only when the relevant con-
suming public both recognizes the mark as an indication of the source 
of a good or service and accords that symbol some relevant reputation-
related characteristics that allow the mark to serve as a shorthand for 
the brand. As courts have noted, it matters not how much money a 
company spends attempting to establish trademark rights in a word, 
symbol, or trade dress; if consumers fail to recognize the putative mark 
as distinguishing among producers, there are few, if any, legal rights for 
the firm to enforce.117 Thus, a company can spend millions of dollars 
                                                                                                                      
 
115 See Bromley, supra note 13, at 15 (characterizing reputation as “essentially a collec-
tive system of subjective beliefs among members of a social group”); Robert N. Bellah, The 
Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 743, 743 (1986) (“[A]lthough we 
think of a person as ‘having’ a reputation, reputation is not a property or possession of 
individuals—it is a relation between persons.”); Nicholas Emler, A Social Psychology of Repu-
tation, 1 Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 171, 171 (1990) (describing reputation as “a collective 
phenomenon and a product of social processes”); id. at 178 (noting that reputations are 
“judgments, about vices and virtues, strengths and weaknesses, based on accumulating pat-
terns of evidence which societies constantly process and reprocess”). 
116 See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 345, 346 (2009) (noting that a recognized trademark is often a firm’s 
“most valuable asset”). 
117 See, e.g., Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1332 
(8th Cir. 1985) (“The desires or intentions of the creator . . . are irrelevant. Instead, it is 
the attitude of the consumer that is important.”); Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. 
Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1936) (“It, therefore, makes no difference what efforts or mon-
ey the DuPont Company expended in order to persuade the public that ‘cellophane’ 
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attempting to get consumers to recognize “SPEEDY” as the trademark 
for a new line of athletic shoes, but the trademark will have no exis-
tence as such unless consumers are willing to engage in the cognitive 
effort required to associate the word with the product’s qualities.118 
And while the financial benefits of the reputation attached to the mark 
redound to the trademark holder, such benefits can accrue only if con-
sumers use the reputational signals associated with the mark to make 
decisions about quality in the marketplace. If those decisions are based 
on muddy reputational signals, the cost of decision making increases. 
 The dignity and honor theories of reputation likewise focus on the 
interests of the reputation holder over the interests of the audience, 
suggesting, respectively, that reputation should be protected because 
such protection demonstrates respect for the intrinsic worth of the in-
dividual and because it helps to maintain the individual’s place in the 
social hierarchy. The former theory, like the property theory, presup-
poses reputation’s existence, akin to individual autonomy. But one is 
not born with reputation; rather, it develops only through social and 
economic actions with others. Neither the newborn child nor the nas-
cent corporation has any reputational interest at the time of birth, even 
though the child, at least, could be said to have dignity from its first 
breath, simply by virtue of her existence as a human being. The honor 
theory of reputation, likewise, incorporates relational aspects in that 
the theory justifies the law’s vindication of reputational interests on the 
grounds that the preservation of social roles is important to individual 
interaction.119 But, as with the dignity theory, the honor theory neces-
                                                                                                                      
means an article of DuPont manufacture. So far as it did not succeed in actually converting 
the world to its gospel it can have no relief.”). 
118 Under the Abercrombie hierarchy used to assess trademark strength a fanciful (in-
vented), arbitrary, or suggestive word mark can be a valid trademark without the need for 
the putative owner to show secondary meaning in the marketplace. See Abercrombie & 
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976). But the fact that the word 
qualifies as a trademark in theory does not mean that it actually serves as a mark in prac-
tice—in other words, that the purported mark bears any acquired (as opposed to inher-
ent) distinctiveness. 
119 Because of the social nature of individuals, the dignity and honor theories have 
some degree of overlap. See Post, supra note 1, at 711. 
Implicit in the concept of reputation as dignity, therefore, is the potential for 
a dual function for defamation law: the protection of an individual’s interest 
in dignity, which is to say his interest in being included within the forms of 
social respect; and the enforcement of society’s interest in its rules of civility, 
which is to say its interest in defining and maintaining the contours of its own 
social constitution. 
Id. 
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sarily depends on a community to give meaning to those social roles; 
without that meaning, the law has nothing to protect. 
 Thus, while not discounting the utility of these existing theories for 
justifying the law’s interest in reputation from the reputation owner’s 
perspective, a more complete theory of reputation would take into ac-
count not only the importance of reputation for the reputation holder 
but also the interests of communities in forming and using the reputa-
tions of others, whether individual or corporate. As I will now discuss, 
given the variety of legal theories individuals and corporations can use 
to vindicate reputational interests, such interests may too easily fall by 
the wayside. 
III. Reputation and the Law 
 Various doctrines in the law are either designed to vindicate repu-
tational interests (although, perhaps, not solely reputational interests) 
or have been employed by resourceful plaintiffs to vindicate such inter-
ests. A consideration of these doctrines reveals varying conceptions 
about the nature of reputation and the justification for its legal protec-
tion. In particular, some doctrines reveal themselves to be grounded in 
the relationship between the plaintiff and others, while other doctrines 
have a more tenuous connection to this interest. 
A. Defamation and Trade Libel 
 The torts of defamation and trade libel are the natural arena for 
claims attempting to address harms to one’s reputation.120 As the Su-
preme Court has noted, “[d]efamation law developed not only as a 
means of allowing an individual to vindicate his good name, but also 
for the purpose of obtaining redress for harm caused by such state-
ments.”121 The tort is predicated on a false and defamatory statement 
about the plaintiff communicated to a third party,122 with “defamatory 
                                                                                                                      
 
120 Commentators have suggested that the number of libel cases filed against media 
defendants is on the wane. John Koblin, The End of Libel?, N.Y. Observer ( June 9, 2010), 
http://www.observer.com/2010/media/end-libel? (citing commentators suggesting that 
the decrease may be due to past defendant victories, the ability to post corrections and 
responses on the Internet quickly, or a decrease in the amount of investigative journalism 
being published). The trend may be explained, however, by a shift to claims filed against 
individuals for allegedly defamatory material on the Internet, which claims would likely 
not be available against service providers due to the safe harbor of 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
121 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 12 (1990). 
122 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977). The tort also requires that the 
publication to the third party be unprivileged; that the defendant have acted with fault at 
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statement” typically characterized as a communication that “tends so to 
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with 
him.”123 A statement can have a defamatory effect even if it resonates 
only with “a substantial and respectable minority,” assuming that the 
audience is a creditable one.124 The Restatement further suggests that a 
defamatory communication may harm one’s reputation if it “expose[s] 
[that person] to hatred, ridicule, or contempt” or “reflect[s] unfavora-
bly upon [the plaintiff’s] personal morality.”125 The defamatory nature 
of the statement at issue is typically a jury question, based on a reason-
able person standard; as the Restatement explains, “[t]he question to 
be determined is whether the communication is reasonably understood 
in a defamatory sense by the recipient.”126 Thus, defamation cases at 
least attempt to judge reputational harm by reference to a community 
judgment, although, as commentators have noted, this is not always a 
straightforward task.127 
 Defamation’s notion of reputation is fundamentally social in na-
ture. One cannot sue for defamation unless the statement at issue has 
been communicated to a third party and has some effect on how others 
perceive or engage with the plaintiff.128 In this way, an audience mem-
ber’s positional involvement is required in receiving the communica-
tion; his or her cognitive involvement is required in responding to that 
communication in a way that is unfavorable to the plaintiff. A statement 
that is communicated only to the plaintiff may cause hurt feelings and a 
decrease in self-worth; it may also reflect an intent on the part of the 
speaker to refrain from future dealings with the plaintiff. But, as with a 
                                                                                                                      
least at the level of negligence; and “either actionability of the statement irrespective of 
special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.” Id. 
123 Id. § 559. 
124 Id. § 559 cmt. e. 
125 Id. § 559 cmt. b. 
126 Id. § 563 cmt. c. 
127 See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 74, at 43 (“[C]ommunity in modern life bears little re-
semblance to the ‘myth of community’ constructed by defamation law.”). 
128 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 cmt. b (1977). 
The law of defamation primarily protects only the interest in reputation. 
Therefore, unless the defamatory matter is communicated to a third person 
there has been no loss of reputation, since reputation is the estimation in 
which one’s character is held by his neighbors or associates. The communica-
tion of disparaging matter only to the person to whom it refers is not action-
able defamation, irrespective of the vile or scandalous character of the com-
munication and its effects upon the feelings of that person. 
Id. 
1378 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1341 
corporation’s goodwill, the decisions of others not to engage further 
with an individual based only on their own experiences with that indi-
vidual is not a decision sounding in reputational interests. Reputation is 
affected only when those experiences or opinions are communicated to 
others, causing those recipients to change their behavior toward the 
plaintiff. In this way, as Peter Tiersma has noted, using the language of 
speech act theory, defamation is based on the perlocutionary effect of 
the defamatory statement.129 
 Despite its focus on the plaintiff’s relationship to the community, 
the defamation tort cannot remedy all reputational harms resulting 
from a disruption of this relationship. On occasion, the plaintiff’s in-
terest must give way to the countervailing interest of the defendant in 
exercising her First Amendment–related rights. True statements,130 
statements of “pure” opinion (that is, statements not based on undis-
closed, potentially defamatory facts),131 statements that could not rea-
sonably be understood to be asserting a false fact (such as a parody),132 
and statements made without fault on the part of the person making 
the statement133 all may have the potential to harm one’s reputation 
but are not actionable as defamation. For example, the statement “Bob 
embezzled money from his former employer” may well change others’ 
view of Bob if they were previously unaware of the incident, but Bob 
has no cause of action under defamation law if the statement is true. 
 Many of these exclusions from the reach of defamation are rooted 
in the First Amendment–based conclusion that the type of speech at 
                                                                                                                      
129 Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 303, 307 (1987) 
(“[R]ather than look to the force of the speaker’s utterance, this view of defamation looks 
to the impact that the utterance or writing may have on the hearer and, as a consequence, 
on the victim’s reputation.”). 
130 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A (1977). 
131 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19–20 (1990) (holding that “a statement on matters of public 
concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, 
at least in situations, like the present, where a media defendant is involved”); Gertz v. Ro-
bert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment there is no 
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other 
ideas.”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977). 
132 Cf. McNamara, supra note 13, at 185 (noting that satire can damage reputation 
“because it conveys factual imputations that would tend to diminish the standing in which 
the plaintiff is held and expresses an opinion that encourages others to view the plaintiff 
in a negative light”). 
133 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (“We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability 
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for 
a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B (1977). 
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issue or the interest in limiting the chilling effect of potential liability 
for speech outweighs the reputational harm to the plaintiff. For exam-
ple, although under the common law, an individual was presumed to 
have a good reputation, such that “[s]tatements defaming that person 
[were] therefore presumptively false,”134 a plaintiff filing suit against a 
media defendant with regard to a matter of public concern now bears 
the burden of showing that the statement at issue is false.135 Thus, a 
plaintiff who believes that a statement that has caused harm to her rep-
utation is false, but who cannot make that showing in court, will not 
prevail. Likewise, under Supreme Court doctrine, a public official or 
public figure cannot prevail in a defamation suit unless she proves that 
the statement was made with actual malice—in other words, “with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not.”136 Thus, even if the statement at issue was false, and 
harmed the plaintiff’s reputation in a substantial way, the defendant’s 
state of mind will determine whether the plaintiff has a legal remedy.137 
Finally, actual malice must be shown in order to recover presumed or 
punitive damages in a public concern case, even for a private-figure 
                                                                                                                      
134 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770 (1986). 
135 Id. at 776. 
136 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that a public figure may recover for defamation only upon a showing of “highly unreason-
able conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and 
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
137 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339, 342 (noting that the New York Times standard “exacts a . . . 
high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood,” since “many deserving plaintiffs, 
including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of 
the New York Times test”); Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 Wm. & Mary L Rev. 905, 910 
(1984) (“Implicit in the strategic protection of New York Times, therefore, is the strategic 
sacrifice of some deserving plaintiffs to the more important, at least to society as a whole, 
goals of the first amendment.”); Martin M. Shapiro, Libel Regulatory Analysis, 74 Calif. L. 
Rev. 883, 885 (1986) (contending that this standard is inappropriate “because it tends to 
obscure the truth/falsehood issue and is ill tailored to achieve one important regulatory 
goal, preventing injury to individuals through falsehoods”). 
Although the New York Times standard is typically raised when the defendant is a media 
institution, the defendants in the case included not only the newspaper that published the 
advertisement at issue but four individual signatories; the Court, in its holding, referred to 
libel actions brought by public officials against “critics of their official conduct.” Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283; id. at 286 (holding that judgment against individual defendants 
was “without constitutional support” under New York Times standard); see also Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773 n.4 (1985) (White, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (noting that the Court has, “[f]rom its inception, without discussing the 
issue, . . . applied the rule of New York Times to nonmedia defendants”). 
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plaintiff,138 although a private plaintiff in a private concern case may 
well be entitled to presumed and punitive damages without a showing 
of actual malice under the common law standard. 
 Thus, the constitutionalization of defamation law in the United 
States limits the ability of the courts to provide a reputation-correcting 
function. Some plaintiffs who are unable to prove fault on the part of 
the defendant or falsity with respect to a matter of public concern are 
not entitled to judgment, even if the goal is simply to achieve a declara-
tion of falsity that corrects the record.139 More precisely, even when 
such a plaintiff can prove intent to harm the plaintiff’s reputation on 
the part of the defendant, but the statement at issue is not susceptible 
of being proved true or false, the plaintiff cannot obtain relief under 
defamation law.140 Each of these exclusions tips the balance not in favor 
of the defendant at issue in any particular case—the types of defen-
dants in defamation cases, while perhaps largely members of the media, 
are too diverse to categorize as having any particular shared interest 
beyond speech—but in favor of facilitating the sharing of information 
and opinions about others. Truthful statements, statements of opinion, 
and critical commentary about others all help the community to form 
judgments and determine the scope of future interactions; false state-
ments about public officials and public figures, in the Court’s view, are 
not discouraged unless they are intended to create a disruption to the 
information flow or are disseminated without regard to this disrup-
tion.141 One might be concerned that the Court permits falsehoods to 
be disseminated about public figures without risk of liability, as these 
                                                                                                                      
138 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 (holding that “the States may not permit recovery of pre-
sumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge 
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth”). 
139 Id. at 376 (White, J., dissenting) (“Plainly, with the additional burden on the plaintiff 
of proving negligence or other fault, it will be exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible, for 
him to vindicate his reputation interest by securing a judgment for nominal damages, the 
practical effect of such a judgment being a judicial declaration that the publication was in-
deed false.”). 
140 Hepps, 475 U.S. at 785 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
141 Id. at 778 (noting that “requiring the plaintiff to show falsity [with respect to mat-
ters of public concern] will insulate from liability some speech that is false but unprovably 
so” but that this standard is justified by “the restrictions that the First Amendment places 
upon the common law of defamation”); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (“The First Amendment 
requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”); Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (noting that an “erroneous statement is inevitable in free de-
bate” and that “it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breath-
ing space that they need to survive”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration omit-
ted); id. at 272 (“Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing 
speech that would otherwise be free than does factual error.”). 
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are individuals about whom the public has a significant collective inter-
est in evaluating. But the Court’s jurisprudence seems to suggest that a 
public official or public figure has a reputation that crosses the boun-
daries of many communities, and so it is more important to facilitate 
communication among as well as within communities to improve the 
outcome of the collective decision-making process that results from in-
formation exchanges than it is to more stringently regulate the precise 
inputs to that conversation.142 In other words, the assumption is that 
because of the public figure’s presence in and access to the media, it is 
more likely that false statements will inspire a true response, thus cor-
recting the record more cheaply and efficiently than litigation.143 It is 
thus not particularly the act of speaking in any one instance that is fur-
thered but the ultimate result of the collective act of exchanging in-
formation about an individual or firm. 
 These limitations reinforce the idea that defamation’s reputational 
interest is social as well as economic. If a plaintiff’s interest in a defama-
tion case were purely economic, plaintiffs might not seek (as they often 
do) to “correct the record” by obtaining a jury verdict in their favor, 
seeking a retraction, or, indeed, filing the case in the first place; rather, 
at least some plaintiffs would be indifferent to an unharmed reputation 
versus a harmed reputation with a monetary payment to compensate for 
the harm. The social nature of the tort is also reflected in the categories 
of plaintiffs who are permitted to seek a remedy. A corporation can 
bring a defamation suit for harm to its business reputation,144 which, on 
its face suggests an economic focus to the tort, but defamation suits 
cannot be brought on behalf of deceased individuals, even if their de-
scendants suffer dignitary harm by virtue of the decedent’s injured 
reputation.145 (One might, for example, suffer emotional harm from 
                                                                                                                      
142 U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 937 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (noting that “the state has only a ‘limited’ interest in compensating public per-
sons for injury to reputation but has a ‘strong and legitimate’ interest in compensating 
private persons for the same injury”). 
143 Cf. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous 
Speech, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1537, 1585 (2007) (concluding that New York Times v. Sulli-
van rests on an assumption that citizens “are capable of exercising their critical faculties to 
ferret out valuable information”). 
144 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(noting that a corporation “cannot have a reputation for chastity but it can have a reputation 
for adhering to the moral standards of the community in which it sells its products and if that 
reputation is assailed in a fashion likely to harm the corporation seriously the corporation 
has been libeled”) (interpreting Illinois law); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 561 
(1977). 
145 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 560 (1977). 
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the knowledge that the memory of one’s mother has been desecrated by 
the dissemination of a false statement about  her.) These limitations can 
be reconciled by emphasizing that reputational injury requires a change 
in behavior by others based on a judgment as to the plaintiff that has 
the potential of guiding future interactions with the plaintiff. Defama-
tion’s differing treatment of corporations and deceased individuals thus 
reflects the importance of a continuing relationship in which the plain-
tiff can modify his or her behavior in response to the community’s view. 
Corporations can have continuing relationships with their business 
partners and customers, but deceased individuals cannot have continu-
ing relationships with anyone; the emotional harm suffered by their de-
cedents, while compelling, does not result from an evaluation by others 
of them. 
 Trade libel is another way in which reputational interests are vindi-
cated, although perhaps a bit more obliquely than in individual defa-
mation cases. Although the tort in practice may be used to cover a 
broad range of uncompetitive practices, including tortious interference 
with prospective economic advantage,146 at its heart are concepts of 
commercial or product disparagement. As such, a claim of trade libel 
must allege (1) that a false and disparaging statement was communi-
cated to a third party with a degree of fault greater than negligence; (2) 
that the defendant had no privilege to make the statement; and (3) 
that the plaintiff suffered a direct economic loss as the result of the dis-
paragement.147 Thus, similar to defamation law, trade libel claims are a 
subset of a larger category of claims constituting injurious falsehood, 
many of which are not directly related to reputational harms.148 
                                                                                                                      
146 See, e.g., Patel v. Soriano, 848 A.2d 803, 834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
147 U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 924; Patel, 848 A.2d at 835. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts is equivocal on whether defamation law’s exclusion of statements of “pure opinion” 
applies to injurious falsehood claims. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A cmt. e 
(1977). 
148 See, e.g., Annbar Assocs. v. Am. Express Co., 565 S.W.2d 701, 702–03 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1978) (reviewing the trial of an injurious falsehood claim involving a false statement 
by a hotel reservation system that plaintiff hotel had no availability); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 623A cmt. a., illus. 2 (1977) (giving as an example of injurious falsehood 
an employer’s report to tax authorities that he paid more in income to an employee than 
he actually paid, which caused the employee to be prosecuted for tax evasion). Because of 
this relationship, not every jurisdiction recognizes a separate tort of business disparage-
ment. City Ambulance of Ala., Inc. v. Haynes Ambulance of Ala., Inc., 431 So. 2d 537, 539 
(Ala. 1983) (holding that the tort of disparagement is subsumed within the tort of inter-
ference with business relations). False claims about another’s product can also, in some 
circumstances, be redressed by a false advertising suit pursuant to section 43 of the 
Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
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 As courts and commentators have noted, trade libel differs from 
defamation in some important ways: the requirement of proof of dam-
ages and the fault required on the part of the defendant, to take just 
two.149 But, at least in some cases, there is less difference in the nature 
of the interest at stake. Although courts have distinguished trade libel 
actions from defamation actions on the grounds that the latter redress 
harm to reputation while the former provide recompense for eco-
nomic loss suffered due to lost sales,150 or on the grounds that defama-
tion claims concern the plaintiff while trade libel claims concern the 
plaintiff’s business,151 such distinctions may not often easily be made in 
practice. Thus, in 2004, in Patel v. Soriano, the Appellate Division of the 
Superior Court of New Jersey held that false statements made about the 
plaintiff surgeon constituted trade libel rather than defamation be-
cause the statements “pertained solely to the character of the medical 
services provided by plaintiff and essentially charged plaintiff with neg-
ligence”; the statements did not imply that the plaintiff was “personally 
dishonest, reprehensible, or lacking integrity.”152 But if defamation 
merely requires that the statement “tends so to harm the reputation of 
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter 
third persons from associating or dealing with him,”153 then it is diffi-
cult to understand why false statements about a surgeon’s medical ser-
vices would not also have such an effect. So too with firms: In both 
kinds of cases, the firm is alleging economic harm due to a change in 
attitude from a particular community with which it engages. For defa-
mation claims, the community may be its creditors or suppliers, while 
for a trade libel claim, the community may be its customers. As one 
commentator has noted, the effect of one harm may not spill over to 
                                                                                                                      
149 See, e.g., Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 543 A.2d 313, 329 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1987); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., 516 A.2d 220, 224–25 (N.J. 1986); Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 626 cmt. b (1977); Fred T. Magaziner, Note, Corporate 
Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75 Co-
lum. L. Rev. 963, 969 (1975). 
150 Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 224–25. 
151 See, e.g., Patel, 848 A.2d at 835 (“For example, if the statement charges plaintiff with 
personal misconduct, or imputes to plaintiff reprehensible personal characteristics, it is 
regarded as libel or slander. If, however, the aspersion reflects only on the quality of plain-
tiff’s product, or on the character of plaintiff’s business as such, it is disparagement.”) 
(citation omitted); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A cmt. g (1977) (distinguish-
ing between defamation and injurious falsehood on the grounds that, inter alia, the former 
concerns personal reputation and the latter concerns economic interests). 
152 Patel, 848 A.2d at 836; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 626 cmt. d 
(1977) (distinguishing statements about “the quality of the thing in question” from state-
ments that “attack the personal character of its owner as vendor or lessor”). 
153 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977). 
1384 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1341 
the other community, such that a false allegation that a company is in 
debt may not cause consumers to stop buying its products.154 But in 
other cases, the line may not be so clear.155 An allegation about the na-
ture of a firm’s products, the core of a trade libel claim, may well call 
into question the company’s reputation for quality or service and thus 
may not be all that distinguishable from a defamation claim, particu-
larly since defamation doctrine has historically provided that false state-
ments regarding the plaintiff’s business conduct can constitute slander 
per se.156 Moreover, as various consumer boycotts have demonstrated, 
the line between criticism of a corporation and a diminution in prod-
uct sales may well be connected. 
 Thus, while the requirement of proof of economic harm may func-
tionally distinguish the tort of trade libel from the tort of defamation, it 
does not fundamentally change the nature of the reputational interest. 
A loss of customers is, in many cases, directly related to the change in 
perception that those customers have about the plaintiff. More particu-
larly, the damages requirement focuses attention on the reputational 
harm, as opposed to any emotional harm that an individual plaintiff or 
its employees might have suffered due to the false statements at issue. As 
with trademark infringement suits, the subject of the next section, the 
pecuniary harm asserted in a trade libel suit reflects the reliance by con-
sumers on what turns out to be a false statement relating to the plain-
tiff’s reputation. In many instances, then, the tort is concerned with ac-
curate information flow to communities that are in a position to make a 
                                                                                                                      
154 Magaziner, supra note 149, at 970. Magaziner suggests that the ability of companies 
to market products under brand names that bear no resemblance to their corporate 
names (such as when the Kimberly-Clark Corporation sells disposable diapers under the 
brand name “Huggies”) helps to segregate product disparagement claims from corporate 
defamation claims. Id. But this could well have precisely the opposite effect: if consumers 
tend to think of the trademark as the company (in other words, that “Huggies” are made 
by “whichever company makes Huggies”), then there may be no real difference in con-
sumers’ minds between a statement that disparages the product and a statement that dis-
parages the company. Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 
UCLA L. Rev. 1099, 1099 (2002) (arguing that because consumers associate franchisees 
with their trademarks, trademark holders should bear liability for malfeasance). 
155 See Magaziner, supra note 149, at 970–72 (discussing cases in which courts distin-
guished disparagement of a product from defamation of a firm and cases in which courts 
made no distinction). 
156 But see id. at 981 (suggesting that the rules of per se actionability “served as a pro-
tective device against psychic suffering, and were justified only to the extent they served 
that function”). 
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collective judgment about the plaintiff and then take action based on 
that judgment.157 
B. Trademark and Unfair Competition 
 Trademark law’s reputational interests are bound up in the nature 
of the trademark. A trademark works as a symbolic handshake: it substi-
tutes for the personal guarantee previously available in face-to-face, 
closed network transactions. Whereas in earlier market-based transac-
tions the consumer could simply deal with the producer of the product 
or service directly and learn of that producer’s reputation for quality 
via in-person word of mouth, the fact that most transactions take place 
at some temporal and geographical distance from the place of manu-
facture now means that the individual producer (often now a conglom-
erate) typically does not sell directly to its customers.158 The trademark 
is the symbol that embodies that reputation: it serves as a repository for 
the relevant consuming public’s beliefs about and reactions to the pro-
ducer’s products and activities. 
 The traditional explanation of a trademark’s function is that it is a 
source identifier—that is, it tells consumers who is responsible for the 
quality, if not the direct manufacture, of the product at issue.159 Trade-
marks are, as I have discussed elsewhere,160 akin to proper names in 
this sense, in that they denote a particular brand in the same way that 
proper names denote a particular individual. As such, trademarks re-
duce the costs of finding products or services with which consumers 
have had a favorable experience; locating those products or services 
with which they have no experience but that they would like to try; and 
avoiding those products or services with which they wish no engage-
ment. Although all of these functions could be viewed as reputation 
related, only some of these functions relate to the collective judgment 
of a relevant community about the brand or producer. For example, 
imagine a soft drink named “Blaze” that has recently come on the mar-
ket. A consumer who was served a Blaze soda at a party, enjoyed it, and 
now wishes to purchase additional cans of the soft drink is not using the 
Blaze trademark as a shorthand for reputation; she is using it simply as 
                                                                                                                      
157 Gillette, supra note 32, at 1194–95 (noting that business defamation law “serves the 
social function of ensuring robust economic markets through competition based on price 
and quality rather than on denigration of a trader’s conduct” and thereby “create[s] in-
centives for the creation of accurate reputation”). 
158 See Bone, supra note 49, at 575–77. 
159 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 50, at 415. 
160 See generally Heymann, supra note 37. 
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a way of ensuring that the cans she retrieves from the shelf at the su-
permarket contain Blaze and not Coca-Cola. Her favorable response to 
the drink at the party is the motivating factor for her purchase, not 
what she might have heard about the drink or its producer from adver-
tisements, media sources, or other consumers. By contrast, a consumer 
who is in the market for a new car may be inclined toward a Volvo be-
cause of its reported reputation for safety, a reputation that accumu-
lated as the result of information exchanged about the brand by others, 
using the trademark as a repository for judgments about the brand. 
Thus, in contrast to the Volvo purchaser, although the Blaze soda pur-
chaser may well contribute to the reputation associated with the Blaze 
trademark in the future, her initial purchase reflects a use of the 
trademark merely as a source identifier and not as a repository for rep-
utation. Reputation, in other words, often reflects information that the 
consumer has not been able to assess based on her past experience with 
the product or service. A consumer may decide to shop for the first 
time at a particular organic supermarket because she has heard of its 
reputation for high-quality produce and for commendable philan-
thropic efforts. If she continues to shop there, she may no longer be 
relying on reputational signals as to the produce, as she can now de-
termine that quality for herself,161 but she may still rely on reputation 
as to the philanthropy, which is more difficult for her to assess. 
                                                                                                                     
 Trademarks often do, of course, function as a repository for repu-
tation, a function that is reflected in the rules regarding the licensing 
or assignment of marks. Trademark doctrine attempts to ensure that a 
trademark continues to have the same associations to consumers after a 
transfer as before by requiring that the trademark licensor monitor the 
quality of the goods produced by the licensee or else risk a finding that 
the trademark has been abandoned; likewise, it requires that alienation 
of the mark must also entail the transfer of goodwill.162 In both cases, 
the license or purchase is presumably motivated by a desire to reap the 
benefits of lower start-up costs associated with using a trademark with 
which the public is already familiar rather than having to enter the 
marketplace under a new name and thus incur the investment of time 
and resources to acquire name recognition. The requirements of moni-
toring and goodwill transfer are concerned with consumers’ ability to 
rely on the trademark both as a way of limiting search costs, such that 
 
161 Of course, the reputational signal as to the produce may still be valuable if the con-
sumer has a bad initial experience but decides to continue patronizing the store—in other 
words, if she believes that her experience was an anomaly. 
162 Landes & Posner, supra note 55, at 283–84. 
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the McDonald’s experience in West Bend is about the same as the 
McDonald’s experience in Phoenix,163 and as a repository for reputa-
tion. (Such a rule is not needed to protect the economic interests of 
the trademark owner, who presumably can address the risk that the 
franchisee will perform suboptimally in the franchise agreement.) If 
trademarks were solely about source identification, it would cause few 
problems if a trademark were transferred to a new owner, with or with-
out goodwill, so long as that transfer were accompanied by sufficient 
efforts at consumer education to mitigate any confusion as to the new 
producer. Indeed, restaurants and other retail outlets do this fairly fre-
quently when they advertise that they are “under new management” 
while retaining the same name of the business. 
 Because of this dual function of trademarks, trademark law’s bases 
for liability do not always reflect reputational concerns. The historical 
view of trademark law was that infringement concerned only the diver-
sion of sales from the plaintiff to the defendant; in other words, the 
plaintiff contended that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark 
on identical goods caused the consumer to purchase from the defen-
dant rather than from the plaintiff.164 This diversion may have resulted 
in an economic loss to the plaintiff, but that harm can be characterized 
as reputational only in some circumstances. If the consumer purchases 
the defendant’s product believing it to be the plaintiff’s and then real-
izes that she has been duped, she may not attribute her misfortune to 
the plaintiff. In this regard, the harm is akin to the loss of sales a busi-
ness might suffer from any sort of unlawful diversionary tactic em-
ployed by a competitor, such as a tortious interference with contract. 
On the other hand, if the consumer, having been duped into purchas-
ing a good of lesser quality sold under the plaintiff’s trademark, holds 
her dissatisfaction against the plaintiff, believing it to have changed the 
quality of its product without notice, this may well constitute a reputa-
tional harm if the consumer conveys her feelings to others, leading 
them also to forego future purchases of the product.165 
                                                                                                                      
 
163 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 50, at 434. 
164 See McKenna, supra note 5, at 1840–41. The case often cited to illustrate this early 
doctrine is Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., in which the court held that 
the defendant’s use of the Borden mark for ice cream did not infringe the plaintiff’s Bor-
den mark for milk, given that the plaintiff did not sell ice cream under the Borden mark 
and so suffered no diversion of sales. 201 F. 510, 515 (7th Cir. 1912). 
165 The trademark holder might argue that it has suffered a reputation-related harm 
merely because of the use of the reputational value of its mark without payment for the use. 
But if this theory sufficed to show reputational harm, it would be difficult to distinguish this 
use of the reputation associated with a trademark from other types of free-riding that are 
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 The relatively modern move to extending trademark infringement 
beyond diversion of sales—both to unrelated goods bearing the same 
or a similar mark as the plaintiff’s and to uses that are likely to confuse 
consumers as to sponsorship by or association with the trademark 
holder166—provides additional venues for reputation-related injury. For 
example, in one of the first cases to extend infringement doctrine to 
unrelated goods, Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co.,167 decided by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1917, the plaintiff, 
who at the time used the “Aunt Jemima” trademark for self-rising flour, 
brought suit against the defendants, who used the same mark for syr-
ups and “sugar creams.” The plaintiff could not prevail on the grounds 
that the defendants’ use of the mark to sell syrup diverted sales from 
the plaintiff that it would otherwise have made, because the plaintiff 
did not sell syrup. Rather, the plaintiff prevailed on the assumption that 
consumers might purchase the defendants’ product on the strength of 
the “Aunt Jemima” name, be disappointed with the result, and recon-
sider its loyalty to products sold under the “Aunt Jemima” brand.168 
 Here, too, it would seem as if the plaintiff’s harm could be charac-
terized as truly reputation-related only if the hypothetical consumer’s 
experience was part of a collective judgment about the quality of Aunt 
Jemima products. In other words, a consumer who was unhappy with 
her purchase of the defendants’ syrup and who believed it to have been 
manufactured by the plaintiff has no way of knowing if her experience is 
                                                                                                                      
widely viewed as permissible. For example, under such a theory, it would be trademark in-
fringement to lease the building next door to a well-known merchant in the hopes of picking 
up some of the merchant’s foot traffic. Similarly, if free-riding were the limit of the harm, a 
trademark owner would be satisfied with monetary compensation and not seek an injunc-
tion, the harm being only the use of the plaintiff’s property without paying. 
166 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (providing a cause of action for uses that 
are likely to “cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connec-
tion, or association of [the plaintiff] with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services or commercial activities by another person”). 
167 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917). 
168 Id. at 410. Some recent marketing studies have suggested that the harm at the cen-
ter of this theory is more theoretical than real, concluding that failed brand extensions do 
not tend to drastically change consumers’ impressions of the parent brand. See Lemley & 
McKenna, supra note 50, at 430–33 (citing studies). But see Luis M.B. Cabral, Stretching Firm 
and Brand Reputation, 31 RAND J. Econ. 658, 658–59 (2000) (suggesting that that success 
of brand extensions depends on the level of firm reputation); Birger Wernerfelt, Umbrella 
Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond, 19 
RAND J. Econ. 458, 458–59 (1988) (suggesting an effect on perceptions of the old prod-
uct when the new product is of poor quality). And even if consumers continue to purchase 
Pepsi cola, for example, after a failed experiment with Pepsi perfume, their sense of Pepsi 
as a well-run corporation may change, which is a type of reputational harm. See Wernerfelt, 
supra, at 458–59. 
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simply an anomaly or is representative of a decline in the plaintiff’s qual-
ity control (and thus reflective of a change in the plaintiff’s reputation 
in the marketplace) until she learns of others’ experiences.169 But the 
court did not explicitly note the social nature of the reputational harm, 
characterizing it instead as an issue of impersonation, control, and free-
riding: “In this way,” the court noted, “the complainant’s reputation 
[was] put in the hands of the defendants” such that the defendants were 
able “to get the benefit of the complainant’s reputation and advertise-
ment.”170 Some years later, Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit 
spoke of a trademark in similar terms, writing in Yale Electric Corp. v. Ro-
bertson in 1928 that a merchant’s trademark 
is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear 
it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he bor-
rows the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within 
his own control. This is an injury, even though the borrower 
does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputa-
tion, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and 
another can use it only as a mask.171 
Although Judge Hand’s description implies the necessity of an audi-
ence—a mask is useful only if it is shown to others—it, too, does not 
fully describe the social nature of reputation, characterizing trademark 
law’s interest in reputation largely as the act of misappropriation rather 
than as a change in consumer reaction.172 
                                                                                                                      
169 Cf., e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that 
consideration of the quality of the defendant’s goods as one factor in a likelihood of con-
fusion analysis “goes more to the harm that confusion can cause the plaintiff’s mark and 
reputation than to the likelihood of confusion”); Bone, supra note 49, at 594 (“Confusion 
of this sort can harm the consumer if his experience with plaintiff’s flour leads him to 
expect high quality, and defendant’s syrup does not measure up. It can also harm the sel-
ler by impairing its ability to communicate quality information to consumers and build a 
favorable reputation.”). 
170 Aunt Jemima, 247 F. at 410. The court analogized the defendants’ misdeed to a mis-
appropriation of authorship, suggesting that the same result would obtain if “one were to 
publish a book on banking under the name of a firm of bankers,” even if “the book was a 
good book.” Id. (noting that the hypothetical bankers would be entitled to an injunction 
under these facts). 
171 Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928); see also Bone, supra 
note 49, at 595 (noting that Judge Hand’s language reflects, to some degree, a personhood 
theory, in that it equates corporate reputation with personal identity). 
172 One modern court has characterized Judge Hand’s language as “the classic descrip-
tion of harm” in a trademark infringement case. Gen. Cigar Co. v. G.D.M. Inc., 988 F. 
Supp. 647, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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 The same definitional concern arises when a plaintiff uses federal 
trademark or unfair competition law to challenge uses of its mark that 
imply sponsorship or authorization of the defendant’s activities.173 For 
example, the owner of the Insinkerator brand of garbage disposals 
brought suit against NBC based on a scene in the television show Heroes 
in which a character mangled her hand by inserting it into a sink’s dis-
posal unit; the Insinkerator trademark was apparently briefly visible 
during the scene.174 The complaint alleged that the depiction of the 
garbage disposal in the scene caused damage to the plaintiff’s reputa-
tion and goodwill because it implied that the disposal would cause “de-
bilitating and severe injuries, including the loss of fingers, in the event 
consumers were to accidentally insert their hand in one” and was likely 
to cause consumers to think that the plaintiff was associated with such a 
use.175 Likewise, a celebrity may use trademark law or unfair competi-
tion law to challenge a use of her name in marketing or advertising that 
falsely suggests that the celebrity has endorsed the advertised product 
or service, on the grounds that celebrities “possess an economic inter-
est in their identities akin to that of a traditional trademark holder.”176 
In these cases, as with the cases discussed earlier, the plaintiff may be 
attempting to vindicate an autonomy-related harm: the use of a trade-
mark in a way that the plaintiff cannot control. But to be a true reputa-
tional injury, as opposed to simply a dignity-based harm, that use must 
change the way that the relevant community views or judges the plain-
                                                                                                                      
173 See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24–25 (2d Cir. 1976) (review-
ing a suit alleging that a television network’s editing of plaintiffs’ comedy program misrep-
resented that plaintiffs were the source of the resulting broadcast); Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt 
Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 915 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (reviewing a suit targeting the use of 
Caterpillar tractors by villains in children’s film as suggesting sponsorship or endorse-
ment); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 50, at 417 (describing the cases). 
174 First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 10, Emerson Elec. Co. v. NBC Univer-
sal, Inc., No. 4:06-cv-01454-TCM (E.D. Mo. Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://www.deanesmay. 
com/files/Emerson_Lawsuit_likelihoodofconfusion.com.pdf. The plaintiff also asserted 
claims for federal unfair competition, federal and state trademark dilution, trade libel, defa-
mation, and tortious interference with business relations. Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, 
Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992). 
A false endorsement claim based on the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s 
identity is a type of false association claim, for it alleges the misuse of a 
trademark, i.e., a symbol or device such as a visual likeness, vocal imitation, or 
other uniquely distinguishing characteristic, which is likely to confuse con-
sumers as to the plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval of the product. 
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110. 
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tiff that leads to some change in the ongoing relationship between the 
plaintiff and that community.177 It was not at all self-evident, for exam-
ple, that viewers would think any differently about the manufacturer of 
Insinkerator disposals after seeing the Heroes scene, even if they be-
lieved the manufacturer to have paid for or otherwise authorized the 
depiction.178 
 Even after consideration of the facts at hand, courts in trademark 
and unfair competition cases are not always clear about whether a repu-
tational effect has occurred. In Waits v. Frito-Lay, a 1992 opinion from 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reputational harm 
seems to have been the plaintiff’s motivation for bringing suit, but the 
court curiously did not focus its attention on this injury.179 The singer 
Tom Waits, who has a particularly distinctive voice, took a public stand 
against commercial endorsements of any kind, believing that they 
compromised his artistic integrity.180 Frito-Lay wanted to hire Waits for 
a radio commercial for a new brand of Doritos chips, but Waits refused, 
leading Frito-Lay to hire someone who sounded like Waits to record the 
commercial instead.181 Waits brought suit under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, alleging that the sound of his voice was particularly dis-
tinctive and that the defendant’s use of a similar voice would thereby 
confuse consumers into thinking that Waits had recorded the commer-
cial and was thereby endorsing the chips.182 Waits had also asserted a 
                                                                                                                      
 
177 One might also characterize this argument as requiring a change that consumers 
find material to their purchasing decisions. See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 50. 
178 Cf. id. at 427 (proposing to eliminate “sponsorship or affiliation” confusion and to 
reframe the trademark infringement question as dealing with issues of quality of goods or 
services, leaving other claims to false advertising law or equivalents). 
179 See 978 F.2d at 1096. 
180 Id. at 1097. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 1098. As the court noted, Waits’s policy against commercial endorsement had 
been widely communicated: “[I]n magazine, radio, and newspaper interviews he has ex-
pressed his philosophy that musical artists should not do commercials because it detracts 
from their artistic integrity.” Id. at 1097. The case thus differs from Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 
in which the court rejected the plaintiff’s trademark claim based on the use of her “signa-
ture song” as background music in a television commercial, in that the Waits radio adver-
tisement featured the Waits-sounding voice extolling the virtues of the new Doritos chip. 
See 251 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2001). Hence, the likelihood that consumers would believe that 
Waits was endorsing the product was much greater than for the Oliveira commercial. Cf. 
Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 718 (9th Cir. 1970) (affirming the 
dismissal of an unfair competition complaint targeting commercial use of the song for 
which plaintiff had become famous); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1152–56 
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (distinguishing cases). Not every court has concluded that unauthorized 
endorsements tend to result in reputational harm. See Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 
F. Supp. 343, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“A star performer’s endorsement of a commercial 
1392 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1341 
cause of action for misappropriation of his voice under California law, 
for which the jury awarded him $100,000 for the fair market value of 
his services; $200,000 for injury to his “peace, happiness, and feelings”; 
and $75,000 for injury to goodwill.183 The court, citing right of public-
ity cases, rejected Frito-Lay’s argument that only compensation for eco-
nomic injury was available in a misappropriation case; it noted in par-
ticular that the reputational damages were based on “the public 
impression that Waits was a hypocrite for endorsing Doritos.”184 
Strangely, however, although the court affirmed the jury’s $100,000 
verdict on Waits’s Lanham Act claim,185 finding there to be sufficient 
evidence of consumer confusion regarding Waits’s endorsement of 
Doritos, it held that the award was duplicative of the damages repre-
senting the fair market value of Waits’s services, not the damages repre-
senting the harm to Waits’s reputation.186 This interpretation suggests 
that the court viewed Waits’s Lanham Act claim not in reputational 
terms but in property terms, such that Waits could be made whole on 
the claim by the payment of what amounted to a licensing fee. 
                                                                                                                     
 A similar inattention to the nature of the reputational harm oc-
curred in the 2003 case of Parks v. LaFace Records,187 decided by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in which the civil rights icon Ro-
sa Parks alleged that the use of her name as the title of a song by the 
rap duo OutKast violated her Lanham Act rights. While noting that the 
prima facie case under section 43(a) requires consumer confusion as to 
sponsorship or approval, the court failed to determine whether such 
confusion existed, focusing entirely on the defendants’ claim that their 
First Amendment rights allowed them to use Ms. Parks’s name as the 
title of a song that included the lyrics “move to the back of the bus.”188 
 
product is a common occurrence and does not indicate either a diminution of profes-
sional reputation nor a loss of professional talent, though plaintiff herself might prefer to 
avoid such engagements.”) (rejecting a defamation cause of action). 
183 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1103. 
184 Id. at 1104. 
185 Id. at 1111. 
186 Id. To be fair, it is unlikely that the court paid much attention to the distinction; the 
trial court had apparently instructed the jury that it could award damages on the Lanham 
Act claim for the fair market value of Waits’s services, and Waits did not challenge the de-
fendant’s argument as to the duplicative nature of the damages on appeal. See id. 
187 329 F.3d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 2003). 
188 Id. at 446 (noting that Parks had submitted affidavits from consumers stating “that 
they either believed Defendants’ song was about Parks or was connected to the Tribute 
album authorized by her”). Only the latter belief was relevant, if at all, to Parks’s Lanham 
Act claim. Indeed, the district court had concluded that there was no likelihood of confu-
sion; despite this, the appellate court remanded, advising that if the defendants’ First 
Amendment defense failed, judgment should be entered for Parks. See id. at 444, 459. 
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This lack of rigor suggests that the mere association of the celebrity’s 
name with a product or service is enough to lead to reputational injury, 
similar to Judge Hand’s concern about unauthorized borrowing of the 
plaintiff’s “face.” But more must be shown if reputation is at issue: The 
consumer must think that the celebrity has, in fact, endorsed the prod-
uct, and such endorsement must cause consumers to judge the celeb-
rity differently, whether due to the nature of the endorsement itself or 
because the community’s experience with the product or service at is-
sue causes the community to penalize the celebrity for having “recom-
mended” the product.189 
 Although reputation-based harm is often at the heart of a typical 
trademark infringement claim, not every judicial extension of such 
claims involves reputational interests to the same extent. The doctrine 
of post-sale confusion, while open to criticism on other grounds, does 
tend to involve reputational concerns. In a post-sale confusion case, the 
consumer knows with whom she is dealing at all times, but the similarity 
between the defendant’s mark and the plaintiff’s mark (often in the 
form of trade dress) may confuse third parties after the sale has been 
transacted. For example, in the 1991 case Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Rob-
erts, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the de-
fendant sold one-piece shells modeled to look like the body of an ex-
pensive sports car that could be bolted onto the chassis of a less 
expensive car.190 The consumer who purchased the defendant’s prod-
uct was well aware of its provenance; he knew that the car in which he 
was subsequently driving around town was not a Ferrari.191 Neverthe-
less, the court held, the defendant was liable for trademark infringe-
ment because third parties who saw the consumer’s car might be con-
                                                                                                                      
189 In Henley v. Devore, the recording artist Don Henley brought suit, including a Lan-
ham Act claim, against a Republican candidate for one of California’s U.S. senate seats and 
a member of his staff who posted two videos on YouTube making fun of Democratic politi-
cians; the videos set humorous words to the music of two of Henley’s songs. In granting 
summary judgment to the defendants on the Lanham Act claim, the court held that there 
was no reasonable likelihood of confusion given the “less-than-angelic” voice of the staff 
member singing on the video. Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1168. The court was not per-
suaded by a survey indicating that forty-eight percent of the respondents thought that 
Henley either endorsed the video or authorized the use of his music in the video, holding 
that the relevant question under Waits was whether consumers would think that Henley 
actually performed the songs in the videos. Id. This conclusion gives short shrift to the 
reputational harm at issue. In the context of a political campaign, in which endorsements 
are a frequent occurrence, the question of whether viewers of the video believed that Hen-
ley endorsed the campaign’s efforts to criticize members of the opposing party should 
probably not have been resolved on summary judgment. 
190 944 F.2d 1235, 1237–38 (6th Cir. 1991). 
191 Id. at 1244. 
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fused into thinking that that the underperforming car was, indeed, a 
Ferrari.192 Thus, in a post-sale confusion case, the consumer has pur-
chased precisely the product she wants to purchase; the only confused 
consumer is one who has not yet sought to purchase the plaintiff’s 
product (although such a consumer may now be dissuaded from doing 
so). Assuming the validity of the assumption underlying the doctrine— 
that the observer both attributes the product’s faults to the mark owner 
and thereby changes her opinion of the brand—post-sale confusion 
involves a fairly strong reputational interest. The doctrine assumes 
some type of shared perception among the community as to the nature 
of the plaintiff’s goods that in some cases may be reputational. If the 
post-sale confusion emanates from an act of impersonation relating to 
the markholder’s characteristics, actions, or qualities (“I guess Ferraris 
aren’t that well made after all—that one just lost its muffler”), the doc-
trine more strongly reflects reputational concerns. If, by contrast, the 
confusion reflects a change in status of the mark (“Ferraris must not be 
that special—everyone seems to have one now”), the harm is less con-
nected to reputation and more related to status.193 
 By contrast, the doctrine of initial interest confusion involves far 
less robust reputational concerns. In an initial interest confusion case, 
the consumer is initially confused by the defendant’s use of the plain-
tiff’s mark into thinking that the defendant and the plaintiff are re-
lated, but this confusion is dispelled before any sale occurs, such that 
the consumer ultimately knows with whom she is dealing at the time of 
sale. For example, in the 1987 case Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum 
Corp., the Second Circuit held that the defendant’s use of the name 
“Pegasus Petroleum,” when the plaintiff’s mark consisted of a flying 
horse, constituted infringement even though the defendant’s custom-
ers were often sophisticated purchasers.194 The harm was not, the court 
noted, “that a third party would do business with Pegasus Petroleum 
                                                                                                                      
192 Id. at 1244–45. 
193 See Washington & Zajac, supra note 69, at 284 (“[T]he Jaguar automobile has long 
suffered from a reputation for poor quality, while at the same time benefiting from the 
privilege of high social status. In the last decade, the Jaguar’s reputation has improved, 
owing to increases in perceived and actual quality, while its status has remained unchanged 
. . . .”); cf. Beebe, supra note 73, at 851–52 (describing that post-sale confusion, “even in the 
minds of those who would never purchase Gucci shoes, is actionable, if only because the 
brand’s reputation for exclusiveness is damaged”). Although the community, by definition 
here, comprises those who have not yet purchased the product, this is not, in itself, prob-
lematic, given that trademark infringement requires proof only of a likelihood of confu-
sion, not of actual confusion among past consumers. 
194 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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believing it related to Mobil,” but rather that “Pegasus Petroleum would 
gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal,” such as a 
cold phone call.195 Thus, in an initial interest confusion case, the con-
sumer has either purchased the product knowing that it is produced by 
the defendant or declined to purchase the product at all; her harm lies 
only in the time expended, if any, rerouting herself to find the trade-
mark holder’s product.196 The reputational interest in such cases is 
therefore fairly weak. The injury is more akin to an emotional harm on 
the part of consumers—frustration resulting from the time spent in 
searching for the plaintiff’s product—than a true reputation-related 
harm on the part of the trademark holder.197 
 The reputational claim is more difficult to make when the argu-
ment is that the defendant’s actions have denied the plaintiff the ability 
to maintain its reputation by failing to attribute a good or service to the 
plaintiff—the gravamen of a reverse passing-off claim. In the 2003 U.S. 
Supreme Court case Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the 
production company Twentieth Century Fox brought suit against Das-
tar, a seller of CDs and videos, claiming that Dastar had repackaged and 
slightly reedited a video on World War II to which Fox had once owned 
the copyright.198 (The work had passed into the public domain when its 
copyright was not renewed, as was then required under federal copy-
right law.199) Fox’s claim was brought under section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act as a reverse passing-off claim, in which Fox contended that 
Dastar was passing off Fox’s material as its own.200 In rejecting Fox’s 
claim by holding that the work’s public domain status allowed Dastar to 
make whatever use of the work it wished, the court also implicitly re-
jected the attempt to use trademark law to vindicate this type of reputa-
                                                                                                                      
195 Id. at 259. 
196 Whether this is a significant burden depends on the circumstances of the search. A 
search involving a physical trip to a brick-and-mortar store, for example, may involve more 
resources than an Internet search. 
197 It is possible that consumers may attribute their frustration to the mark holder, 
causing a risk of reputational injury despite the lack of confusion at the point of sale. For 
example, a consumer who sees a sign on a highway indicating that a well-known restaurant 
is located at the next exit but discovers only the competitor after exiting may be frustrated 
with the mark holder if she believes that the mark holder was once located at that exit but 
neglected to take down its sign. 
198 539 U.S. 23, 27–28 (2003). 
199 Id. at 34. 
200 Id. at 27. The real motivation for Fox’s suit may well have been an attempt to cap-
ture via trademark law what it could no longer capture via copyright—control over the 
work outright—but for this analysis, I take the claim on its face. 
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tional interest.201 The Court first held, interpreting the term “origin” in 
section 43(a), that the source-identifying function of a trademark un-
der the Lanham Act applied only to the source of the physical goods 
that served as the vehicle for a communicative work, not to the source 
of the communicative work itself.202 It then held that even if the latter 
source was of interest to consumers, requiring correct identification of 
that source would both be unduly difficult and present a conflict with 
copyright law, which gives the public “[t]he right to copy, and to copy 
without attribution, once a copyright has expired.”203 
 This blurring of the interest at the heart of copyright law—the use 
of the work—and the interest at the heart of trademark law—the iden-
tification of the source of the product—led the Court to discount the 
importance to audiences of having accurate information on which to 
base reputational assessments, in part because the plaintiff’s lost oppor-
tunity to bolster its reputation is not as compelling a harm as injury to 
an existing reputation.204 Nevertheless, it is at least debatable whether 
consumers of communicative products share with consumers of more 
tangible goods an interest in forming judgments about the sources of 
communicative products and, thus, whether a space can be made for 
trademark-related concepts even in realms largely governed by copy-
right law. Indeed, the style and signature of a visual artist, for example, 
have been recognized by both courts and commentators as having a 
source-identifying function, such that the attempt to pass off an origi-
nal work as the creation of the artist should raise legitimate trademark-
based concerns.205 
                                                                                                                      
 
201 Id. at 34–35. 
202 Id. at 31–33. 
203 Id. at 33–35. 
204 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34–35. 
205 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law 259 (2003) (suggesting that because the value of art is tied 
to the artist’s identity, “confusingly similar copies of original works, unless they carry a 
clear disclaimer of authenticity, violate the original artist’s trademark in his instantly rec-
ognizable style”); Lang & Lang, supra note 63, at 105 (noting that “the name attached to a 
work of art functions much like a brand label”); Geoffrey Scarre, On Caring About One’s 
Posthumous Reputation, 38 Am. Phil. Q. 209, 209–10 (2001) (discussing the importance of 
reputation after death). Thus, as broad as Dastar’s language is, it should not be read to 
suggest that the use of the Lanham Act for traditional false endorsement claims (as op-
posed to a reverse passing-off claim) has now been completely foreclosed in the creative 
arena. See Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. Rev. 55, 58–59 
(2007); see also Beebe, supra note 73, at 887 (contending that the Dastar Court “missed the 
opportunity to establish a principle of crucial importance to the attribution system that 
underlies the commons-based model of innovation: that the exclusive right to claim attri-
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 Finally, anti-dilution law, which purports to vindicate reputational 
interests, is in fact the trademark doctrine least apt to do so. Under 
federal law, an owner of a famous and distinctive trademark may seek 
an injunction against a use of the mark that is “likely to cause dilution 
by blurring or dilution by tarnishment” of the famous mark.206 In the 
prototypical dilution case, the customer is not confused about the rela-
tionship between the parties; she knows that there is none and is not 
deterred from acquiring the goods or services that she desires. Never-
theless, the plaintiff alleges in such a case that the association of the 
defendant with the plaintiff due to the use of the same or a similar 
trademark will cause a reputational harm to the plaintiff, much as the 
use of the name of a real individual in a work of fiction may cause 
readers to think of the individual differently despite readers’ unequivo-
cal knowledge that they are reading a work of fiction.207 
 To the extent that anti-dilution law is intended to address the rep-
utation of the mark—whether for linguistic exclusivity or for quality— 
its function does not map well onto reputational harms. First, as with 
defamation law, anti-dilution law is underinclusive. The federal statute 
excludes from its scope various categories of uses that are likely to have 
a similar effect on the plaintiff’s mark as uses by commercial speakers, 
such as fair use (including comparative advertising and parody), news 
reporting and news commentary, and noncommercial uses of a 
mark.208 In addition, the federal statute preempts state law or common 
law dilution claims against the holder of a federally registered mark 
                                                                                                                      
bution does not necessarily carry with it the exclusive right to control the uses of the good 
to which that attribution is affixed”). See generally Heymann, supra note 37. 
206 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). The mark owner can also seek damages and de-
struction of goods if the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark first occurred after the date 
of enactment of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (Oct. 6, 2006) and if the 
defendant “willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the famous mark” in a dilu-
tion by blurring action or “willfully intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark” 
in a dilution by tarnishment action. Id. at § 1125(c)(5)(B). 
207 Cf. Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of 
Libel, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 87–88 (1983) (“As long as the ordinary reasonable reader is not 
led into believing that what is packaged as fiction is meant to be taken as fact, conventional 
first amendment and common law doctrine should make the work nonactionable.”) (ana-
lyzing “libel by fiction” claims). 
208 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3); see also Laura A. Heymann, Metabranding and Intermediation: 
A Response to Professor Fleischer, 12 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 201, 221–22 (2007) (noting the 
reputational effect of media reports); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trade-
mark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507, 540 (2008) (“There is nothing (as yet) 
that Coca-Cola can do to erase my memory of the time I spilled a Diet Coke into my key-
board.”). 
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with respect to the use of that mark.209 In each of these ways, anti-
dilution law excludes from its reach, largely on First Amendment–
related grounds, activities that may have the same effect on the plaintiff 
as the conduct that falls within the scope of the statute. 
 Anti-dilution law is also, however, overinclusive to the extent that it 
purports to target reputational harms. Both types of dilution involve a 
change in consumers’ perception of the trademark in question, either 
that the mark is no longer distinctive210 or that negative as well as posi-
tive associations with the mark are evoked.211 But neither type of dilu-
tion is actually concerned with the reputation of the mark, its owner, or 
the products or services with which it is associated—in other words, 
with a change in the collective judgment of the relevant community 
based on beliefs about the mark holder’s activity. Rather, dilution ac-
tions involve a change in or addition to the associations with the word or 
image that constitutes the mark (or, to use terminology discussed ear-
lier, a change in the perceived status of the mark). For example, it is 
unlikely that the use of the “R Us” phrase in the name of the website 
“Guns R Us” will cause consumers to think that the chain of toy stores 
operating under the name “Toys R Us” is a worse actor or that the toys 
it sells are now unsafe.212 Likewise, it is unlikely that the use of the 
name “Victor’s Little Secret” for a sex toys vendor in Kentucky will 
cause consumers to judge the chain of lingerie stores operating under 
                                                                                                                      
209 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(6)(A). The language of this section also purports to preempt 
dilution claims generally against federally registered marks, but this would appear to be a 
drafting error. See id. § 1125(c)(6)(B) (providing that the ownership of a federal registra-
tion is a bar to an action that “asserts any claim of actual or likely damage or harm to the 
distinctiveness or reputation of a mark, label, or form of advertisement”); Stacey L. Dogan 
& Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 Santa Clara Com-
puter & High Tech. L.J. 541, 549 n.42 (2008). 
210 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (defining “dilution by blurring” as an “association aris-
ing from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the 
distinctiveness of the famous mark”); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, 
LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 265 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that “[i]n the context of blurring, distinct-
iveness refers to the ability of the famous mark uniquely to identify a single source and 
thus maintain its selling power”). This reputational effect is similar to the reputational 
effect caused by post-sale confusion, described above, which suggests that courts may be 
motivated by an anti-dilution rationale in those cases. 
211 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (defining “dilution by tarnishment” as an “association 
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms 
the reputation of the famous mark”); see also Beebe, supra note 73, at 858 (noting that 
“[l]atent within the concept of tarnishment, as within these statutory definitions, has al-
ways been an extraordinarily capacious notion of harm to the ‘reputation’ or ‘repute’ of 
the trademark”). 
212 See Toys R Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated on other 
grounds, 201 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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the name “Victoria’s Secret” any differently.213 The secondary uses in 
these cases may evoke different associations or emotions in consumers, 
such that a mark that formerly aroused feelings of wholesomeness 
might now evoke contrary feelings or, more broadly, an insensitivity to 
the drawing power of the brand.214 But this is a different effect from 
causing a harm to the reputation of the trademark owner, as embodied 
in the symbol of the mark, particularly given that in an anti-dilution 
case, the defendant is, by definition, not purporting to speak about or 
on behalf of the plaintiff at all and so cannot be providing consumers 
with false information about the plaintiff.215 
 This failure to distinguish between association and reputation may 
be the reason that courts have not been particularly clear about de-
scribing the nature of the reputation-related harm in dilution cases. For 
example, when the defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark in connec-
tion with sexually explicit material, some courts have contrasted the 
sexually themed nature of the defendant’s activities with the whole-
some nature of the plaintiff’s business and then concluded that the de-
fendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark has had a deleterious effect on the 
plaintiff’s reputation.216 In other instances, the court will simply con-
                                                                                                                      
 
213 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423 (2003). Indeed, the Army co-
lonel who alerted the Victoria’s Secret chain about what was then called the “Victor’s Se-
cret” store focused his judgment solely on the latter; the Court noted that he was “of-
fended by what he perceived to be an attempt to use a reputable company’s trademark to 
promote the sale of ‘unwholesome, tawdry merchandise.’” Id. 
214 Bradford, supra note 89 at 1234 (describing the harm caused by blurring as emo-
tionally unsettling the positive feelings consumers have for famous trademarks); id. at 1279 
(suggesting that “blurring is a subset of the ways in which a mark may be tarnished” by 
causing consumers “to feel worse about the senior brand” through overexposure or incon-
sistent associations); Magid et al., supra note 40, at 35–37 (proposing an experiment to 
measure actual dilution through a change in brand image, which comprises differentiation 
from other brands, relevance of the brand name to consumers, esteem of the brand with 
respect to other brands in the same category, and knowledge of what the brand name 
stands for). 
215 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 110 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“That a consumer may associate a negative-sounding junior mark with a famous mark says 
little of whether the consumer views the junior mark as harming the reputation of the 
famous mark.”). 
216 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the TDRA provides for a “rebuttable presumption, or at least a very strong inference, that 
a new mark used to sell sex-related products is likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a 
clear semantic association between the two,” even despite any evidence of tarnishment); 
Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that the defen-
dant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark in connection with adult entertainment “would likely 
harm [plaintiff’s] reputation”); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 
949–950 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“The content of Mr. Helm’s website . . . is of an admittedly adult 
nature. It depicts graphic sexuality and nudity, as well as illustrations of drug use and drug 
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clude that the defendant’s bad activities accrued to the detriment of 
the plaintiff’s reputation, despite the lack of evidence of any relation-
ship between the two parties or their activities.217 Even allowing for the 
law’s need to limit administrative costs by incorporating assumptions 
about consumer behavior rather than requiring empirical evidence in 
all instances,218 such assumptions do not reflect a concern with reputa-
tional effects. To draw an analogy in the personal naming context, the 
follies of a celebrity or other famous person with a distinctive name may 
cause anguish to non-celebrities who also happen to bear that name, 
but we would not say that the celebrity’s actions have harmed the repu-
tation of the non-celebrity—they have merely caused salient and dis-
tasteful associations with the name. 
 In sum, trademark law’s relationship with reputational concerns is 
strong but not robust. To the extent it provides a remedy for what 
amounts to the use of a mark by another entity without regard to the 
effect of that mark on consumers’ perception of the trademark hold-
er—as in the dilution cases and some infringement cases—the doctrine 
sounds more like a property right or right against misappropriation or 
free-riding. And to the extent it provides a remedy in instances where 
consumers have been frustrated in acquiring the goods they want, the 
doctrine, while consumer focused, does not directly address reputa-
tional harms. But where the doctrine is concerned with the effect of 
the defendant’s activity on the relevant market’s perception of the 
plaintiff or its goods, reputational harms are at its core. 
                                                                                                                      
paraphernalia. These images conflict with the image that Kraft has successfully cultivated 
for more than 79 years as a wholesome, family-oriented product. . . . Mr. Helm’s use of 
‘VelVeeda’ corrodes Kraft’s mark, because the association of Velveeta® with ‘VelVeeda’ 
likely causes the former to lose the reputation and goodwill that it once had.”) (issuing a 
preliminary injunction); cf. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (interpreting precedent as “strongly urg[ing] courts to think for themselves 
about what considerations they believe are relevant to dilution”). 
217 See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Am.’s Team Props., 616 F. Supp. 2d 
622, 643 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (“Plaintiffs also complain of the inferior quality of Defendant’s 
products and website, which they allege tarnish the Cowboys’ trademark. Plaintiffs’ evi-
dence shows Defendant in 2006 distributed thousands of ‘America’s Team’ wristbands with 
the word ‘basketball’ misspelled. Certainly such shoddy goods can harm ‘the reputation of 
the famous mark.’”). 
218 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark Law, in Trade 
Marks and Brands: An Interdisciplinary Critique 140, 148 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 
2008) (noting that the reasonable consumer in trademark law must be “in large part a 
legal fiction that implements a vision of the degree of consumer protection regulation that 
Congress and the courts think appropriate without rendering commerce inefficient”). 
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C. Copyright 
 U.S. copyright law focuses largely on an author’s economic rights. 
Unlike the moral rights regime of Continental copyright law, in which 
the author’s interests in attribution and the integrity of the work are di-
rectly protected, U.S. copyright law centers on allowing the author con-
trol over certain uses of the work in order to incentivize creation of the 
work in the first place.219 Nevertheless, authors have used U.S. copyright 
law to vindicate reputational rights when certain uses or modifications 
of the author’s work are likely to cause audiences to form a particular 
judgment about the author.220 Because the author’s control over a work 
protected under U.S. copyright law is fairly broad, copyright owners can 
use their rights to control uses of their work whether or not such uses 
implicate the author’s economic interests, assuming that such uses can-
not be characterized as fair.221 Indeed, one might consider the fact that 
U.S. copyright law grants the author control over derivative works222 to 
be a powerful tool in this regard, in that an author can prohibit the cre-
ation of derivative works by others not only to ensure that he or she has 
control over the economic benefits that come from such works but also 
                                                                                                                      
219 See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (“The plaintiff’s legally 
protected interest is not, as such, his reputation as a musician but his interest in the poten-
tial financial returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public’s approbation 
of his efforts.”); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 Tex. L. 
Rev. 873, 902 (1997) (describing intellectual property as “a restriction on the free flow of 
information to the minimum extent necessary to encourage needed investment in innova-
tion”) (reviewing James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Con-
struction of the Information Society (1996)). Moral rights regimes typically comprise 
three rights: the right of integrity, the right of attribution, and the right of disclosure. Ro-
berta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of Constructed Personas 
through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 151, 152. 
220 See Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1547 (10th Cir. 
1996); Engel v. Wild Oats, Inc. 644 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
221 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral 
Rights Law for the United States 27 (2010) (noting that copyright owners can use 
their derivative work right under copyright law to address integrity and attribution con-
cerns); Note, An Author’s Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 
1490, 1491 (1979) (noting that the Copyright Act’s “protection of an author’s rights of 
economic exploitation may permit an author to employ a copyright’s economic safeguards 
to protect the integrity of his work, thus protecting artistic reputation”). Catherine Fisk has 
described the efforts of James Joyce to enjoin the publication of an unauthorized version 
of Ulysses in the United States using state unfair competition law, as the book was not pro-
tected under U.S. copyright law. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Modern Author at Work on Madi-
son Avenue, in Modernism and Copyright 173, 181 n.18 (Paul K. Saint-Amour ed., 2011) 
(“[A]ttribution did for Joyce what copyright could not.”) (citing Robert Spoo, Note, Copy-
right Protectionism and Its Discontents: The Case of James Joyce’s Ulysses in America, 108 Yale L.J. 
633, 640 (1998)). 
222 17. U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006). 
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to control the reputational interest that comes from having a consistent 
canon. The author of a children’s book series featuring a beloved lead 
character, for example, may not want others to create a television series 
based on the books that depicts the character engaging in unsavory or 
unsafe activities; similarly, the resistance on the part of some authors to 
fan fiction may be motivated by the nature of the narratives, such as a 
focus on gay and lesbian themes, rather than on the loss of a potential 
derivative market.223 Authors’ amenability or resistance to potential re-
putational harms may be related to the strength of the “brand”: a strong 
brand such as the Star Wars or Star Trek series can arguably withstand 
more retellings than a brand that is still coming into full existence.224 
 Artists may, therefore, use copyright law to assert what is essentially 
a trademark-related claim—in other words, they use their ability to con-
trol the exploitation of the work to challenge uses that suggest an au-
thorization or sponsorship of the message conveyed by the defendant’s 
use.225 For example, David Byrne, lead singer of the musical group 
Talking Heads, filed suit in 2010 against Florida governor Charlie Crist 
for the use of the group’s song “Road to Nowhere” in a video support-
ing Crist’s campaign for U.S. Senate.226 As Byrne stated in an interview, 
“It’s not about politics, it’s about copyright and about the fact that it 
does imply that I would have licensed it and endorsed him and what-
ever he stands for.”227 Indeed, such a copyright plaintiff may be able to 
argue that such uses are not fair uses under the law by relying on the 
fourth statutory fair use factor, in which the court is asked to consider 
                                                                                                                      
223 For a discussion of the motivations behind the creation of fan fiction, see Rebecca 
Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
513, 527–36, 542 (2009) (stating that many copyright owners “won’t license homoerotic or 
sexually explicit versions of their works”). 
224 Anti-dilution law, as noted, works in the opposite direction, granting protection on-
ly to brands that are famous and distinctive. Cf. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 267 (“[B]y 
making the famous mark an object of the parody, a successful parody might actually en-
hance the famous mark’s distinctiveness by making it an icon. The brunt of the joke be-
comes yet more famous.”). 
225 See generally Heymann, supra note 205. One recent study indicates that authors who 
maintain a creative attachment to their work are likely to resist valuation of that work ac-
cording to the market. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity 
Effect, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 31, 31 (2011). 
226 See David Byrne Suing Florida Governor for Copyright Infringement, RTT News (May 26, 
2010) http://www.rttnews.com/Content/EntertainmentNews.aspx?Section=2&Id=1316846 
&SM=1. 
227 Id. In connection with the settlement of the dispute, Crist posted a video on You-
Tube apologizing for the use of the song and noting Byrne’s aversion to the use of his 
music in advertising. David Itzkoff, Ex-Governor Apologizes for Using Song in Ad, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 12, 2011, at A15. 
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“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the co-
pyrighted work,”228 to argue that uses that are inconsistent with the 
plaintiff’s current reputational status will have an economic effect on 
the plaintiff’s ability to license or sell copies of the work in the fu-
ture.229 Alternatively, copyright plaintiffs may attempt to vindicate repu-
tational interests by seeking a high statutory damage award for in-
fringement that, the plaintiff believes, has had reputational harms.230 
And although an individual who makes his or her full-time living as a 
writer, artist, or musician might be most likely to attempt to use copy-
right law to vindicate reputational interests, there is no reason for such 
attempts to be so limited. Given the law’s abandonment of formalities 
such as registration,231 and the relatively low requirements for copy-
rightability, any work that is original to its author, exhibits a modicum 
of creativity, and is fixed in a tangible medium of expression qualifies 
for copyright protection,232 and an author need register such works 
only before bringing suit.233 Thus, the writer of a diary or letter not in-
tended for publication that ends up being distributed to the public, 
causing harm to the author’s reputation, might well decide to use copy-
right law to attempt to vindicate those reputational interests, at least to 
the point of issuing a cease-and-desist letter.234 Importantly, however, 
                                                                                                                      
 
228 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006). 
229 Cf. Harolds Stores, 82 F.3d at 1547 (affirming the verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a 
claim that the defendant’s infringement of plaintiff’s copyrighted print skirts damaged 
plaintiff’s goodwill; survey revealed that respondents who saw skirts in both stores were 
“somewhat unlikely to purchase clothes from Harold’s within the next year”). 
230 See Wild Oats, 644 F. Supp. at 1092 (noting that “[t]he harm of the infringement to 
the late Ms. Engel’s artistic reputation, in the form of lost revenues from her works, may 
become evident only over the years to come”); see also Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheat-
land, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
439, 506 (2009) (urging courts not to award statutory damages “to compensate the plain-
tiff for injuries that are not cognizable by U.S. copyright law,” including reputational 
harm). 
231 See generally James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 167 
(2005); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485 (2004). 
232 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, 
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or 
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (noting that “originality requires independent 
creation plus a modicum of creativity”). 
233 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). 
234 Cf., e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 313 (2d Cir. 
1966) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring) (criticizing the use of copyright law to “restrict the 
dissemination of information about persons in the public eye even though those con-
cerned may not welcome the resulting publicity”); Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 
F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting an attempt to use copyright law to 
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because copyright law focuses on economic harms related to the use of 
the work, rather than the moral rights of the author, and because of the 
availability of statutory damages,235 courts have no need or incentive to 
focus on community reactions to or judgments of the work as opposed 
to evidence of lost sales or profits. 
                                                                                                                     
 In one fairly minor respect, U.S. copyright law directly addresses 
reputational interests through the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).236 
Enacted in 1990, VARA creates a right on the part of the author of a 
work of visual art,237 whether or not the author is also the copyright 
holder, to “claim authorship of [the] work”; to “prevent the use of his 
or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did 
 
squelch public discussion of plaintiff’s voting machines); Heymann, supra note 205, at 59–
60 (proposing that the use of copyright law to address trademark-related concerns be 
deemed copyright misuse). 
A public figure may suffer irreparable injury to his reputation if publication 
of extracts from his private papers reveals him to be dishonest, cruel, or gree-
dy. An individual suffers irreparable harm by the revelation of facts he would 
prefer to keep secret. But those are not the types of harms against which the 
copyright law protects; despite irreparability, they should not justify an injunc-
tion based on copyright infringement. Only injuries to the interest in author-
ship are the copyright’s legitimate concern. 
Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1134 
(1990). One organization that assists physicians with malpractice suits advises its members 
to require patients to assign their copyright in any comments they post online after their 
visit; the physicians can then request that the hosting websites take down any unfavorable 
comments pursuant to section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 
U.S.C. § 512 (2006). See Dan Frosch, Venting Online, Consumers Can Land in Court, N.Y. Times, 
June 1, 2010, at A1. Relatedly, some individuals and entities seeking to have reputation-
related material (such as negative reviews) removed from online fora will attempt to charac-
terize the material as infringing and thus subject to the notice-and-takedown provisions of the 
DMCA. See generally Joyce E. Cutler, Counsel at Leading Social Sites Describe Crush of User Content 
Takedown Requests, 16 Electronic Comm. & L. Rep. (BNA) 368 (Mar. 9, 2011) (reporting on 
conference proceedings). 
235 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
236 Id. § 106A. 
237 The Copyright Act defines a “work of visual art” as  
a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture existing in a single copy, in a limited 
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by 
the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabri-
cated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the au-
thor and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or a still 
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a sin-
gle copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or 
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.  
Id. § 101. The Act also excludes certain works from this definition, including a work made 
for hire. Id. 
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not create,” including if the work is modified in a way that “would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation”; and to prevent certain 
such modifications.238 Thus, VARA directly reflects a recognition of the 
fact that the use of an artistic work can affect an artist’s reputation, par-
ticularly by falsely conveying the artist’s authorization of the contested 
use. The application of VARA only to works existing in a single copy or 
in limited, signed copies makes the possibility that audiences will inter-
pret a subsequent use as authorization much more likely, in that such 
works quite literally bear the touch of the artist’s hand.239 
 The scope of VARA’s provisions also reflects, at least to some de-
gree, the social nature of reputation. For example, as with defamation 
law, an author’s rights under VARA last only for the life of the author,240 
which suggests a concern not with economic interests but with the abil-
ity to engage in an ongoing dialogue with one’s audience. Additionally, 
although some courts and commentators suggest that the interest at 
stake is the “personality and creative energy that an artist contributes to 
his or her work,”241 the statute’s consistent reference to the artist’s in-
terests in “honor” and “reputation,” even in describing the extent of 
permissible modifications, suggests an interest that depends on com-
munity judgment and assessment, rather than an internal, spiritual mo-
ti ion. 
 In particular, VARA, like defamation law and trademark law, re-
flects reputational interest to the extent that courts determine that a 
finding of prejudice to reputation requires an inquiry into whether the 
relevant community has been inspired to modify its assessment of the 
artist based on the defendant’s actions.
vat
                                                                                                                     
242 This is not true of all of VA-
 
238 Id. § 106A(a)(1), (2), (3)(A). The statute provides that modifications that are a re-
sult of “the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials” or the result of “con-
servation, or of the public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the work” is 
not a modification unless the modification results from gross negligence. Id. § 106A(c). 
VARA also provides a right to prevent the destruction of a “work of recognized stature.” Id. 
§ 106A(a)(3)(B). 
239 Cf. Lang & Lang, supra note 63, at 102 (“[T]here is in the visual arts no substitute 
for the original. Pictures are valued not just for what they portray but for the authentic 
touch of the artist.”). 
240 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d). 
241 Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 51 (1st Cir. 
2010); see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that 
moral rights “spring from a belief that an artist in the process of creation injects his spirit 
into the work and that the artist’s personality, as well as the integrity of the work, should 
therefore be protected and preserved”); Kwall, supra note 219, at 152 (“Fundamentally, 
moral-rights laws seek to vindicate damage to the human spirit, an interest that transcends 
the artist’s concern for property or even reputation.”). 
242 See Buchel, 593 F.3d at 54. 
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RA’s provisions; for example, VARA accords the artist the right both to 
“claim authorship of the work” and to “prevent the use of his or her 
name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not 
create” without regard to the effect of such attribution on the relevant 
audience.243 (One might argue that in such cases, the reputational ef-
fect can be presumed, because an artist’s reputation is formed through 
the assessment of an accurate catalog of her work.) But VARA’s prohibi-
tion against modifications that “would be prejudicial to the artist’s 
honor or reputation” does, courts have held, require consideration of 
the community’s judgment, at least with respect to the work at issue.244 
For example, in Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, 
Inc. v. Buchel, a 2010 case involving a dispute between a visual artist and 
a museum that sought to display certain of his unfinished works, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit looked to media reports to 
determine whether there was a triable factual issue as to the effect of 
the display on the artist’s reputation, noting that the record demon-
strated “that some viewers of the installation reacted unfavorably to the 
work in its allegedly modified and distorted form.”245 The court thus 
left it to the jury to determine whether this reaction stemmed from the 
concept underlying the work itself or from the museum’s unauthorized 
modifications, which a jury could conclude “diminish[ed] the quality 
of the work and thereby harm[ed] Buchel’s professional honor or rep-
utation as a visual artist.”246 Thus, to the extent that VARA focuses di-
rectly on reputational interests, it appears that at least one court has 
approached the question with the appropriate focus: whether the de-
fendant’s actions in fact inspired a change in assessment or judgment 
from the relevant community. This is not, however, the focus of copy-
right suits more generally, even where reputational harms are at issue, 
and thus broad injunctions may result against the use of creative work 
to vindicate what are more circumscribed reputational interests. 
                                                                                                                      
243 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006). 
244 Buchel, 593 F.3d at 54 (noting that “the focus is on the artist’s reputation in relation 
to the altered work of art; the artist need not have public stature beyond the context of the 
creation at issue”); see also Laura Flahive Wu, Note, Massachusetts Museum of Contempo-
rary Art v. Buchel: Construing Artists’ Rights in the Context of Institutional Commissions, 32 Co-
lum. J.L. & Arts 151, 173 (2008) (contending that the question of prejudice to the artist’s 
honor or reputation is “[b]y its terms . . . an objective test, requiring a showing that the 
purported distortion would actually cause prejudice to the artist’s ‘honor or reputation’” 
and that the artist’s assertion of displeasure alone is insufficient). 
245 Buchel, 593 F.3d at 60–61 (citing media reports on the installation, including one 
critic who observed that “many people are going to judge [Buchel] and his work on the 
basis of this experience”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
246 Id. at 60. 
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D. Right of Publicity, Privacy, and Other Causes of Action 
 A variety of other torts do not necessarily have reputation-related 
interests at their core but can be used to vindicate harms to reputation. 
In some of these cases, courts make specific reference to audience per-
ception; in others, reputation is viewed through a property or auton-
omy lens. I discuss certain of these torts below. 
1. Right of Publicity 
 The right of publicity provides an individual with the right to con-
trol use of her persona, including her name, image, voice, or some 
other distinguishing factor. A creature of state law, the right’s genealogy 
consists of two different doctrinal strands: the right to privacy and the 
right against misappropriation. The right of publicity was originally 
proposed by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their land-
mark article as one of four variations of the privacy tort, conceptualized 
as the right to avoid intrusion and preserve the inviolate sphere of the 
individual.247 In particular, Warren and Brandeis encouraged the de-
velopment of a separate tort action that would vindicate dignitary, ra-
ther than economic, harms from personal intrusions, which would ob-
viate the need to shape the perceived harm to match the elements of 
an existing cause of action, as courts had done to that point.248 Their 
proposal borrowed from both defamation law and common-law copy-
right doctrine; indeed, as Robert Post has noted, the article is largely 
concerned with “the legal rights of unpublished authors and artists.”249 
Dean Prosser’s influential article seventy years later likewise character-
ized “appropriation of name or likeness” as one aspect of the general 
interest of the plaintiff “to be let alone.”250 Thus, the right of publicity 
was viewed as unconnected from the audience; the intrusion, not its 
effects, was what mattered. 
 But as the tort began to be invoked by celebrities who, presumably, 
sought publicity rather than anonymity, the right to privacy developed 
along the lines of a misappropriation tort, in which the harm was the 
failure to compensate the plaintiff for the use of his or her persona, 
                                                                                                                      
247 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 
195–97 (1890). 
248 Id. at 207–13. 
249 Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 647, 647–48 (1991). 
250 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). 
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rather than the fact of the use at all.251 Although the tort is not limited 
to commercial uses, such that an impersonation of the plaintiff in order 
to obtain information or other benefits might well be found unlaw-
ful,252 commercial advantage has become an assumed element of the 
tort, and the defendant’s malfeasance is often seen as unlawful free-
riding rather than as a failure to respect the boundaries that the dignity 
of individuals requires. The touchstone, according to the Restatement, 
is that “the defendant must have appropriated to his own use or benefit 
the reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest 
or other values of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”253 
 To the extent, then, that the tort simply involves the question of 
the proper owner of the benefits of the use of one’s persona, the tort is 
only loosely tied to a reputational interest. The value of the use may 
well depend on the reputation of the individual, but the fact that an 
individual or entity other than the plaintiff has benefited from that val-
ue does not, of itself, cause a reputational harm. Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., in which the Supreme Court in 1977 held that 
the plaintiff, whose live performance was shown in its entirety on a lo-
cal television news broadcast, could bring suit for a violation of his right 
of publicity, is an example of a case that treats the right of publicity 
largely as a property interest.254 As the Zacchini Court characterized it, 
the interest in a right of publicity case is an economic one in which “the 
only question is who gets to do the publishing” and thus reap the at-
tendant commercial benefits.255 Reputational interests were present in 
the case, to be sure, but only as a source of value as opposed to a source 
of information. Thus, as the Court noted, while the right of publicity 
may typically involve the “appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation 
to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product,” in the case at 
hand, the right involved “appropriation of the very activity by which the 
                                                                                                                      
251 The case typically cited as representing the turning point is Haelan Labs., Inc. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). See also, e.g., Philip Auslander, 
Legally Live: Performance in/of the Law, 41 Drama Rev. 9, 15 (1997) (noting that a performer 
“must be sufficiently famous so that someone else would seek to purchase her identity to 
enjoy protection of her performance under the right of publicity paradigm”). 
252 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C cmt. b (1977) (describing privacy tort of 
“appropriation of name or likeness” and noting that the rule is not necessarily limited to 
commercial uses). But see J. Thomas McCarthy, Two Sets of Events That Changed Right of Pub-
licity Law, 19 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 129, 130 (1995) (“The right of publicity is simply 
the right of every person to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”). 
253 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C cmt. c (1977). 
254 433 U.S. 562, 564–66 (1977). 
255 Id. at 573. 
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entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place,”256 a claim sound-
ing very much like unlawful free-riding or other economic harm rather 
than harm to the nature of Zacchini’s reputation itself. In other words, 
as the dissent suggested, even if the television station received no addi-
tional revenue from the airing of the plaintiff’s act, it could still be li-
able in damages for the lost revenue to the plaintiff from those who 
now would not pay to see the act in person, a rationale that has echoes 
in the economic incentives provided by U.S. copyright law rather than 
in defamation.257 
 To the extent, however, that the tort retains an interest in preserv-
ing the plaintiff’s interests in autonomy and self-definition, as some 
commentators have suggested,258 the reputational harm is clearer. By 
purporting to speak or act on behalf of the plaintiff (by, for example, 
associating her with a particular product or service against her wishes), 
the defendant in a right of publicity case provides information to the 
plaintiff’s audience that can shape its perception of the plaintiff. In Pa-
vesich v. New England Life Insurance Company,259 an early right of public-
ity case from 1905, the defendant used a photograph of the plaintiff 
without his permission to advertise life insurance, attributing an in-
vented quote to the plaintiff about his satisfaction with the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                      
256 Id. at 576. 
257 Id. at 580 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court based its rationale in part 
on a parallel to the incentives provided by patent and copyright law. Id. at 576; see also Ro-
chelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent? 
Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 123, 127 
(1996) (noting that, under facts such as those in Zacchini, “the right of publicity serves as a 
useful adjunct to the Copyright Clause and to the federal statutes enacted under its au-
thority, for its promise of exclusivity stimulates creativity in spheres that patents and copy-
rights do not reach”) (footnote omitted). But see Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for 
a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 Duke L.J. 383, 402 (1999) (noting that the Court’s analogy 
to patent law “lost sight of the essence of the claim, namely the sustained unconsented use 
of the performer’s identity”). 
258 J. Thomas McCarthy, Public Personas and Private Property: The Commercialization of 
Human Identity, 79 Trademark Rep. 681, 685 (1989) (“Perhaps nothing is so strongly intu-
ited as the notion that my identity is mine—it is my property, to control as I see fit.”); Mark 
P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 225, 
285–93 (2005) (conceptualizing the right of privacy as a right of self-definition); Daniel J. 
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 548 (2006) (describing the publicity 
right as concerned with “control of the way one presents oneself to society”). Robert Post 
has proposed bifurcating the existing tort into two separate causes of action, one that vin-
dicates property interests and one that vindicates dignity interests, with the latter requir-
ing, as part of the prima facie case, that the appropriation be “highly offensive to the rea-
sonable person.” Post, supra note 249, at 675. 
259 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905). 
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product.260 The plaintiff brought suit both for invasion of privacy and 
for defamation; the lower court sustained the defendant’s demurrer, 
and the Georgia Supreme Court reversed.261 The court did not charac-
terize the harm to the plaintiff as the lack of payment for the adver-
tisement— not surprisingly, as the plaintiff was not in the business of 
endorsing products or services. Rather, the court saw the harm to the 
plaintiff— both as to the right of publicity and as to the defamation 
claim—as a loss of autonomy and a harm to reputation caused by the 
defendant’s having falsely suggested the plaintiff’s endorsement.262 
Similarly, in a right-of-publicity case reminiscent of the Waits case dis-
cussed earlier, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis successfully obtained a pre-
liminary injunction based on the appearance of a celebrity impersona-
tor in an advertisement for the clothing designer Christian Dior.263 The 
harm, the court suggested, was the inference that Onassis had con-
sented to appear in a commercial advertisement; by speaking on her 
behalf in this regard, the defendant contributed to the formation of 
adverse judgments about Onassis by those who saw the advertise-
ment.264 
                                                                                                                      
260 The quotation was: “In my healthy and productive period of life I bought insurance 
in t nd Mutual Life Insurance Co., of Boston, Mass., and to-day my family is 
pro
d merit the contempt of all persons having a 
cor
81. 
 The court noted the parallel between counterfeit merchandise (of the 
type ty n at 
issue i
e plaintiff com-
d the Law 96 (1991) (characterizing the Onassis case as asserting “that in 
 
he New Engla
tected and I am drawing an annual dividend on my paid-up policies.” Id. at 69. 
261 Id. at 81. 
262 Id. at 80 (“[A]s long as the advertiser uses [the plaintiff] for these purposes, he 
cannot be otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the time being under the 
control of another, that he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave, without hope 
of freedom, held to service by a merciless master . . . .”) (describing the privacy claim). 
Given the allegation that plaintiff’s acquaintances knew he did not have a policy from the 
defendant, the advertisement made it seem as if he was telling an untruth; accordingly, 
“[i]f he lied gratuitously, he would receive an
rect conception of moral principles. If he lied for a consideration, he would become 
odious to every decent individual.” Id. at 
263 Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1984), 
aff’d, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1985). 
264 Id. at 260.
pically objected to by the defendant designer) and the celebrity impersonatio
n the case: 
It is somewhat ironic that the principal defendant, Christian Dior-New York 
Inc., should be advocating the permissibility of passing off the counterfeit as a 
legitimate marketing device, when it (or its predecessor) has itself vigorously 
policed the market to prevent persons by fraud and deception obtaining the 
fruits of another’s labors and using them commercially. Ther
plained bitterly (and effectively) that there had been a misappropriation of its 
name and reputation. Now the shoe is on the other foot. 
Id. at 263 (citations omitted); see also Jane M. Gaines, Contested Culture: The Image, 
the Voice, an
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 This is not to say that the reputational interest at the heart of the 
right of publicity is as strong as the interest at the center of a false en-
dorsement claim under the Lanham Act, even though some courts and 
commentators have suggested that endorsement issues also underlie 
right of publicity claims,265 including Dean Prosser, who analogized the 
interests protected by the tort to those addressed by trademark law.266 
The mere use of the plaintiff’s image as a T-shirt decoration, for exam-
ple, does not necessarily comment on the plaintiff’s beliefs in the same 
way that featuring the plaintiff as a putative commercial spokesperson 
without authorization does. And, of course, not every use of a plaintiff’s 
image, even in ways she would disavow, gives rise to a right of publicity 
claim; the exceptions that courts have carved out for First Amend-
ment–related activities, as with other torts, serve as a limit on the extent 
to which the right of publicity can address reputational interests.267 
Thus, the reputational interest is stronger where there is an implied 
assertion of at least willful participation, if not endorsement, on the 
part of the plaintiff. But, as with copyright claims, because the right of 
publicity tort has come to be viewed largely through a property lens, 
courts need not, as in Pavesich, consider community reactions in de-
termining the nature or scope of reputational harm. 
                                                                                                                      
the contemporary world the face has come to stand for the honor and integrity of the 
individual”). 
265 Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The basis of a right 
of publicity claim concerns the message—whether the plaintiff endorses, or appears to 
endorse, the product in question.”); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc. 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (suggesting that a false endorsement claim under the Lanham Act and an Ohio 
right of publicity claim were essentially equivalent); Dreyfuss, supra note 257, at 127 (not-
ing that the right of publicity protects “the ability of those who do not want to hawk prod-
ucts, or to be seen as associated with or endorsing a particular manufacturer or product, to 
prevent others from putting words into their mouths”); Richard Masur, Right of Publicity 
from the Performer’s Point of View, 10 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 253, 257–58 (2000) (de-
scribing instances in which an actor’s film performance is scanned and used in a new film 
or in degrading uses, causing damage to the actor’s reputation, and noting that the copy-
right holder of the original film would have little incentive to challenge such use on the 
actor’s behalf). 
266 Prosser, supra note 250, at 423 (noting that the appropriation privacy tort creates 
“in effect, for every individual, a common law trade name, his own, and a common law 
trade mark in his likeness”); see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of 
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1165 (2006) (contending 
that “[r]econceiving the right of publicity as a trademark-like right offers significant bene-
fits in defining the right’s scope and limitations”). 
267 See, e.g., Jireh Publ’g, 332 F.3d at 931–36 (discussing the cases). 
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2. Privacy Claims 
 Many claims under the general invasion of privacy tort, such as the 
public disclosure of private facts and false light privacy, involve con-
cerns about reputation, as Dean Prosser also indicated.268 In such 
claims, the plaintiff is aggrieved not merely because he feels that a phys-
ical private sphere has been invaded or that he has been the unwilling 
subject of surveillance but because the unwanted release of true infor-
mation about him will, he fears, be used by others in ways detrimental 
to his reputation.269 The 1931 case of Melvin v. Reid,270 decided by the 
California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District and often identified 
as one of the early public disclosure of private facts cases, falls into this 
category. The plaintiff, Gabrielle Darley Melvin, who had formerly 
worked as a prostitute, was acquitted in a widely reported murder tri-
al.271 She was subsequently able to start her life anew among acquaint-
ances who were not aware of her history.272 The defendant produced a 
film called “The Red Kimono,” based on Melvin’s life, which had the 
effect of revealing her past to her current acquaintances, who 
“scorn[ed] and abandon[ed] her” as a result.273 The California court 
held that Melvin had stated a valid claim for invasion of privacy, noting 
that although the facts of Melvin’s former life were in the public re-
cord, and thus open to all, the use of Melvin’s name in advertising for 
the film, which identified the film as semi-biographical, was unneces-
sary.274 The focus on the attribution of the past events to Melvin, as op-
posed to the revelation of the events itself, frames the harm as reputa-
                                                                                                                      
268 Prosser, supra note 250, at 398–400 (contending that the interest at the core of pub-
lic d
injury,” it causes harm because 
“suc t others see them”). 
Cal. Ct. App. 1931). 
3. 
isclosure and false light privacy torts is reputational). 
269 Doe v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 833, 842 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (noting that the tort 
of public disclosure of private facts “is designed to redress reputational injuries made all 
the more painful because the public revelations about deeply private and intimate matters 
are undeniably true”); Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Ind. 1997) (although 
declining to recognize the tort, noting that the tort of public disclosure of private facts 
protects a person’s interest in reputation and a person’s interest in “avoiding the emo-
tional distress that could result from disclosures”); M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy 
Harm, 86 Ind. L.J. 1131, 1131 (2011) (distinguishing between the “subjective category” of 
privacy harm (unwanted observation) and the “objective category” of privacy harm (use of 
information)); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291, 339 (1983) (noting that although the dis-
closure of private facts does not cause “classic reputational 
h revelations may alter the way tha
270 297 P. 91 (
271 Id. at 91. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 9
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tional: the change in how her current associates perceived Melvin 
based on this additional, and truthful, information about her past.275 
Thus, such a claim can largely be distinguished from a privacy action in 
which a privately taken photograph of the plaintiff is published without 
the plaintiff’s permission; unless the circumstances of the publication 
(a nude photo published in a disreputable magazine, for example276) 
would suggest something disparaging about the plaintiff’s beliefs or 
ctiv
                                                                                                                     
a ities, the photographs themselves are unlikely to cause others to 
form a particular judgment about the plaintiff’s character or qualities. 
 The false light privacy tort can also involve reputational concerns, 
although reputational injury need not be alleged. As described in the 
Restatement, the tort addresses the harm resulting from publicity given 
to a matter “concerning another that places the other before the public 
in a false light,” if the false light “would be highly offensive to a reason-
able person” and the defendant “had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in 
which the other would be placed.”277 Dean Prosser has suggested, not 
without controversy,278 that the English case of Byron v. Johnson279 repre-
sents the use of false light in connection with reputational concerns.280 
A man named Johnson published a volume of poems entitled “A Pil-
grimage to Jerusalem, a Tempest, and an Address to my Daughter” and 
 





(199  Lord Byron as a passing-off case). 
g. Rep. 851. 
98. 
275 See id. 
276 Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that the plaintiff had a false light claim for 
 trial due to errors by the district court). 
277 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977); see also Meyerkord v. Zipatoni 
Co., 276 S.W.3d 319, 324 nn.1 & 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (listing jurisdictions that have rec-
ognized and jurisdictions that have refused to recognize the tort); Andrew Osorio, Note, 
Twilight: The Fading of False Light Invasion of Privacy, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 173, 174 
(2010) (advocating for abolition of the tort); Zimmerman, supra note 59, at 374 (suggest-
ing that a review of the case law indicates “the inherent vagueness of the concept” of what 
is “highly offensive to a reasonable person”). In King v. Semi Valley Sound, LLC, an Ohio 
appellate court held that a magazine publisher’s inclusion of the plaintiff in a list of “Local 
Registered Sexual Offenders,” when the plaintiff was no longer required to be registered, 
could form the basis of a false light claim but not a defamation claim. Inclusion in the list, 
the court held, could be “highly objectionable to a man in [the plaintiff’s] position,” but 
could not be defamatory, given that being falsely identified as a registered sex offender 
would cause no greater reputational injury “beyond what [plaintiff] would be subjected to 
simply by being identified as a sex offender.” King v. Semi Valley Sound, LLC, No. C
777, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3014, at *13, 15-16 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 2011). 
278 See J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 Santa Clara L. Rev. 783, 792
2) (stating that subsequent English cases treated
279 Byron v. Johnston, (1816) 35 En
280 Prosser, supra note 250, at 3
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attributed certain of the poems therein to Byron in advertising.281 
Byron disavowed creation of the poems or their sale to Johnson— in-
deed, he claimed that he had never met the man—and brought suit.282 
In an exceedingly brief reported opinion, the Lord Chancellor issued 
an injunction on the grounds that the defendant could not show that 
the work was indeed Byron’s.283 Whether Prosser was correct in deem-
ing Byron a false light case, given the presumably pedestrian nature of 
the poems, or whether the opinion is better characterized as a passing-
off or right of publicity case,284 Prosser’s characterization of the case as 
privacy-related appears to be indicative of his view of the use of the tort 
to address reputation-related concerns more generally. Indeed, in 1977 
the Supreme Court cited Prosser with approval in Zacchini v. Scripps-
tation may be an element bearing upon such damage” and that “the 
                                                                                                                     
Howard Broadcasting Company when it stated that the interest protected 
in a false light case “is clearly that of reputation.”285 
 Not every false light case, however, involves reputational injury. For 
example, in the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court case Time v. Hill, a family 
sought recovery under New York’s privacy law when a Life magazine ar-
ticle suggested that a play about a family held hostage in their home was 
closely based on the plaintiffs’ experience, when it was apparently only 
inspired by their circumstances.286 In holding that the First Amendment 
standards of New York Times v. Sullivan applied to the claim,287 the Court 
distinguished the injury at the heart of the case from that in a tradi-
tional defamation case, noting that although both torts involve false 
statements, in the privacy cases, “the primary damage is the mental dis-
tress from having been exposed to public view, although injury to repu-
 
281 Byron, 35 Eng. Rep. at 851. 
282 See Kelso, supra note 278, at 791 n.25 (quoting a December 9, 1816, letter from 
Lord Byron to his publisher to this effect). 
283 Byron, 35 Eng. Rep. at 852. 
284 See John W. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1093, 1097–
98 (1962). 
285 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). In one recent 
case, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey permitted a plaintiff to plead 
reputational injury as a false light claim. Savely v. MTV Music Television, Viacom, No. 2:11-
cv-01021-SDW-MCA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77621, at *15 (D.N.J. July 18, 2011) (denying a 
motion to dismiss a false light claim alleging that unauthorized inclusion of footage of the 
plaintiff in a program about a rapper would associate the plaintiff with “artists and institu-
tions that could tarnish his reputation”). 
286 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 378–79 (1967); see also Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 571 (de-
scribing Hill as “hotly contested and decided by a divided Court”). 
287 The comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts note that the validity of Hill on 
this point is uncertain in light of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. d (1977). 
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published matter need not be defamatory, on its face or otherwise, and 
might even be laudatory and still warrant recovery.”288 But simply be-
cause a report can be characterized as nondefamatory does not mean 
that reputational interests are not at its core. Thus, for example, in the 
1964 New York Supreme Court case of Spahn v. Julian Messner,289 the de-
fendant published a biography of the plaintiff that made the plaintiff 
seem more heroic during his wartime service than he actually was; the 
embarrassment this caused the plaintiff, the court held, formed the ba-
sis of a valid false light privacy claim.290 The fact that the biography was 
laudatory rather than disparaging does not render it non-reputation-
related. The report likely caused others to form an inaccurate positive 
judgment of the plaintiff, which may have resulted in detrimental re-
percussions if the plaintiff was held responsible for the mistruth once 
revealed. Thus, as with other causes of action, the reputational harm is 
closely tied to a perceived misattribution of statements or events to the 
plaintiff that are relevant to the community’s judgment of the plaintiff’s 
character. 
. O3 ther Causes of Action 
 Finally, plaintiffs have used a host of other causes of action to vindi-
cate reputational interests, including malicious prosecution,291 tortious 
                                                                                                                      
288 Hill, 385 U.S. at 384–85 n.9; see also William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limita-
tions on Recovery from the Press—An Extended Comment on “The Anderson Solution,” 25 Wm. & 
Mary able a 
hypot
o-
lthough A is not defamed 
 § 652E cmt. b (1977). 
. Supreme Court ordered reconsideration of the case in light of Hill, the New 
York
670(a) (1977) (noting that a plaintiff in a ma-
licio
 L. Rev. 793, 810–11 (1984). The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes as action
hetical in which 
A is a war hero, distinguished for bravery in a famous battle. B makes and ex-
hibits a motion picture concerning A’s life, in which he inserts a detailed nar-
rative of a fictitious private life attributed to A, including a nonexistent r
mance with a girl. B knows this matter to be false. A
by the motion picture, B is subject to liability to him for invasion of privacy. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts
289 250 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff’d, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Div. 1965), 
aff’d, 221 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1966). 
290 Id. at 538–39 (describing how defendant’s biography of plaintiff falsely stated that 
plaintiff had been awarded the Bronze Star in World War II and noting that “the heroics 
attributed to [the plaintiff] constituted a gross non-factual and embarrassing distortion”). 
After the U.S
 Court of Appeals affirmed. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 841–42 
(N.Y. 1967). 
291 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
us prosecution case may recover damages for “the harm to his reputation resulting 
from the accusation brought against him”). 
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interference with contract,292 and general negligence claims.293 For ex-
ample, in the 1995 case Cargill, Inc. v. Boag Cold Storage Warehouse, Inc.,294 
decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiff 
successfully brought suit against a warehouse that negligently allowed 
food manufactured by the plaintiff to spoil while in storage but still 
shipped the food to local supermarkets; such negligence was alleged to 
have caused the plaintiff reputational injury when consumers (not un-
expectedly) blamed the plaintiff manufacturer for the spoilage.295 
Other courts have suggested that the availability of such actions should 
turn on the foreseeability or identifiability of the reputational harm, 
which often implicates evidence of audience perception.296 For exam-
ple, in the 1988 case Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., decided 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant orches-
tra cancelled a performance featuring the actor Vanessa Redgrave after 
receiving threats and statements of protest relating to Redgrave’s politi-
cal support of the Palestine Liberation Organization.297 Redgrave 
sought damages resulting from the loss of additional professional op-
portunities from employers who were skittish after the orchestra’s ac-
tions; the court concluded that the identifiable nature of these reputa-
tional damages distinguished them from “nonspecific allegation[s] of 
damage to reputation” and so could be pursued in a breach of contract 
claim.298 
                                                                                                                      
292 For an analysis of cases from the United Kingdom, see generally Nelson Enon-
chong, Contract Damages for Injury to Reputation, 59 Mod. L. Rev. 592 (1996). 
293 See Travis M. Wheeler, Note, Negligent Injury to Reputation: Defamation Priority and the 
Economic Loss Rule, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 1103, 1107 (2006) (concluding that the economic loss 
rule lurks in the background of some courts’ conclusions that stand-alone reputational 
damages must be sought only via defamation and not ordinary negligence); id. at 1127 
(contending that “when reputational injury is a direct result of a defamatory communica-
tion about the plaintiff . . . courts have good reasons to refuse ordinary negligence as an 
alternative theory of recovery. Resolving these claims under defamation respects the limi-
tations on defamation recovery and encourages the development of defamation-privilege 
law.”). Some courts are not amenable to plaintiffs’ attempts to use negligence claims to 
vindicate reputational injuries. See, e.g., Hall v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 273, 
276 (N.Y. 1990) (“Injuries to an individual’s personal and professional reputation such as 
the injuries alleged here have long been compensated through the traditional remedies 
for defamation.”) (discussing plaintiff’s allegation of reputational injury from negligently 
administered polygraph test). 
294 71 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 1995). 
295 The plaintiff sought damages for costs associated with a product recall, lost sales, 
and advertising expenses, among other expenses. Id. at 554. 
296 Jorgensen v. Mass. Port Auth., 905 F.2d 515, 522 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing, in dicta, 
the possible result under Massachusetts law). 
297 855 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1988). 
298 Id. at 894. 
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E. Summary 
 The law of reputation, as this overview suggests, is fairly diffuse, 
although there are some core elements. Both individuals and corporate 
entities can vindicate reputational interests through the law where the 
interest is conceived as economic, although only individuals can vindi-
cate reputational interests that are seen as dignitary or privacy based. In 
most causes of action, the reputational harm is caused by a false state-
ment by the defendant as to the plaintiff’s qualities or an appropriation 
of the plaintiff’s identity, voice, or creative work that suggests affiliation 
or authorization with the defendant’s activities. And in some instances, 
but not uniformly, the scope and nature of the reputational interest is 
determined by reference to the community. It is this last characteristic 
to which this Article now turns. 
IV. Reassessing Reputation 
 Taking the social nature of reputation and the associated audience 
interests into account, along with the other interests previously identi-
fied, helps us to think more broadly about whether and in what way the 
law should protect reputation. The interests at stake in controlling repu-
tation do not all relate to the individual or firm to which the reputation 
belongs; they also relate to audience interests in the stability of reputa-
tions so as to ensure useful heuristics and consistent signals when those 
reputations are used by others. The law’s interest is not an expansive 
interest “in having others think well of you and associate with you”;299 
rather, an audience-based perspective reminds us that the law’s interest 
in reputation is equally, if not more, concerned with the quality of in-
formation provided to one’s audience—to those who are making judg-
ments and taking actions based on those judgments. In this sense, the 
law is not vindicating reputation as such, but using harm to reputation 
as the measure of the quality of the information on which judgments 
leading to reputation are based. 
 An audience-focused view of reputation thus provides some addi-
tional grounding for the various doctrinal approaches to the interest. 
First, an audience-focused theory of reputation applies both to individ-
ual and corporate reputation because reputation is used by audiences 
similarly as to individuals and corporations as a way of reducing search 
costs and determining the direction and scope of future engagements. 
Thus, while different legal doctrines might favor the interests of par-
                                                                                                                      
299 Gibbons, supra note 30, at 593. 
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ticular plaintiffs or defendants,300 the audience’s interest in sound 
foundational information tends to be much the same in each case. 
                                                                                                                     
 Second, an audience-focused theory helps explain the importance 
of truth to the construction of reputation. To the extent that audiences 
are using the reputations of others as a way of forming judgments and 
opinions and subsequently taking action based on some of those judg-
ments, there is a societal interest in ensuring that those judgments are 
based on accurate information.301 Thus, even though true statements 
can have an effect on reputation, such statements do not undermine 
the factual foundation for the community’s judgment. This helps to 
further justify the principle in both defamation and trade libel doctrine 
that the truth of the statement at issue is a defense to liability,302 as well 
 
300 Cf., e.g., Senna v. Florimont, 958 A.2d 427, 443 (N.J. 2008) (“We cannot find any 
significant public benefit in giving business rivals greater protection for the false and de-
famatory speech they use as an economic club to harm each other.”) (declining to apply 
New York Times v. Sullivan to commercial speech). 
301 Gibbons, supra note 30, at 593 (noting that it is reasonable for individuals “to ex-
pect that social judgments are based on an adequate factual foundation”); Neil M. Rich-
ards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1295, 1340 (2010) (charac-
terizing Brandeis’s later views as suggesting that “the First Amendment requires not only 
protection for outputs such as speeches and newspaper articles, but also attentiveness to 
inputs and the process by which opinions are formed and beliefs are transmitted”); see also, 
e.g., SCO Grp., Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1291 (D. Utah 2010) (“‘The pub-
lic’s interest in obtaining information [about the quality and characteristics of consumer 
products] . . . is perhaps even greater than the corresponding interest in personal defama-
tion actions, the interest in obtaining information about other people.’” (quoting Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1271 (D. Mass. 
1981))) (holding that slander of title claims are subject to the First Amendment); Dairy 
Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., 516 A.2d 220, 225 (N.J. 1986). 
302 See Gibbons, supra note 30, at 605 (suggesting that this exception reveals that defa-
mation law “gives more weight to the factual foundation for reputation than the judgments 
derived from it”). The extent to which the law can proscribe noncommercial false state-
ments of fact consistent with the Constitution is far from clear. See, e.g., United States v. 
Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the Stolen Valor Act, which criminal-
izes false statements about the receipt of military honors, unconstitutional, noting that 
“the harm the Act identifies—damage to the reputation and meaning of military honors— 
is not the sort of harm we are convinced Congress has a legitimate right to prevent by 
means of restricting speech”); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where’s the Harm?: Free Speech and the 
Regulation of Lies, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1091, 1091 n.2 (2008) (“The State may only pun-
ish deliberate falsehoods when they cause significant harms to individuals.”); Richards, 
supra note 301, at 1345 (“The hallmark of modern American First Amendment jurispru-
dence is that hurt feelings alone cannot justify the suppression of truthful information or 
opinion.”); Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 897, 917 
(2010) (asserting that “[t]he First Amendment plainly does not permit restriction of non-
commercial and nondefamatory factual falsity in the public sphere”); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Fighting Freestyle: The First Amendment, Fairness, and Corporate Reputation, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1457, 
1476 (2009) (contending that “many of trademark law’s core presumptions would disap-
pear if the field were constitutionalized”). 
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as the fact that trademark infringement, false implied endorsement, 
and false light privacy torts all predicate liability on the falsity of an ex-
plicit or implicit statement of identity, association, or sponsorship. It 
may also help to explain the coexistence of doctrines such as false light 
privacy alongside the defamation tort, in that the former addresses false 
information flows that are not captured by the latter because, although 
their falsity leads to reputational effects, such statements are not con-
sidered defamatory.303 
 Not every doctrine, however, exhibits the same sensitivity to the im-
portance of the factual foundation of social judgments. For example, 
the tort of public disclosure of private facts contemplates liability for the 
dissemination of truthful information about the plaintiff that causes, in 
many instances, reputational harm, even though facts have traditionally 
not been thought to be an appropriate subject of private ownership.304 
Additionally, the public figure doctrine in defamation law, for example, 
provides that even where a false assertion has been made about a public 
official or public figure, the individual cannot recover unless he or she 
can show that the defendant published the statement with actual mal-
ice.305 Trademark anti-dilution law predicates liability on what is essen-
tially a truthful statement—or, at least, not a false statement—as to the 
lack of relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. And to the 
extent that copyright law and the right of publicity are used to vindicate 
reputational interests, their economic focus means that the plaintiff is 
not required to allege or prove that the defendant’s use falsely implies 
authorization or licensing by the plaintiff, even when this appears to be 
the nature of the harm at issue. 
 Defamation law’s tolerance for false statements in some cases is jus-
tified by the importance of “breathing room” in the sphere of public 
debate—the idea that fear of liability for defaming public officials will 
create a chilling effect that will cause speakers to stay far from the line of 
                                                                                                                      
303 Cf. Post, supra note 1, at 719 (“[T]o characterize a person incorrectly as a Republi-
can is not defamatory, even though Democrats may well be deterred from dealing with 
him and as a result the person may lose credit or business opportunities.”). 
304 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of 
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1065–73 (2000); see also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 891, 901 (1984) (stating 
that a conclusion that a state “may not constitutionally treat as tortious statements that 
cannot be proved false” would “do away with a good deal of state tort law concerning rights 
of privacy”). 
305 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
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liability. But, while critically important for vibrant public debate,306 this 
tolerance places additional responsibility on the audience to sort out 
false statements from true statements. This is not to say the issue of in-
terpretive burdens on audiences is unique to defamation law; trademark 
law, to take another example, may impose liability for statements that 
are confusing to some consumers but helpful to others or decline to 
impose liability for uses of marks that confuse a small number of con-
sumers so long as those consumers do not represent a substantial pro-
portion of the relevant market.307 And, at least in the public figure 
realm, the access that public figures have to opportunities to correct the 
record helps to mitigate some of the burdens on audiences. In all of 
these instances, however, while truth plays an important role in ensuring 
a sound foundation for decision making by audiences, audiences must 
also contribute to the process by, as Jerome Skolnick has suggested, 
questioning the information they receive in some instances rather than 
accepting it on face value.308 
 Finally, an audience-focused theory of reputation highlights a re-
lated concern to that of truth: whether the defendant is speaking for 
the plaintiff or speaking only for himself. The distinction between repu-
tation and status mentioned earlier highlights that reputation is a per-
formance-based assessment; at root, it is based on activities or state-
ments purportedly by the reputation holder. Impersonation or false 
attribution is therefore the harm underlying many reputational inju-
ries, in that the defendant has made a statement or undertaken an ac-
tivity that, implicitly or explicitly, is falsely attributed to the plaintiff and 
thus becomes the basis for the audience’s judgment. The audience’s 
interest in such cases is therefore not only that the foundation for its 
                                                                                                                      
306 See George C. Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Con-
flicting Approaches, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 43, 66 (1976) (noting the conflict between “an indi-
vidual’s interest in freedom of speech” and “the expanding interest of another individual 
in the integrity of his reputation”); Van Alstyne, supra note 288, at 814–23 (discussing First 
Amendment limitations on tort actions). 
307 See generally Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 60 (2008) (advocating for courts to give more consideration to unconfused consum-
ers who benefit from a defendant’s product in traditional trademark infringement cases). 
308 Skolnick, supra note 112, at 687 (“The New York Times doctrine assumes that con-
sumers of information are supposed to question, not necessarily to believe, what they read 
and hear.”); cf. generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First 
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 799 (discussing assumptions about audience’s inter-
pretive capabilities in First Amendment cases and proposing that courts assume rational 
audiences in order to respect autonomy interests). 
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judgments is sound but also that the source of such foundation is ap-
propriately attributed.309 
 Various reputation-related doctrines concern acts of impersona-
tion or false attribution. Trademark infringement is an example of im-
personation in the commercial context, in which the defendant, by us-
ing the plaintiff’s trademark, positions itself as the plaintiff in the 
marketplace and thus is able to provide false inputs toward the forma-
tion of the plaintiff’s reputation. False implied endorsement and right 
of publicity claims have the same concern, in that the plaintiff’s voice is 
used without authorization to speak on behalf of the product.310 Defa-
mation, although this is not immediately obvious, also involves an im-
personation of sorts, in that the defendant, by asserting certain facts 
about the plaintiff as truth, is falsely constructing the plaintiff’s identity. 
Indeed, in some cases, as when the defendant is alleged to have falsely 
attributed statements to the plaintiff in a way that causes reputational 
injury, libel is directly an act of impersonation, as the defendant’s ac-
tions put words in the plaintiff’s mouth.311 (This may also help to ex-
                                                                                                                      
309 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, 
and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1345, 1365 (2009) (encouraging courts to consider, 
“[i]n a conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment,” whether the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s persona “results in a type of compelled or forced speech” 
on the part of the plaintiff); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying 
Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 587, 592–93, 595 (2008) (reviewing social science litera-
ture confirming that source matters to perceived credibility of claim but noting that know-
ledge of source may have positive or negative effects, depending on the source’s credibility 
or popularity); Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated 
Ads, and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 721, 747–48 (2010) (also reviewing 
social science literature confirming importance of source for perceived credibility). 
310 One court has used the privacy tort to accommodate the same concern. See Good-
year Tire and Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 184 S.E. 452, 454–55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936) (hold-
ing that impersonation of the plaintiff in telephone calls to the defendants’ competitors to 
acquire confidential information violated the plaintiff’s right to privacy); Recent Deci-
sions, Torts—Right of Privacy—Use of Concept as Substitute Means of Securing Relief—
Impersonation of Non-Competitor as Invasion of Right of Privacy, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1375 
(1936) (noting of Vandergriff that “[t]he high probability of actual commercial injury cou-
pled with the great difficulties of proof, may indicate some reason for employing the right 
of privacy rationale in cases of commercial impression”). 
311 See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510–11 (1991) (con-
sidering a defamation suit based on misquoting of the plaintiff in a magazine interview); 
cf. Geoffrey Nunberg, Have It My Way, in The Way We Talk Now 193, 193 (2001) (noting 
that utterances like a “Kick me” sign cause the bearer to be “implicit in the utterance” and 
concluding that “[t]his is about the most powerful magic you can work with writing, put-
ting a first-person pronoun into somebody else’s mouth”); Tiersma, supra note 129, at 314 
(suggesting that defamatory language should require “that the speaker perform the illocu-
tionary act of accusing,” meaning that it “attribute[s] responsibility to a specific person for 
a discreditable or blameworthy act or state of affairs”). 
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plain why statements about a group are generally not remediable under 
defamation law, because one cannot generally impersonate a group.312) 
And copyright infringement suits, when used to vindicate reputational 
interests, are an example of the appropriation of the author’s voice 
through his or her work. By using a recording artist’s song at a cam-
paign appearance, for example, a political candidate is potentially sug-
gesting the artist’s endorsement of the candidate as much as if the artist 
were there performing the song herself. 
 By contrast, various doctrines recognize that statements that do 
not pose attributional difficulties are not appropriate targets of liability, 
even though such statements may cause reputational harms. For exam-
ple, defamation law excludes statements of “pure opinion” from the 
scope of liability despite their potential effect—the opinion of a re-
spected film critic that a famous director has no talent313—because it is 
clear that the source of the opinion is the defendant and not the plain-
tiff. Additionally, because the persona of a public figure is both created 
by and, in part, belongs to the public, a defendant must do more than 
simply make a false statement before he can be accused of wrongfully 
speaking on behalf of the public-figure plaintiff—as the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence indicates, he must be speaking with actual malice 
(a state of mind which indicates, at least, a disregard of the conse-
quences of impersonation and, in some cases, an intent to imperson-
ate).314 Likewise, parodies are generally protected speech under several 
doctrines, including defamation, copyright infringement, and trade-
                                                                                                                      
312 Cf. Epstein, supra note 2, at 793 (noting that to denounce a group “is to refer to 
everyone and no one at the same time”); Lidsky, supra note 302, at 1094 (“Preserving the 
dignity of a group, as opposed to an individual, has not been deemed a sufficient harm to 
overcome constitutional objects to speech regulation.”). 
313 Jeremy Cohen, Diana Mutz, Clifford Nass & Laurie Mason, Experimental Test of Some 
Notions of the Fact/Opinion Distinction in Libel, 66 Journalism Q. 11, 247 (1989) (reporting 
research suggesting that “opinions may be quite capable of carrying a defamatory reputa-
tional sting at least as damaging as any factual statement”). 
314 John C.P. Goldberg, Judging Reputation: Realism and Common Law in Justice White’s De-
famation Jurisprudence, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1471, 1513 (2003) (“[A] person eager for public 
attention cedes his autonomy—his ability to define himself.”); Magaziner, supra note 149, 
at 991 (“Just as the public figure who has sought fame cannot be given the same protection 
against defamation as the private individual who has not relinquished his privacy, the 
manufacturer or seller which has sought commercial acceptance of its product cannot 
reasonably expect legal protection against occasional disparagement. Disparagement is an 
indication of a product’s fame just as defamation is a reflection of personal fame.”); Joan 
E. Schaffner, Note, Protection of Reputation Versus Freedom of Expression: Striking a Manageable 
Compromise in the Tort of Defamation, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 433, 464 (1990) (noting that “gen-
eral-purpose public figures are more vulnerable to injury by the very nature of their noto-
riety because they depend upon public endorsement for their livelihood”). 
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mark infringement, in part because the impersonation concerns are 
minimized—in other words, parodies will typically be understood to be 
the defendant’s speech and not the plaintiff’s.315 
 In sum, taking audience interests into account in cases involving 
alleged reputational harms provides a more complete view of the issues 
at stake. Without a consideration of such interests, disputes concerning 
reputation are likely to be assessed as a conflict only between the auton-
omy or right to self-definition of the individual or corporate holder of 
the reputation and the speech rights of the defendant speaker who is at 
risk of being silenced.316 When broader societal interests are men-
tioned, they are typically discussed as the collective result of enhanced 
speech rights of potential defendants—in other words, that society will 
be better off if there is a multiplicity of voices in the intellectual or 
commercial marketplace.317 The audience-interest view provides addi-
tional justification for the law’s interest in reputation. The recognition 
that reputation is a result of collective community judgment, and that 
such judgments enable members of that community to engage in social 
and commercial interactions, highlights the importance of creditable 
information as an input into that process.318 
                                                                                                                      
315 See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 
366 (4th Cir. 2001) (“A parody must convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody. 
To the extent that an alleged parody conveys only the first message, it is not only a poor 
parody but also vulnerable under trademark law, since the customer will be confused.”) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ramsey, supra note 6, at 
917–19 (discussing First Amendment–related defenses to impersonation claims). In some 
cases, courts may be able to assume that the relevant audience will recognize a parody or 
other use of the plaintiff’s work to be the defendant’s speech and not the plaintiff’s; in 
other cases, evidence will be required. As others have noted, this evidence may well be 
influenced by what courts communicate to the public regarding lawful uses of others’ 
work. See, e.g. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 51 (2008) (noting that if 
filmmakers “were generally free to use songs without the copyright holders’ permission 
and most film audiences knew that, few would regard [the use of another’s song in a film 
soundtrack] as saying one thing or another about [the recording artist’s] own beliefs”). 
316 Cf. e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757 
(1985) (plurality opinion) (characterizing judicial task in defamation cases as “balanc[ing] 
the State’s interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation 
against the First Amendment interest in protecting . . . expression”). 
317 Gillette, supra note 32, at 1193 (“[T]he broad privileges that have been applied in 
areas involving public officials and public figures essentially recognize that net social bene-
fits may be obtained by subordinating an individual’s interest in reputation, even though 
that requires tolerating certain falsehoods about the individual.”). 
318 Cf., e.g., Volokh, supra note 304, at 1093 (“[I]n a free speech regime, others’ defini-
tions of me should primarily be molded by their own judgments, rather than by my using 
legal coercion to keep them in the dark.”). 
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 How, then, should the law reflect an audience-focused interest in 
reputation? This Article considers two proposals below: greater atten-
tion to the reputational interest in cases in which harm to reputation 
appears to be at issue, and a greater accommodation of audience inter-
ests in the consideration of remedy. Each relates to the overall audience 
interest in a reliable information flow—the former relating to the in-
formation provided by the community, and the latter relating to the 
information provided to the community. 
A. Focusing on the Reputational Interest 
 Reputational harm occurs when dissemination of information 
about an individual or entity causes others to form a collective judg-
ment that has the potential to result in a change in relationship or atti-
tude.319 Although various types of information can result in reputa-
tional harm, the audience’s interest in reputation is reflected most 
clearly when the law prohibits the dissemination of false information 
that frustrates the audience’s ability to make reputation-related judg-
ments.320 True information, by contrast, does not pose the same risk to 
the community’s decision-making process. Thus, while an individual or 
corporation may have an interest in restricting the publication of true 
but private information, the law’s vindication of that interest cannot 
truly be justified in terms of protecting one’s reputation. To the extent 
the law provides a remedy for the disclosure of true information, as in 
the public disclosure of private facts tort, that remedy should be justi-
fied on grounds other than redressing reputational harm. Courts that 
allow assertions of an individual plaintiff’s emotional distress or general 
harm to a firm’s business interests to serve as evidence of reputational 
harm risk confusing the side effects of reputational injury with the in-
                                                                                                                      
319 Anderson, supra note 93, at 765–67 (identifying four types of reputational harms that 
involve relational injuries: disrupting the plaintiff’s existing relationships with others, disrupt-
ing future relationships with others, harming the plaintiff’s existing public image, and put-
ting the plaintiff in the public eye unfavorably); Lidsky, supra note 74, at 6 (“[H]arm to repu-
tation is socially constructed: it is defined more by its effect on the ‘others’ who make up the 
plaintiff’s ‘community’ than by its effect on the individual plaintiff.”). Anderson asserts that 
injury to public image “occurs despite the absence of any relationship,” but this is not wholly 
accurate, since one’s image is formed in the view of others. Anderson, supra note 93, at 765. 
320 Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in The Next Digital Dec-
ade: Essays on the Future of the Internet 293, 294 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 
2010) (defining “reputational information” as “information about an actor’s past perform-
ance that helps predict the actor’s future ability to perform or to satisfy the decision-maker’s 
preferences”); id. at 299 (describing ways in which the accuracy of reputational information 
can be distorted, such as through the dissemination of false information). 
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jury itself. In this vein, courts would do well to heed the capacity of the 
word “reputation” to encompass a wide variety of interests—hurt feel-
ings, frustration of autonomy, and the like—not all of which reflect a 
community-based assessment and many of which risk engendering a 
correspondingly broad and unfocused legal response. Claiming a gen-
eral harm to “reputation” without clarifying the nature of that harm 
denies courts the opportunity to test that assertion by reference to the 
appropriate community.321 
 This increased attention to the scope of the claimed reputational 
harm could be accomplished through a variety of means. Courts could 
develop, in the tradition of Warren and Brandeis, a separate tort more 
specifically directed to reputational injury. As with the development of 
the privacy tort, a distinct reputation-related tort would attempt to 
weave together the strands threaded throughout the various existing 
tort doctrines, thereby allowing courts to more closely monitor the 
means-end relationship between harm and liability. For example, al-
though defamation and false light privacy are often distinguished on 
the grounds that the communication at issue in a defamation case must 
be defamatory while the communication in a false light privacy case 
need be “highly offensive to a reasonable person,” many statements will 
satisfy both requirements,322 and so one might question whether it is 
worthwhile to maintain what turns out to be an illusory difference. 
 It is not clear, however, that such a broad approach is required in 
order to ensure that audience interests in reputation are represented. 
Warren and Brandeis’s proposal was inspired by a sense that no body of 
law at the time allowed individuals to vindicate what they believed was 
an important core interest—the “right to be let alone” —leading courts 
to shape the facts of cases before them so that they could be addressed 
by existing torts.323 Here, by contrast, the diffuseness is not caused by 
the absence of a legal remedy for reputational injury; rather, the con-
cern is that existing doctrine has become unmoored from the harm it 
                                                                                                                      
321 Many thanks to Talha Syed and Mark McKenna for encouraging me to clarify these 
points. 
322 Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 902–03 (Colo. 2002) (“We believe that 
recognition of the different interests protected rests primarily on parsing a too subtle dis-
tinction between an individual’s personal sensibilities and his or her reputation in the 
community.”); Gannett Co. v. Anderson, 947 So.2d 1, 10 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding 
that, “in practice, nearly all false light cases involve a claim that the false impression 
harmed the plaintiff’s reputation”). 
323 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 247, at 193, 207–13 (noting that courts used, inter 
alia, breach of contract or trade secret law to address privacy-related harms). 
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aims to vindicate because courts have paid insufficient attention to the 
true meaning of “reputation.” 
 Courts might, alternatively, refocus cases on core reputational in-
terests by favoring doctrines in which audience interests are typically 
central, such as defamation and trademark infringement claims. Many 
reputational harms could, as the discussion in Part III suggests, be pled 
as more than one tort.324 The unauthorized use of a celebrity’s voice in 
an advertisement, for example, might well be pled as defamation (in 
that the use falsely suggests that the celebrity has acquiesced to such ac-
tivities) or as an unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act (in 
that the use falsely suggests endorsement).325 Although courts and 
commentators have attempted to outline the boundaries of the various 
torts,326 there is still enough overlap such that litigants are likely to plead 
a set of facts under whichever tort is most likely to maximize their 
chances of recovery.327 William Van Alstyne has described ways in which 
a plaintiff injured by a particular publication can easily recharacterize 
the nature of the harm to avoid procedural or other constraints: the un-
                                                                                                                      
324 See supra notes 120–298 and accompanying text. 
325 See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259–60 (1st Cir. 1962) (reversing 
the lower court’s dismissal of a complaint pleading both theories, although focusing in the 
unfair competition claim on the dilution of the commercial value of plaintiff’s voice). 
326 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (noting that the 
false light tort protects a reputational interest, while the right of publicity protects a prop-
erty interest); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, 769 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The 
false-light tort, to the extent distinct from the tort of defamation (but there is indeed con-
siderable overlap), rests on an awareness that people who are made to seem pathetic or 
ridiculous may be shunned, and not just people who are thought to be dishonest or in-
competent or immoral.”); Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co., 276 S.W.3d 319, 324 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2008) (noting that in defamation cases, “the interest sought to be protected is the 
objective one of reputation, either economic, political, or personal, in the outside world,” 
while in privacy cases, “the interest affected is the subjective one of injury to the person’s 
right to be let alone”); Kwall, supra note 309, at 1345–46 (noting that the right of publicity 
is typically seen as providing a means of compensation for use of the plaintiff’s persona, 
while the right of privacy provides compensation for “hurt feelings”); Daniel J. Solove & 
Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1650, 1659 
n.41 (2009) (noting that the “principle difference between false light and defamation is 
the theory of damages,” in that “[f]alse light remedies false statements that cause emo-
tional or psychological injuries, while defamation remedies false statements that cause 
damage to a person’s reputation”). 
327 See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 1, Fox News Network LLC v. Robin Carnahan for Senate, Inc., 
No. 4:10-cv-00906–GAF (W.D. Mo. Sept. 15, 2010) (bringing claims for copyright in-
fringement, right of publicity, and invasion of privacy based on unauthorized use in politi-
cal campaign of footage of news reporter “to [make] it appear—falsely—that [plaintiffs 
network and reporter] . . . are endorsing [politician’s] campaign for United States Sen-
ate”); id. ¶ 44 (use of news clip “created the false impression that Wallace was not an objec-
tive reporter but rather had endorsed Defendant”). 
2011] The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience 1427 
authorized use of a celebrity’s photograph on the front cover of a gossip 
magazine, for example, might be alleged as a violation of the celebrity’s 
publicity rights or as defamation.328 Likewise, Diane Zimmerman sug-
gests that plaintiffs often sue both for defamation and for false light in-
vasion of privacy (prevailing, if they do, on the defamation claim) or 
have false light claims treated by the court as defamation claims.329 The 
duplicative nature of many of these efforts is recognized by courts that 
ensure that successful plaintiffs do not obtain a double recovery; thus, a 
plaintiff who brings claims both for false implied endorsement and for 
right of publicity, based on the same misappropriation of reputation, 
will typically obtain, if successful, only one award.330 
 Cabining plaintiff’s options at the outset may therefore help to 
focus the courts’ and the parties’ attention on the reputational interest 
when present and thus make it more likely that all claims based on re-
putational harm will be assessed similarly. The defamation and trade-
mark infringement torts in particular are useful models to consider, as 
both are sensitive to audience reception as a measure of reputational 
harm. Both doctrines also focus on the importance of accurate trans-
mission flow as the way to vindicate that interest, and both doctrines 
incorporate a sensitivity to First Amendment–related discourse in ways 
that benefit audiences as well as speakers. Under this approach, a plain-
tiff attempting to use the public disclosure of private facts tort to vindi-
cate a reputational interest would be encouraged, via threat of dismissal 
or other adverse action, to present her claim as defamation (to which, 
of course, the defense of truth would apply). 
 This framework would draw from jurisprudence such as the Su-
preme Court’s decision in the 1988 case Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
in which the Court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to plead as inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress the harm resulting from a satirical 
                                                                                                                      
328 See Van Alstyne, supra note 288, at 809–14; see also David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. 
Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser: How Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity to Termi-
nate Non-Defamatory Political Speech, 45 Santa Clara L. Rev. 651, 653 (2005) (“[P]ublic 
figures often turn to rights of publicity to avoid the New York Times standard. Although 
such suits are not always successful, courts are often more sympathetic to right of publicity 
claims than to defamation claims.”). 
329 Zimmerman, supra note 59, at 367 n.16; see also Kelso, supra note 278, at 785 (stat-
ing that for most cases, “[f]alse light is on the periphery, and the core of the case lies else-
where”); Kate Silbaugh, Comment, Sticks and Stones Can Break My Name: Nondefamatory Neg-
ligent Injury to Reputation, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865, 877–78 (1992) (discussing plaintiffs’ 
attempts to evade procedural requirements of the defamation tort by characterizing their 
claims as other torts); Wade, supra note 284, at 1121 (noting an overlap between defama-
tion and privacy torts). 
330 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1112 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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advertisement in the defendant’s magazine suggesting that the plaintiff 
had had sexual relations with his mother; such claims, the Court held, 
were subject to the same First Amendment limitations as defamation 
claims.331 Other courts have expressed similar skepticism when pre-
sented with attempts to plead reputation-related claims as torts other 
than defamation, particularly when the injury alleged appears to relate 
to a harm caused by a statement disseminated to the public.332 The line 
drawing that such an approach requires is difficult but not impossible: 
it requires a focus both on the nature of the harm and on the act of the 
defendant that allegedly caused it, rather than solely on the nature of 
the damages that the plaintiff has sought. If, for example, the plaintiff’s 
case can be reduced to the claim that “the defendant made statements 
that harmed the plaintiff” in the eyes of the community, or if the plain-
tiff would have been unlikely to complain of the defendant’s actions if 
the effect on the plaintiff’s reputation had been positive rather than 
negative, such observations suggest that the harm at issue may be repu-
tational.333 
 In many of these cases, however, the courts’ concern arises from 
the belief that the plaintiff is engaging in artful pleading in order to 
                                                                                                                      
331 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); see also, e.g., Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1184 
(Cal. 1986) (“First Amendment limitations are applicable to all claims, of whatever label, 
whose gravamen is the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement.”) 
332 See, e.g., Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 1995); Desnick v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting trespass and fraud claims 
relating to an investigative journalism television program involving hidden cameras, not-
ing that investigative journalism “is entitled to all the safeguards with which the Supreme 
Court has surrounded liability for defamation. And it is entitled to them regardless of the 
name of the tort, and, we add, regardless of whether the tort suit is aimed at the content of 
the broadcast or the production of the broadcast”) (citation omitted); Jorgensen v. Mass. 
Port Auth., 905 F.2d 515, 520 (1st Cir. 1990) (suggesting that “where there is an alleged 
injury to reputation and a communication, the plaintiff’s claim sounds in defamation de-
spite any attempt to characterize it otherwise”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. 
Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 274 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that to allow defamation of a corpora-
tion to serve as the basis for a wrongful interference with business relations case would 
“enabl[e] the plaintiff to avoid the specific limitations with which the law of defamation—
presumably to some purpose—is hedged about”). 
333 See Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs., 499 F.3d 520, 533 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(calling “the ‘defendant made statements that harmed the plaintiff’ injury” a “classic ex-
ample of reputational . . . harm”); see also Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1057–
1058 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of product disparagement and tortious interfer-
ence with business relationships claims given summary judgment on defamation claim); 
Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 895 n.5 (1st Cir. 1988) (con-
cluding that defamation doctrine’s First Amendment limitations did not apply to a breach 
of contract claim seeking reputation-related damages because the defendant’s cancellation 
of the contract with the plaintiff “was not intended to be a form of symbolic speech or a 
‘statement’”). 
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avoid the constitutional restrictions, statute of limitations, or other im-
pediments that would apply if the tort were otherwise characterized.334 
In Hustler v. Falwell, for example, the Court noted that the application 
of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to Falwell’s intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim was “necessary to give adequate 
‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the First Amend-
ment.”335 But this concern is not particularly present where the con-
cern is a lack of attention to audience interests. The constitutional and 
statute of limitations restrictions are focused primarily on the defen-
dant’s interests in swift resolution of pending matters and the freedom 
to speak on important issues without fear of liability; they are not di-
rectly concerned with the quality of the transmission of information to 
audiences. Put otherwise, the failure to more fully accommodate audi-
ence interests in reputation-related cases is not the result of plaintiffs’ 
strategic behavior; rather, it is simply the result of the perspective en-
couraged by the bilateral model of litigation. Thus, while defamation 
and trademark infringement doctrine provide useful models for con-
sideration of community interests, particularly in helping to determine 
how best to gauge community reaction,336 it is not necessary, for the 
purposes of such interests, to require plaintiffs to plead their claims 
under those two torts. 
 Rather than restructure tort doctrine more dramatically, then, 
courts might be encouraged simply to give more attention to whether 
the plaintiff is asserting a reputation-related interest under whatever 
torts are the subject of the complaint; if so, the parties should be ex-
pected to present at least some evidence of the effect of the challenged 
statement on the relevant community’s judgment and conduct. Even 
this more modest approach will likely require some definitional work at 
                                                                                                                      
334 Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 249 (5th Cir. 1984) (“It is clear that publications al-
leged to constitute invasions of privacy merit the same constitutional protections as do 
publications alleged to be defamatory.”); Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 7 (rejecting an attempt 
to circumvent a two-year statute of limitations for defamation actions by pleading facts 
under a false light privacy theory); Zimmerman, supra note 59, at 396 (noting that “solid 
reasons support treating all cases sounding in injury to reputation according to the same 
rules so that success or failure in litigation does not become a game of artful pleading”). 
335 Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56. In Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., the 
Court accepted the view of the lower appellate court, without deciding, that the New York 
Times v. Sullivan rule also applied to product disparagement cases. 466 U.S. 485, 513 
(1984). 
336 Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark Law and the Social Construction of Trust: Creating the 
Legal Framework for Online Identity, 83 Wash U. L.Q. 1773, 1740 (2005) (recommending 
borrowing from trademark law concepts “to account for the collective way [online] reputa-
tion is created”). 
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the outset. For example, it will be important not to conflate a change in 
reputation with a change in cultural meaning or associations. When an 
image of John Wayne is recontextualized to challenge traditional icons 
of masculinity,337 this is not a reputational harm (assuming the actor 
were alive to pursue such a claim). The act may challenge viewers to 
think more deeply about gender and sexuality issues, and it may well be 
the case that some viewers will subsequently not be able to see an image 
of John Wayne without calling the alternative image to mind. But these 
new associations are not reputation-related because they do not cause 
viewers to form a judgment about Wayne’s qualities or characteristics 
based on actions or beliefs attributed to Wayne himself.338 In other 
words, it is very likely that the relevant audience will interpret such al-
ternative representations as self-consciously positioning themselves 
against an existing reputation rather than concluding that such repre-
sentations attempt to speak for or impersonate Wayne. 
 Testing that assertion—in other words, determining whether repu-
tational harm has occurred or is likely to occur as opposed to the ex-
tent of that harm339—is both difficult and important.340 The touch-
stone, given the social construction of reputation, is a consideration of 
the view of the relevant audience to determine the likelihood of an atti-
tude, behavioral, or opinion change.341 Thus, the goal in assessing the 
                                                                                                                      
 
337 See Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 
Tex. L. Rev. 923, 958 (1999); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular 
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 125, 144–45 (1993). 
338 Cf. McNamara, supra note 13, at 159 (contending that statements that merely in-
cite others to avoid doing business with the plaintiff—such as the false statement that the 
plaintiff individual is deceased or that the plaintiff firm is no longer operational—should 
not be actionable defamation “if the purpose of defamation law is to protect reputation”). 
339 This is not to say that there is automatically a remedy whenever a reputational harm 
is identified. Certain other policy interests, such as newsworthiness, may warrant a finding 
in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing and Publ’g, 208 
F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding no remedy, based on a certified question to the New 
York Court of Appeals, under New York privacy law when plaintiff’s photograph was used 
to illustrate a magazine advice column, even though the publication might have created 
the false impression that the plaintiff was the subject of the column). 
340 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (noting that the 
common law presumption of damages in defamation cases is “an oddity of tort law, for it 
allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss”). 
Indeed, the difficulty of such proof was thought, at least in part, to underlie the common 
law doctrine of presumed damages in certain types of defamation cases. See Post, supra 
note 1, at 697–99 (discussing how presumed damages are difficult to justify via a concep-
tion of reputation as property). 
341 Calvert, supra note 31, at 939 (describing “two basic ways in which reputational 
harm is manifested: (1) attitude and opinion change, in the negative direction, toward the 
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existence of reputational harm should be, first, to define the relevant 
audience whose attitude counts342 and, second, to determine how a 
change in attitude is to be measured. The first question relates to the 
“reputation for what?” inquiry. For both individuals and for corpora-
tions, the reputational assessment may well be multidimensional. An 
individual might have a different reputation with respect to different 
audiences: one’s reputation in the workplace might be different from 
one’s reputation in one’s social circle, which may be different yet again 
from one’s reputation as a writer or performer. Likewise, a brand might 
have one reputation in one community and a second reputation in an-
other, such as when brands come to be adopted by different communi-
ties over time.343 Thus, a more coherent assessment of reputational 
                                                                                                                      
plaintiff; and (2) physical or behavioral change, also in the negative direction, toward the 
plaintiff”). 
Logically, if defamation requires a detrimental change in readers’ opinions 
towards an individual, and not merely the distress suffered by the individual 
when he or she sees the publication or knows that others see it, then the de-
termination of whether the tort has occurred hinges on numerous variables. 
These variables include the readers’ pre-publication attitude toward the 
plaintiff, the readers’ pre-publication attitude toward the media defendant, 
and the persuasive potency of the statement—all interchanging within the 
dynamic social setting of the community. 
David McCraw, How Do Readers Read?: Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41 Cath. U. L. Rev. 
81, 84 (1991). 
342 Cf., e.g., McNamara, supra note 13, at 36 (suggesting that the evaluation of reputa-
tion by a community “always rests upon some sense of who is—and who is not—a part of 
the community”); Tiersma, supra note 129, at 317 (noting that “[t]he law will not provide a 
remedy if the accusation relates to moral standards that are considered antisocial or are 
held by too small a group of people, even if the harm to the victim is very real,” such as 
falsely stating that a drug dealer is an undercover narcotics agent) (footnotes omitted). 
343 Bromley, supra note 13, at 1. 
In so far as there are channels of communication and overlapping member-
ship between groups, information and influence are likely to be transmitted 
from one group to another and diffused throughout the wider community. It 
is possible, however, for opinions and beliefs to circulate among members 
within a group without people outside the group being party to them. 
Id.; Berger & Ward, supra note 73, at 559 (“The meaning of consumption (e.g., brands, 
products, and cultural tastes) is not static, and it can shift based on the social identity of 
the individuals who hold those tastes.”). The development of different reputational signals 
in different communities may involve issues of race, gender, and socioeconomic status, to 
name just a few categories. See Douglas Century, Jay-Z Puts a Cap on Cristal, N.Y. Times, July 
2, 2006, at H1 (describing a protest by the rap artist Jay-Z in reaction to unfavorable com-
ments by the president of a champagne producer regarding the association of the brand 
with hip-hop music). 
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harm would determine, at the outset, the nature of the reputational 
interest and the community that bears responsibility for constructing it. 
 The second question encompasses both an inquiry as to which 
judgments count within a community and a consideration of the use of 
empirical evidence. Because reputation is based on a collective social 
judgment, idiosyncratic or outlier opinions should probably not be giv-
en much, if any, weight.344 But here, as in other areas of the law, courts 
will have to consider whether the law’s approach to audience percep-
tions should be reflective or normative, as well as the extent to which 
the law itself shapes those perceptions. For example, if a recording art-
ist alleges that a politician’s use of his song at a campaign appearance 
conveys the false message that the recording artist endorses the candi-
date, should the law provide a remedy so long as some cognizable per-
centage of the relevant audience perceives such an endorsement, or 
should the law deny a remedy on the grounds that the perception 
should be normatively discouraged?345 To be sure, in various areas of 
the law, courts do not acknowledge every instance of confusion or de-
ception among audiences; New York Times v. Sullivan, which permits 
some false information to circulate regarding public figures,346 is but 
one example. And, of course, courts will occasionally hold that, under 
the circumstances, “no reasonable person” could hold a particular be-
lief about the plaintiff;347 the law would descend into meaninglessness 
if courts could not so determine. 
                                                                                                                     
 But this doesn’t necessarily mean that courts should always impose 
their views about what are appropriate judgments within a particular 
community by crediting only those views that are “reasonable,” as is the 
 
344 See, e.g., Bromley, supra note 13, at 17 (suggesting that one’s reputation “can be de-
fined either as the sum of all the attributions [given by others], including those that are 
idiosyncratic, or more simply, as the attributions that are widely shared”). 
345 Cf. Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 394 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(“[T]he Lanham Act protects against misleading and false statements of fact, not misun-
derstood statements.”); Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir. 
2000) (rejecting survey evidence as the basis for determining the meaning of advertising 
claims);  Netanel, supra note 315, at 50–52 (suggesting that “[a]uthors do have a cogniza-
ble speech interest in refraining from appearing to convey or endorse a message that is not 
their own” but noting that this speech interest “is contingent on social practices and per-
ceptions that are themselves contingent on whether authors enjoy exclusive rights”). 
346 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
347 See, e.g., Mason v. Jews for Jesus, No. 06 Civ. 6433 (RMB), 2006 WL 3230279, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006) (declining to issue a preliminary injunction against the distribu-
tion of a pamphlet using comedian Jackie Mason’s name and caricature, in part because 
no reasonable reader of the pamphlet, in context, would believe that Mason had endorsed 
the defendant organization). 
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standard in defamation doctrine and trademark law.348 If the focus of 
reputational harm is judgment by a particular community, it is difficult 
to justify rejecting evidence of a change in assessment simply because 
the community experience is not one shared by the trier of fact. More-
over, decision makers may be susceptible to what communications schol-
ars have called the “third-person effect” —the concept that “people feel 
media messages will have more influence on others than on themselves” 
and so overestimate the reputational harm of a given statement.349 
While the effect of any particular communication on an audience is 
rarely simple to determine,350 the difficulties involved in asking deci-
sion-makers to surmise the reputational effect of a statement on a com-
munity with which they may not be familiar suggests that the more di-
rect evidence of attitudinal change that can be derived directly from the 
community at issue, the better the assessment of reputational harm will 
be. 
 Notably, when copyright law, trademark anti-dilution law, privacy 
law, and the right of publicity are used to vindicate reputational inter-
ests, the community’s response is not frequently present in the consid-
                                                                                                                      
348 See McCraw, supra note 341, at 100. 
Although interested in readers’ response and not just the words themselves, 
the reasonable reader approach is not synonymous with the pure positivist 
approach, an approach that focuses on the meaning actually given to the 
words by those who read them, no matter how unreasonable, and allows for 
multiple meanings across the community of readers. 
Id. 
349 Jeremy Cohen & Albert C. Gunther, Libel as Communication Phenomena, 9 Comm. & 
L. 9, 17 (1987); see also Jeremy Cohen et al., Perceived Impact of Defamation: An Experiment on 
Third-Person Effects, 52 Pub. Opinion Q. 161, 171–72 (1988) (reporting the results of a 
study suggesting the existence of a more robust third-person effect for defamatory com-
munications the larger the readership group (e.g., national readership versus local reader-
ship)); W. Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 Pub. Opinion Q. 1, 
3 (1983) (defining the effect as a hypothesis that “people will tend to overestimate the 
influence that mass communications have on the attitudes and behavior of others”); Lau-
rie Mason, Newspaper as Repeater: An Experiment on Defamation and Third-Person Effect, 72 
Journalism & Mass Comm. Q. 610, 616–17 (1995) (reporting results of an experiment 
suggesting that the third-person effect is likely to be more robust when a defamatory mes-
sage is conveyed by a republisher such as a newspaper). 
350 Cohen & Gunther, supra note 349, at 21; Lidsky, supra note 74, at 45–47 (arguing 
that courts should be more upfront about the social implications of this analysis); McCraw, 
supra note 341, at 82 n.10 (asserting that the use of social science and survey research in 
defamation cases is more difficult than its use in trademark cases because “empirical re-
search must account for diverse variables reflecting how individuals define and evaluate 
‘reputation’”); id. at 90 (“[T]he idea that there is a simple and direct causal relationship 
between the mass-communicated message and its cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral 
effects on an audience no longer prevails in communications research.”). 
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eration of reputational harm. Because copyright’s harms are largely fo-
cused on unlawful uses of the work that deprive the author of economic 
benefits, an author who uses copyright law to vindicate reputational in-
terests need not make any showing that the challenged use has caused 
harm to her reputation. Likewise, although the Lanham Act defines “di-
lution by tarnishment” as an “association arising from the similarity be-
tween a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputa-
tion of the famous mark,” the statute suggests no factors whatsoever for 
courts to take into account to determine when a mark’s reputation has 
been harmed.351 Privacy law, similarly, focuses on the circumstances of 
the dissemination of the information at issue, not on the public recep-
tion to that information. A more rigorous focus on audience reaction to 
ameliorate these concerns may increase the costs of litigation in that it 
may call for surveys, expert testimony, or other empirical evidence. But 
costs may be saved in other respects: if reputational injury is the real 
harm at issue, narrowing the issues to those truly in dispute may save 
litigation costs overall. Moreover, a focus on audience does not require 
mathematical certainty; it simply requires enough evidence so that a 
court can determine that it is truly reputational harm, and not merely 
the plaintiff’s hurt feelings, for which the plaintiff is seeking compensa-
tion.352 Determining whether a change in attitude toward the plaintiff 
has taken place that arises from false information attributed to the 
plaintiff should be at the core of this analysis. 
 Admittedly, it will not always be apparent when reputational claims 
are at issue. Even after the recent guidance of the Supreme Court on 
the requirements of federal pleading standards,353 plaintiffs are not re-
quired to delineate the interests they are attempting to vindicate, so 
long as they adequately allege the facts necessary to support the cause of 
action pleaded. Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s allegations as to the nature 
and scope of the injury suffered and the damages requested may pro-
                                                                                                                      
351 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(2)(C) (2006). By contrast, the statute suggests six factors that 
courts may take into account to determine when a mark is likely to cause dilution by blur-
ring. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
352 Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (deeming unlawful uses of a trademark that are like-
ly to cause confusion); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 cmt. d (1977) (noting that 
a defamatory statement need only have the tendency to harm one’s reputation); see also 
Lidsky, supra note 74, at 7 (noting that courts in defamation cases “rarely resort to polls, 
surveys or even witness testimony to determine the values held by the community segment 
but instead rely on their own personal knowledge and intuitive judgments which they sub-
sequently label common knowledge and common sense”); id. at 44–45 (recommending 
that defamation law require proof of actual harm to reputation). 
353 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 554–63 (2007). 
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vide a clue as to the interest at stake, and discovery may flesh things out 
further as the case approaches summary judgment or other resolution. 
B. The Nature of the Remedy 
 A focus on audience interests and reception may also provide 
guidance on the scope of an appropriate remedy. Although monetary 
damages are typically awarded in many cases involving reputational in-
jury,354 such awards tend to serve as a proxy for the degree of emo-
tional harm alleged to have been felt by the plaintiff as a result of the 
harm to her reputation or, in the case of a business, the loss of selling 
power of the mark.355 There is, however, an uneasy fit between mone-
tary awards and various justifications for the legal protection of reputa-
tion, particularly those that do not conceive of reputation as a property 
interest.356 Monetary damages, while perhaps satisfying to the plaintiff, 
do not on their own provide any benefit for audiences;357 indeed, some 
commentators have suggested that the availability of the judicial proc-
ess for a public airing of the dispute vindicates the plaintiff’s interests in 
this regard more than does a monetary award.358 A focus on audience 
interests, therefore, might counsel more attention to disclaimers, re-
tractions, and other forms of information correction as an appropriate 
                                                                                                                      
354 See Barrett, supra note 93, at 853 (providing critical commentary). 
355 See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104 (“We have no doubt, in light of general tort liability prin-
ciples, that where the misappropriation of identity causes injury to reputation, compensa-
tion for such injury is appropriate.”); Smolla, supra note 207, at 19 (“[I]t seems clear that 
the bulk of the money paid out in damage awards in defamation suits is to compensate for 
psychic injury, rather than to compensate for any objectively verifiable damage to one’s 
community standing.”). 
356 Post, supra note 1, at 727 (noting that compensation “is compatible only with the 
concept of reputation as property. Reputation as dignity is not a value susceptible to objec-
tive measurement; and the paramount goal of a defamation law designed to protect dig-
nity would not be compensation, but rehabilitation.”); see also, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Mead 
Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that it is “virtually impossible to as-
certain the precise economic consequences of intangible harms, such as damage to repu-
tation and loss of goodwill”). 
357 Cf. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 50, at 446 n.122 (contending that injunctions 
are always appropriate in trademark infringement cases involving confusion as to source or 
responsibility for quality of goods or services). 
358 Bezanson, supra note 108, at 799 (suggesting that “[t]he act of suing itself repre-
sents a public response denying the story, which legitimates the plaintiff’s claim of falsity 
more effectively than any other method”); Emler, supra note 115, at 185–86 (discussing 
research suggesting that “a strategy for protecting one’s reputation is to give others one’s 
own account of” events as well as “arming and priming one’s supporters to defend it on 
one’s behalf”). The amount of an award likely serves an expressive function in that it em-
phasizes the degree of the defendant’s wrongdoing, but that function may be adequately 
served by statements on the record. 
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remedy or as a consideration in determining whether further relief 
from the court is warranted.359 Such a remedy helps to ameliorate is-
sues regarding the falsity of the communication, the attribution or au-
thorization of the plaintiff, and the information flow that audiences 
receive; it involves not only “setting the record straight in a public fo-
rum” but also acting as a public admonishment to the defendant.360 
Taking account of such measures serves defendants’ interests in addi-
tion to audiences’ interests. More tailored remedies are less likely to 
prevent speakers from speaking altogether (or, in the case of copyright 
claims, from using the work at issue) and more likely to recalibrate the 
nature of the information flow by requiring the defendant to speak 
truthful matter on his own behalf. Speakers would therefore not risk 
crippling monetary awards or fear speaking at all due to the chilling 
effect associated with the risk of liability.361 
 There are at least two concerns that arise in considering remedies 
in this context. First, it is unclear whether a court, consistent with the 
First Amendment, could require a defendant to issue a retraction or dis-
claimer in a noncommercial speech context.362 This does not mean, 
however, that such statements should be irrelevant to the question of 
remedy in reputation-related cases. Courts could, for example, take the 
nature and timing of a voluntary retraction into account in determin-
ing whether additional relief is warranted or in considering the scope 
of monetary damages; alternatively, as Paul LeBel has suggested, de-
                                                                                                                      
359 See Lidsky, supra note 308, at 821 n.130 (“It is more troublesome when the govern-
ment forces ignorance on its citizens by withholding information than when it forces 
knowledge on them through disclosure requirements. Mandatory disclosure does not 
compromise autonomy in the same way as withholding information.”); Mark P. McKenna, 
Back to the Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion in Trademark Cases, 14 Lewis & Clark L. 
Rev. 537, 553 (2010) (proposing that courts in trademark cases consider narrow equitable 
remedies, such as disclaimers, more often). 
360 Stanley Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 Va. L. Rev. 785, 
791–92 (1979); see also Bezanson, supra note 108, at 793 (contending that plaintiffs pursue 
libel actions not for monetary relief but rather for “restoring reputation, correcting what 
plaintiffs view as falsity, and vengeance” and that plaintiffs view libel lawsuits “as a form of 
public vindication”). 
361 It should be noted, however, that some plaintiffs may not be in a position to fund 
litigation without the expectation of monetary damages. I thank Lisa Ramsey for highlight-
ing this point. 
362 See Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 680–82 (3d Cir. 1991) (expressing skepti-
cism regarding the court’s ability to order mandatory retractions); cf. Miami Herald Publ’g 
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). 
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fendants could be offered the option of a “remedy of repair” in lieu of 
damages for reputational injury.363 
 Second, it is true that some research indicates that retractions and 
disclaimers do not have the hoped-for effect, and that, by including the 
plaintiff’s name or the substance of the challenged statement itself, 
such disclaimers in fact have the opposite effect from that intended, 
reinforcing the falsehood or misattribution in the minds of the audi-
ence.364 This does not necessarily mean, however, that resort to such 
remedies is futile; rather, it may simply require increased attention to 
the form of the disclosure. Consistent with research demonstrating the 
importance of source to an audience’s willingness to accept a state-
ment, for example, one might encourage courts to provide clearer and 
more definitive statements on the record regarding the reputational 
interest.365 The courts not only, as Robert Post has noted, “speak[] for 
the community at large,” but also speak to the community at large in a 
way that plaintiffs, defendants, and audiences will tend to recognize.366 
                                                                                                                      
363 Paul A. LeBel, Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 779, 788–90 & n.40 (1984) (proposing a “remedy of repair” in which the 
defendant would be required “to explain the defamatory statement, and the circumstances 
that caused the defendant to publish it,” occupying “as much space or time as the defama-
tory communication”). 
364 See, e.g., Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52 (stating that defamatory statements “cause damage to 
an individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however per-
suasive or effective”); Cass R. Sunstein, On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We 
Believe Them, What Can Be Done 46 (2009) (noting that “corrections of false impres-
sions can be futile; they can also actually strengthen those very impressions”). 
365 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 364, at 54 (suggesting that corrections of false rumors 
work when “those hearing the false rumor do not have strong motivations for accepting it, 
if their prior knowledge is weak or nonexistent, and if they trust those who are providing 
the correction”). 
366 Post, supra note 1, at 713. Likewise, 
the spectacle of criminal punishment is much more than a decision about the 
liability of a particular offender. It is also, importantly, a referendum on the 
social standing and worth of the victim. A successful punishment indicates 
that the community values the victim. A failure to punish indicates something 
less—perhaps indifference toward the victim, perhaps even disdain. 
Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1059, 1088 (2007); see also, 
e.g., Skolnick, supra note 112, at 679–680 (“The formal recourse to the courts is thus sym-
bolically significant. The plaintiff perceives the judiciary as a fair, competent, and impartial 
arbiter of the dispute—the only societal institution capable of destigmatizing, of restoring 
the plaintiff’s lost dignity.”). But see Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to 
Current Libel Law, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 809, 816 (1986) (discussing proposal in which an ap-
propriate retraction would preclude a declaratory judgment action for libel, suggesting 
that “an appropriate retraction is preferable to a judicial declaration issued after a dis-
puted hearing” because it “constitutes an admission and publication of the correct facts”). 
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  Additionally, communications research might also be consulted to 
determine the best way in which to phrase a correction or retraction so 
as to ensure maximum effectiveness. For example, much work has been 
done on the appropriate and effective form of product warnings in the 
products liability context given that consumers are expected to read 
such warnings under the law; indeed, a failure-to-warn case posits that 
the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred had an effective warning 
been provided.367 It would therefore be unduly pessimistic, given exist-
ing research, to assume that retractions or disclaimers can never be ef-
fective, no matter what their form of presentation.368 
 This is not to say that monetary damage awards for injury to repu-
tation might not be appropriate in many circumstances. An individual 
who can demonstrate lost employment opportunities or a firm that can 
prove lost sales directly resulting from reputational injury should be 
able to recover those damages. But many cases do not involve such 
damages, and plaintiffs who are alleging unspecified harm merely from 
a change in audience opinion should not be assumed to be entitled to 
monetary damages where an alternative remedy can correct the record 
while not imposing other restraints on the free flow of information.369 
Conclusion 
 The importance of reputation does not mean, of course, that 
harms to reputation need always be redressed legally. Gossip and other 
forms of informal information exchanges play an important role in 
maintaining accurate information flows,370 and various communities 
have developed more elaborate methods of enforcing reputational 
                                                                                                                      
367 See Laura A. Heymann, Reading the Product: Warnings, Disclaimers, and Literary Theory, 
22 Yale J.L. & Human. 393, 396 (2010). 
368 Calvert, supra note 31, at 938 (describing an experiment showing that a repeated 
statement of denial within the same article containing defamatory allegations “may signifi-
cantly mitigate or reduce the extent of harm to reputation caused by defamatory state-
ments”); Carl I. Hovland & Walter Weiss, The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication 
Effectiveness, 15 Pub. Opinion Q. 635, 647 (1951–52) (reporting results of an experiment in 
which “changes in opinion [were] significantly related to the trustworthiness of the source 
used in the communication”). 
369 Cf. McKenna, supra note 359, at 553 (suggesting that a disclaimer that OutKast’s 
song was not endorsed by Rosa Parks would have been a preferable solution to a finding of 
infringement, although noting that a disclaimer remedy would be a second-best result to a 
finding of noninfringement). 
370 See Nicholas Emler, Gossip, Reputation, and Social Adaptation, in Good Gossip 117, 
138 (Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev eds., 1994) (“As an exchange of informa-
tion and observations about the inhabitants of one’s environment, gossip contributes cen-
trally to successful functioning in that environment.”). 
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norms, even in online environments where the attributional norms that 
govern are often related to pseudonyms and screen names. Indeed, it is 
in many of these environments—such as the participant rating systems 
of eBay and other online fora—that the importance of reputation to 
audiences seems most clear. An individual participating in such com-
munities values his or her reputation precisely because it will encourage 
others in the community to engage with him or her; relatedly, the 
community has an interest in ensuring that reputations are built on 
legitimate informational inputs so that those reputational ratings are 
useful grounds on which to base decision making.371 The same con-
cerns should be taken into account when individuals and firms attempt 
to vindicate reputational interests legally. The plaintiff and defendant 
are the parties before the court, but the resolution of their dispute 
necessarily requires the consideration of audience interests. 
 
371 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 41, at 18 (“The very existence of many of the key institu-
tional components of the financial world, including credit rating agencies and audit firms, 
can be explained only by the theory of reputation.”); Paul Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, 
43 Communications of the ACM 45, 47 (2000) (“To operate effectively, reputation sys-
tems require at least three properties: [1] Long-lived entities that inspire an expectation of 
future interaction; [2] Capture and distribution of feedback about current interactions 
(such information must be visible in the future); and [3] Use of feedback to guide trust 
decisions.”). 
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